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NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal
Aspects

What others have to say
...
Bruno Simma
[*]
Full text available:
PDF format **
Abstract
The threat or use of force by NATO without Security Council
authorization has assumed importance because of the Kosovo crisis and the
debate about a new strategic concept for the Alliance. The October 1998 threat
of air strikes against the FRY breached the UN Charter, despite NATO's effort
to rely on the doctrines of necessity and humanitarian intervention and to
conform with, the sense and logic of relevant Council resolutions. But there
are "hard cases" involving terrible dilemmas in which imperative political and
moral considerations leave no choice but to act outside the law. The more
isolated these instances remain, the less is their potential to erode the rules
of international law. The potential boomerang effect of such breaches can never
be excluded, but the danger can be reduced by spelling out the factors that
make an ad hoc decision distinctive and minimize its precedential significance.
In the case of Kosovo, only a thin red line separates NATO's action from
international legality. But should such an approach become a regular part of
its strategic programme for the future, it would undermine the universal system
of collective security. To resort to illegality as an explicit ultima ratio
for reasons as convincing as those put forward in the Kosovo case is one
thing. To turn such an exception into a general policy is quite another. If the
Washington Treaty has a hard legal core which even the most dynamic and
innovative (re-)interpretation cannot erode, it is NATO's subordination to the
principles of the UN Charter.

* Professor of International and
Community European Law, Institut für Internationales Recht -
Völkerrecht, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Professor-Huber-Platz 2,
D-80539 München, Germany; member of the Editorial Board. This article was
originally presented at Policy Roundtables organized by the United Nations
Association of the U.S.A. in New York and Washington, D.C., on 11 and 12 March
1999. Footnote references have been provided only where considered essential.
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