Resource Sharing in Antarctica:

II. Was an Antarctic Minerals Regime Really Necessary?

Despite the sharp diversity of views on this issue it is fair to say that the main motives behind the starting of the minerals negotiations were essentially two: 1) the absence in the Antarctic Treaty adopted at Washington in 1959 of specific provisions addressing the issue of mineral resources; and 2) the fear that this lacuna might facilitate unilateral deposits in Antarctica.

The latter argument carried a special weight for the Consultative Parties to the Antarctic Treaty in so far as possible unilateral action in the field of mineral activities would have unavoidably resurrected the specter of sovereignty claims in Antarctica, a specter that for the time being has been put to rest by the "freezing clause" of Article IV of the Treaty.⁴ On the basis of these considerations, the Consultative Parties had already endeavoured to preempt the risks of unilateral action by adopting in 1977 Recommendation IX-1 which imposed a "voluntary" moratorium on mineral activities in Antarctica pending the adoption of a regime agreed upon amongst the Consultative Parties. In 1981 another recommendation, n. XI-1, was adopted by the Consultative Parties which in effect started the process of mineral negotiations and eventually led to the 1988 Convention. These arguments in favour of an Antarctic minerals regime have been sharply criticized by some environmental organizations whose lobbies were particularly active during the negotiations. They maintain that a mineral regime is neither necessary nor desirable simply because no mineral activities should ever take place in Antarctica. On this assumption, they forcefully argue for the designation of the continent as a world park, a solution that would better guarantee the preservation of the Antarctic environment and the continuation of scientific activities under the scope of the Antarctic Treaty. As for the risk of unilateral action in the absence of any international regulation, the proponents of this theory tend to dismiss it as a false problem since, they maintain, no one would ever engage in the extremely costly and risky business of exploring Antarctica for mineral resources without a legal framework capable of guaranteeing the investment and the enjoyments of its products.

The arguments of the opponents of the mineral regime have undoubtedly certain merits: they are supported by the moral strength of the idea that the devastating effects of industrial activities, as they are felt now all over the inhabited part of the globe, should not be extended as well to the last pristine continent on earth, Antarctica. Further, economic considerations lend support to the world park option for Antarctica since there is no doubt that today's world market prices can in no way justify the commercial exploitation of Antarctic oil, gas or hard minerals. However, the opponents of the mineral regime fail to recognize that, at least for the time being, the a priori exclusion of the possibility of conducting mineral resource activities in Antarctica was not politically acceptable to the Governments. Not one of the 22 Consultative Parties which participated in the final meeting at which the minerals convention was adopted, was in fact prepared to consider such exclusion: neither the two superpowers, nor the group of the seven claimant countries, including Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, nor the less developed countries including the leading powers of the group, China, India, Brazil. In this situation, also the argument that the minerals regime was not needed because no one would in its absence engage in Antarctic mineral activities risked becoming an exercise in self-deception. Governments were so unwilling to exclude the mineral resources option that, as a consequence, no one could exclude that, for reasons of prestige, economic gain, strategic self sufficiency or others, a unilateral program of Antarctic mineral exploration and exploitation might be launched.

If this analysis is correct, then the answer to the question whether the minerals convention was necessary is yes. Undoubtedly, however, the minerals negotiations have caused new environmental concerns and put a strain on both the Antarctic Treaty system - because of the unresolved sovereignty issue in Antarctica - and on the relationship between the Parties to this system and the rest of the international community, which may legitimately ask in whose interest the new mineral regime really is. How the Convention deals with these questions and whether it resolves the tensions within the Antarctic system and between that system and the outside world is what I am going to discuss now.

4 Article IV provides that nothing in the Antarctic Treaty and no activity carried out under it may be interpreted as renunciation, diminution or enlargement of rights or claims over Antarctic territory, or as a prejudice to the position of any state regarding non-recognition of such claims.

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