Book Reviews Gillespie, Alexander. International Environmental Law, Policy and Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Pp. xiv, 178. Index. $68. In an absorbing and frank approach, Gillespie critiques the current political, economic and philosophical justifications for environmental protection and finds each one inimical to global conservation efforts. Is it possible that these justifications could form a unified approach to environmental protection? Is a pragmatic approach involving a diverse range of incentives for environmental protection preferable? Is it realistic to presume that human self-interest will give way to a non-anthropocentric conservation ethic? Although Gillespie's critique is not directly aimed at addressing these questions (a follow-up book is proposed), his findings will undeniably assist the international legal community in reinventing current approaches to environmental protection. The text begins by tracking the evolution of anthropocentricity in the context of man's relationship with nature. An interesting exposé of the philosophical and scientific ideas which form the foundation of anthropocentrism reveal why nature's intrinsic value is often denied, while its use and control are emphasized in international environmental law. In critiquing the self-interest justification for environmental protection in the international arena, the author identifies the fact that it provides little incentive to protect those parts of nature which are of no present or potential use. Similarly, traditional economic methods do not reflect the true economic value of the environment because not all aspects of nature can be represented in monetary terms. Even if economic values can be established with certainty in the short term (the complexity of environmental systems makes this difficult), such values fail to convey important contextual information and are likely to change with time. In addition to identifying faults within the existing economic orthodoxy, Gillespie reveals the social problems which impede implementation of environmental pricing regimes (such as the dichotomy between the individual as self-interested and as a member of a community). He also discusses the political problems with such regimes (for example, to be immune from exploitation the environment must have a higher monetary value in its natural state than from any other use). Gillespie then describes how religiously inspired conservation suffers from differing and changing interpretations of religious ethics (such as those derived from the Bible) and from an indifference or hostility to environmental concerns (Lovelock's Gaia theory and Emerson's views of Nature do not escape unscathed). Religious justifications are inhibited by a spiritual self-interest (as compared with a pantheistic, reverent regard for the environment), and by its limited relevance to secular societies. An analysis of the aesthetic, cultural and recreational justifications for environmental protection exhibits similar deficiencies. Aesthetics not only suffer from subjectivity (not all of the natural world is aesthetically pleasing), but it is also socially and culturally determined (and therefore liable to passing fads). Objectifying nature and thereby trivializing it is another limitation. Environmentally harmful practices in the name of cultural tradition and the translocation of Western wilderness values to developing countries are also highlighted. Cross-temporal identity and Rawls' 'ideal observer' theory are described by the author as underpinning the future generations' justification for environmental protection. However, motivational problems resulting from lack of affiliation and societal alienation pose constraints, as do theoretical problems such as inadequate information about future needs and 'existence' as a prerequisite for moral considerability. The remainder of the book analyses non-anthropocentric ideals that are developing in international environmental law. Gillespie considers the moral considerability of animals (which takes an individualistic and utilitarian view) fundamentally at odds with environmental ideals which support a broader, holistic approach. The land ethic (or deep ecology), for example, seeks to find inherent value in complete communities or ecosystems and appears to be the most appealing justification. However, it may also suffer from misanthropic tendencies. The 'respect for life' approach can be criticized for its humanistic bias, individualistic emphasis and impracticability. Drawing upon an extensive array of literature, Gillespie provides an insightful critique of the policies and ethics underpinning international environmental law. I look forward to Gillespie's follow-up book. Charmian Barton Crown Solicitor's Office Perth, Western Australia
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