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Remarks on Scelle's Theory of "Role Splitting"
II. Scelle's Doctrine: its Essential Content
We are now in a position to illustrate Scelle's doctrine of "dédoublement fonctionnel." The great jurist observes at the outset that the "original and persistent flaw of the international legal order" is the lack of legislative, judicial and enforcement organs acting on behalf of the whole community. This being so, and in view of the necessity for any legal order to rest on the three aforementioned functions, the inescapable consequence for Scelle is that the three social functions do exist in the world community, but are organized in a quite unique fashion. As there are no "specifically international rulers and agents" ("gouvernants et agents spécifiquement internationaux"), national members of the executive as well as state officials fulfil a "dual" role: they act as state organs whenever they operate within the national legal system; they act qua international agents when they operate within the international legal system. Thus, when the head of state or the state legislature take part in the formation of a law-making treaty, they act as international law-making bodies; by the same token, any time a domestic court deals with a conflict of law question, it acts qua an international judicial body; similarly, any time one or more state officials undertake an enforcement action (resort to force short of war, reprisals, armed intervention, war proper) they act as international enforcement agencies ("agents exécutifs internationaux").6 To avoid possible misunderstandings, it should be emphasized that for Scelle national officials do not have double roles which are fulfilled simultaneously, but a dual role in the sense that they operate in a Dr. Jakyll and Mr. Hyde manner, exhibiting a split personality. In other words, although from the point of view of their legal status they are and remain national organs, the can function either as national or as international agents.
What I have just recalled applies, in the view of G. Scelle, to classical or traditional international law, which holds sway in a typical "interstate society" ("société interétatique"). With this class of society, Scelle contrasts what he terms the "suprastate society" ("société superétatique"), where one can discern social organs proper to the society, and distinct from national organs.7 In this category one finds, according to Scelle, "federalism" (broadly conceived), which embraces such wide range of institutional forms as the federal state and the confederation of states. Plainly, in this class of society the law of dédoublement fonctionnel no longer applies.
It should be immediately stressed that this part of Scelle's scientific contribution has been subject to fluctuations and a great deal of uncertainty. The concept of "suprastate society" was introduced by Scelle in the 30s (and either dropped or at least muted in his writings published after 1945) primarily as a sort of "ideal type" ("Idealtyp") in the sense of Max Weber.8 At that stage, Scelle did not develop the concept. He stated a number of times that the League of Nations, although it did not amount to a "suprastate society" proper, constituted a "suprastate phenomenon" very similar to a confederation of states9 and that with the building up of the League of Nations, the international community had "made a general effort of constructive federalism" ("un effort généralisé de fédéralisme constructif").10 He noted in particular that "federal" elements could especially be discerned on the plane of law-making and of judicial activity.11 However, Scelle did not delve into the basic question of the relations between the fulfillment of the three social functions in the traditional international community and within the League of Nations (or, after 1945, in the United Nations system). To put it differently, Scelle did not explore in depth the nexus between the old and the new "model" of international community.
This is, in short, what Scelle terms "the fundamental law of role splitting" ("la loi fondamentale du dédoublement fonctionnel"),12 a law that Scelle concedes to be "one of the most shocking concepts for traditional and instinctive views."13 He points out, however, that at least two compelling reasons make the adoption of his view imperative. First, it would be absurd to characterize a legal act by adopting formal criteria only, with the consequence that any time a legal act is performed by a national agent, it must always and exclusively be termed "national." If, by contrast, allowance is made for the substance and the content of a legal act, it follows that any time such an act deals with an international situation or an international relation, it falls within the purview of the international legal order, and must be regarded as an international act. The second reason is that if one were not to accept Scelle's theory, one should perforce conclude that there are no social functions proper in the international legal order, that is, there is no legislation, no adjudication proper, and no collective enforcement.14
It should further be pointed out that Scelle is aware of the limitations of dédoublement fonctionnel. He points out that this "law [...] is the dangerous substitute of the institutional organization lacking in the international legal order. It is a makeshift construct, in the present stage of inter-state trends"15 and he fervently hopes that it will be gradually replaced by a better institutional scheme, by a "hierarchy of the institutions corresponding to the law of hierarchy of legal orders."16 In addition, Scelle draws attention to all the shortcomings of the dédoublement fonctionnel: thus, for instance he emphasizes that the unilateral fulfillment of international functions by national agents may lead and does indeed lead to conflict (conflits de compétences) between governing officials performing international functions by way of competition (en concurrence) and not by way of subordination (et non en subordination), that is to say anarchically and not according to a hierarchical order.17 Furthermore, as far as the law-making function is concerned, Scelle emphasizes that the content of the powers conferred by the national order and by international law do not coincide as a rule. Normally, executives are vested with a more extensive law-making power in the international area than under municipal law. By the same token, legislative assemblies, which normally enjoy wide law-making powers under national law, have a limited role in international legislation.18 As far as the judicial function is concerned, Scelle pinpoints a number of deficiencies, chiefly as regards the lack of legal security for individuals, who are not sure about the proper court that will settle a transnational dispute, nor about the applicable law.19
6 Scelle explains the double role thus: "dans l'ordre interétatique, où il n'existe pas de gouvernants et agents spécifiquement internationaux, les agents et gouvernants étatiques qui les remplacent sont investis d'un double rôle. Ils sont agents et gouvernants nationaux lorsqu'ils fonctionnent dans l'ordre juridique étatique; ils sont agents et gouvernants internationaux lorsqu'ils agissent dans l'ordre juridique international. C'est ce que nous appellerons la loi fondamentale du dédoublement fonctionnel", Règles générales, supra note 1, at 358. It is useful to mention a more sophisticated definition of the doctrine at issue, formulated by Scelle in one of his last works: "Ce phénomène pourra se définir ainsi: les agents dotés d'une compétence institutionnelle ou investis par un ordre juridique utilisent leur capacité `fonctionnelle' telle qu'elle est organisée dans l'ordre juridique qui les a institués, mais pour assurer l'efficacité des normes d'un autre ordre juridique privé des organes nécessaires à cette réalisation, ou n'en possédant que d'insuffisants" (`Le phénomène juridique du dédoublement fonctionnel', supra note 1, at 331).
7 In one of his later works Scelle redefined the concept by pointing out the following: "Elle [la technique de `l'institutionnalisme'] consiste essentiellement à créer, pour l'exercice des fonctions juridiques essentielles de l'ordre international, des organes dont les membres sont ex officio dénationalisés, c'est-à-dire indépendants des gouvernants étatiques pour lesquels leurs décisions deviennent obligatoires": `Quelques réflexions', supra note 1, at 9.
8 Namely a logically precise theoretical construct based on a certain number of elements of reality, and which is not intended to reflect the multiplicity of specific historical situations, but merely to enable us `to determine the typological locus of a historical phenomenon,... to see if, in particular traits or in their total character, the phenomena approximate one of our constructions' (M. Weber, `Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions' (1915), in H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (1967) 323.).
9 Précis, supra note 1, I, at 57, 250-260.
10 Théorie et pratique, supra note 1, at 101. In a later writing Scelle pointed out that "On a pu voir s'ébaucher, depuis la naissance de la S.d.N. et surtout de l'O.N.U, un système fédéraliste oecuménique qu'on ne peut guère connaître qu'incomplètement tellement il est complexe, fragmentaire et à cheval sur le fédéral et le confédéral":`Le phénomène juridique', supra note 1, at 341.
11 Théorie et pratique, supra note 1, at 101. In a later writing, Scelle noted that what he then called "the new technique" of legal order undermining state sovereignty was still hesitant and had acquired some weight only in the area of international adjudication and administration: see `Quelques réflexions', supra note 1, at 9.
12 Règles générales, supra note 1, at 358. In subsequent writings Scelle stated that in his view that of "role splitting" is one of two "fundamental laws" (lois capitales) of international law, the other law being that of hierarchy between legal orders (hiérarchie des ordres juridiques): see Manuel, supra note 1, at 20-21. It should be stressed that in later writings Scelle changed his mind on this point. Thus, for instance, in a paper of 1956 he asserted that there are in fact two laws of legal technique, and the role splitting is simply a consequence of them: "La première [of these two laws] est celle de la naissance même et l'évolution des ordres juridiques. La seconde est la loi de hiérarchie des ordres juridiques. Un autre phénomène, celui du `dédoublement fonctionnel' [...] repose sur les deux premiers": `Le phénomène juridique du dédoublement fonctionnel', in Rechtsfragen der Internationalen Organisation, Festschrift für H. Wehberg (1956) 324.
13 Précis, supra note 1, I, at 56, n. 1.
14 Manuel, supra note 1, at 22.
15 Manuel, supra note 1, at 22.
16 Manuel, supra note 1, at 22.
17 Précis, supra note 1, II, at 10.
18 Précis, supra note 1, II, at 452.
19 Manuel, supra note 1, at 800-807, 815-817.
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