Democratic Control of European Foreign Policy

III. The Expansion of the European Parliament's Role in Foreign Policy⁷³

Suggestions for reforms are determined by three factors:

- Modern trends towards transparency and an increased need for legitimacy in international relations,

- comparison with the role of Parliaments within state systems,

- solutions to inherent contradictions in the present EC procedures.

A considerable margin of evolution for an increased democratic control over foreign policy results from the flexibility of the decision-making procedure as laid down by the European Community Constitution. Modifications can be achieved both through changes in the present practice and by way of treaty amendments.

1. Scope for Expansion Requiring a Reform of the Treaties

(a) Parliament's right to give its assent to international treaties ought to be extended beyond the field of association agreements to all important agreements. In other words, instead of the formal criterion of `association', a substantive criterion should be used for the purposes of identifying all agreements of an overwhelmingly technical nature for which parliamentary assent is not necessary.

From the technical point of view this could be achieved by means of a general definition of the parliamentary cooperation procedure in Article 228 of the EEC Treaty and the adoption of the expression `significant international agreements' used in the Solemn Declaration of the European Council of 20 June 1983 (with a mention of association agreements only by way of example).

(b) The mandate for the negotiating of `significant' agreements and accession treaties should be forwarded to Parliament for its approval.

(c) If proposal (a) above is adopted, the special type of parliamentary participation in the case of treaties concluded under the cooperation procedure will not apply. If the option outlined in (a) above cannot be put into effect, a special procedure for parliamentary participation could be arrived at by adjusting the cooperation model laid down in Article 149(2) of the EEC Treaty (taking Article 130n of the EEC Treaty as a precedent).

(d) All other treaties to be concluded by the Community should be forwarded to Parliament for information so that it can deliver an opinion before the treaty is signed.

(e) The procedure for the conclusion of treaties laid down in the EEC Treaty and EAEC Treaty should be parallel.

(f) Article 228 of the EEC Treaty must be amended to give Parliament the right to request the Court of Justice to deliver an opinion on the compatibility of an intended agreement with the Community Treaties.

(g) Article 229 might be amended to make it clear that Members of the European Parliament can take part as observers in Commission delegations to international organizations.

2. Scope for Expansion Without a Reform of the Treaties

(a) Agreements on the notification of Parliament of the progress of treaty negotiations could be extended to all treaty negotiations and strengthened.

(b) Parliament could be consulted before the signature of agreements.

(c) Since the scope of Art. 238 is extremely wide⁷⁴ this article could be used more often as legal basis for agreements thus rendering Parliament's power of co-decision more effective.

(d) The Council could include representatives of the European Parliament in the committee set up pursuant to Article 113 of the EEC Treaty.

(e) Even in the case of agreements concluded within the context of the adoption of implementing provisions, the Council could provide for Parliament to be involved, at least in the form of consultation.

(f) Parliament itself could introduce greater structural coherence in its deliberations on foreign policy issues.

(g) Parliament could also make greater use of its autonomy in the choice of foreign policy initiatives. In particular, it could extend its debates to security issues.

(h) An agreement could be reached with the presidency of EPC on continuous cooperation, especially by means of regular and active participation in plenary sittings.

(i) Parliament could itself make greater use of the means of supervision available to it vis-à-vis the other institutions in order to impose certain foreign policy options.

3. Conclusions

The Community's institutional structures and procedures have not yet come of age. This applies particularly to the field of foreign policy, which is not reinforced by clear internal guidelines.

The quality of democratic control has not kept pace with the expansion of the Community's identity. In particular, the governments and institutions concerned still have no rational notion of the role which the European Parliament should play in the control of foreign policy.

Rationality does not, however, mean that Parliament's ideal role in shaping foreign relations can be reduced to a simple formula, if only because the concepts of `supervision' and `control' cover complex processes involving the interaction of a large number of different parties and necessarily requiring structural and procedural flexibility.

Plans for increasing the EP's role in foreign policy need to take account of the following variables:

- the large number of instruments operating in the field of foreign policy;

- the different methods of supervision;

- the various legal sources of the powers and procedures relating to foreign policy activities.

The prospects for procedural change are favourable because a governmental conference on the amendment of the Treaties as regards the EP's future role is scheduled for 1990/1991.

73 Parliament has submitted proposals in its report `On the role of the European Parliament in external policy within the framework of the Single European Act', Doc. A 2-86/88 (draftsman Mr Planes Puchades), Resolution of 17 June 1988, OJ (1988) C 187/233. Suggestions for an increased role of Parliamentary participation in the conclusion of international agreements in the light of the procedure provided by the Dutch Constitution (Art. 60) are discussed by Weiß, supra note 12, at 228. See also EP Resolution of 8 October 1986, OJ (1986) C 283/39 and of 20 February 1987, OJ (1987) C 76/180, suggesting inter-institutional agreements for improvements of its role in the conclusion of international agreements. The Commission has taken up some proposals in the presentation of the annual programme for 1990; supra note 48.

74 See ECJ case 12/86, Demirel (1987) ECR 3710, para. 9.

© 1990-2004 European Journal of International Law
All comments and suggestions should be sent to webmaster
This site is part of the Academy of European Law online, a joint partnership of the Jean Monnet Center at NYU School of Law and the Academy of European Law at the European University Institute.
This file was last modified: Tuesday, July 27, 1999 02:44PM