The Kurdish Crisis and Allied Intervention in the Aftermath of the Second Gulf War

II. Factual Background

The Kurdish population, which is estimated to amount to between 8 and 30 million people,⁴ does not have an independent state but lives as a minority mainly in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria and in smaller groups in the USSR and Lebanon.⁵ According to recent estimates the Kurds represent between 19 and 24% of the population of Turkey, 23 to 27% of Iraq, 10 to 16% of Iran and 8 to 9% of Syria.⁶ The difficulty in establishing their precise number is due to official denial of their existence - in Turkey, they have been referred to as `mountain turks' - and to the unreliability of statistics supplied by both governments and Kurdish nationalists.

Tracing their origin back to the Medes who conquered Nineveh in 612 BC, the Kurds assert that they are a distinct nation which has never really acquired political independence.⁷ It is more likely that the ancestors of the Kurds came from several sources; some from Turkic, Armenian, or Assyrian tribes, but most probably from Indo-European groups.⁸ While the Kurds have a north-western Iranian linguistic origin in common, they are separated by two major dialects with considerable local variation and a number of sub-dialects, which seems to make communication between the various tribes and regions difficult, though possible. Tribal structures have traditionally dominated Kurdish society and continue to do so to a remarkable extent. A clear national identity began to emerge in a class of urban Kurdish intellectuals in the second half of the 19th century, but tribalism as well as regional and feudal loyalities stood in the way of its development on a broad scale. Thus, in practice, the Kurds never achieved unity in their struggle for independence against foreign domination, but remained always at least as much involved in fighting each other as combatting Turkish, Iraqi or Iranian troops.⁹

For many centuries Kurdistan had remained a buffer region between Turkey and Persia subject to the control of one or other of these empires. By 1639 three quarters of the Kurds had come under Ottoman rule and in the 19th century there were repeated uprisings particularly against Turkey. Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres provided not only for the creation of the three Arab states of Hejaz (later Saudi-Arabia), Syria and Iraq, but also for an Armenian state and a Kurdish state. In 1921 Iraq became a monarchy under the rule of Feisal, who had been deprived of Syria by the imposition of a French mandate. The Treaty of Sèvres, however, was superseded by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. The latter confirmed the plan to create the three Arab states, but no longer mentioned either Armenia or Kurdistan. It was Anglo-French collusion and rivalry in redrawing the map of the Middle East, as well as British interest in controlling oil rich areas, that led to the rejection of an independent Kurdistan and the artificial extension of Iraq to include a predominantly Kurdish north.

Thus, the seeds were laid for continuous Kurdish revolts in Iraq which intensified after southern Kurdistan - the Ottoman province or vilayet of Mosul - was awarded by the League of Nations in 1925 to the new Arab state of Iraq, and therefore in reality placed under British mandate, with some guarantees for the appointment of Kurdish officials and the use of the Kurdish language. Such pledges, however, were not included in the Anglo-Iraqi treaty which terminated the British mandate in 1930. After the 1958 coup d'état against the monarchy, relations between the Kurds and the new military government initially appeared promising on the basis of the new constitution which referred to a partnership between Arabs and Kurds in Iraq.¹⁰ However, the Kassem Government had developed close relations with Kurdish tribes who were enemies of the famous Kurdish tribal leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani. Therefore, civil strife broke out between various Kurdish groups, later followed by a Kurdish uprising against the Bàath Government. In 1970 the Bàath Government and the Kurds concluded a peace agreement which reaffirmed Kurdish rights and envisaged the creation of an autonomous region of Kurdistan. However, the 1974 Law of Autonomy in the Area of Kurdistan announced by the Iraqi Government was refuted by the Kurds as falling short of the peace agreement. Fighting continued with thousands of Kurds fleeing to Turkey and Iran.

In the First Gulf War the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) under the leadership of Barzani's sons cooperated with Iran against Baghdad and infiltrated Iraqi territory partly side by side with Iranian Pasdaran, while Iraq was supporting the Iranian Kurds against Teheran in the Iranian part of Kurdistan.¹¹ On the other hand, the patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which had been founded under the leadership of Jalal Talabani in the mid seventies in opposition to Barzani's KDP, offered the Iraqi Government help against Iran and the KDP. It is reported that in the mid eighties 150,000 Kurds or more were fighting with Baghdad against Iran and the KDP, which had to pay dearly at the end of the war for its collaboration with Teheran. In 1988 the Iraqi Army crushed the alliance of Iranian and Kurdish KDP forces ruthlessly by using all kinds of arms available, including chemical weapons. About 5,000 civilians were killed by poison gas in March 1988 in the village of Halabja.¹²

During the Second Gulf War, President Bush invited several times the people of Iraq to rise against the regime,¹³ although this was denied by the State Department spokeswoman, Margaret Tutwiler.¹⁴ Probably, this was intended to invite a military coup against President Saddam Hussein. At any rate, in view of American interests in the region as a whole, it did not mean support for a division of Iraq in the wake of the Shiite insurrection in the south and a corresponding Kurdish uprising in the north. On the contrary, the territorial integrity of defeated Iraq needed to be secured in order to preserve Iraq's function as a balance, primarily against Iran. Although the Islamic Republic did not say so officially, it was clear that only Iran had an interest in a successful Shiite revolution in the south of Iraq. The establishment of an independent Kurdistan in the north of Iraq, on the other hand, not only would have raised the issue of control over the important oil resources in the area, but also would have posed a threat to the security of neighbouring States, in particular Turkey.

There is reason to assume that this scenario and the unwillingness of the United States to commit its military to a presence of unknown duration in a country engaged in a civil war were key factors for the political decision not to go through with the campaign against Saddam Hussein at the end of February 1991.¹⁵ The official reason given for the suspension on 27 February 1991 of `Operation Desert Storm' was that the goal to push Iraq out of Kuwait had been achieved.¹⁶ Later it became clear that this decision allowed a large number of tanks of the Iraqi Republican Guard to escape to the north before General Schwarzkopf was able to complete his encirclement of the mass of Iraqi tanks assembled in the area west of Basra.¹⁷ As a result, the Republican Guard, which had deployed almost half of its forces in the north of Iraq, remained able to function after the war. Thus, it appears that the domestic survival of the regime in power was preferred as a lesser evil, at least for the time being, to the carving up of the state of Iraq.

When in mid-March of 1991 the Kurds, following the lead taken by the Shiite rebellion in the south of Iraq, also rose in the north they were able to operate on the basis of an alliance called the Kurdish Front which had been principally formed by the two major Kurdish organizations, Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union and Masud Barzani's Kurdish Democratic Party.¹⁸ The Kurdish pershmerga fighters, joined by defectors from the pro-government Kurdish militia (jash), made quick advances in the north of Iraq and gained control over the Kurdish cities Sulaymaniyah, Arbil, Dohuk and the oil centre of Kirkuk. However, they were unable to resist counter-attack by the Republican Guard, supported by combat helicopters and, according to Kurdish sources, combat aircraft. Well remembering the Iraqi use of chemical weapons in 1988 the population of the cities fled in panic mainly towards Iran and Turkey. It was alleged by the Kurdish leader Barzani that about 3 million Kurds had fled into the mountains as part of a `tactical withdrawal' to escape the government's programme of `genocide and torture against our people'.¹⁹

There was an urgent appeal from Kurdish leaders to France, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom and the United States to seek immediate intervention by the United Nations.²⁰ However, by early April 1991 there was no coordinated international response. France made an effort, but failed to persuade the UN Security Council on 2

April 1991 to adopt a resolution to provide protection for the Kurds. There was opposition from China, the USSR and the United States who shared the view that this would create a precedent for the involvement of the Security Council in internal matters.²¹ Various reasons for the refusal were put forward by the US administration, such as the unlikely success of insurgents in view of their lack of a central command, the absence of a mandate from the United Nations extending the objective of the operation beyond the liberation of Kuwait, and the President's reluctance to put the lives of American soldiers at risk by becoming involved in a civil war which had been continuing for decades.²²

This attitude prevailed for some time, but eventually altered in view of the position taken by other states and public pressure resulting from reports in the media. At the beginning of April, Turkey,²³ France²⁴ and Iran²⁵ sent letters in support of the Kurds to the United Nations Security Council. Due to French persistence, the discussion finally resulted in the adoption on 5 April of Resolution 688. While the resolution was rejected by Iraq,²⁶ it reflected growing international condemnation of Iraq's treatment of the Kurdish people.²⁷

Furthermore, the idea was advanced of creating UN `safe havens' backed by military forces in northern Iraq to protect the Kurds from further attacks by the Iraqi Government. In one form or another this idea was quickly endorsed, inter alia, by Austria, Turkey, and European leaders attending the summit meeting of the European Communities on 8 April 1991 in Luxembourg.<sup>28</sup> The decision in Luxembourg was based upon a British proposal which envisaged `enclaves' for Kurdish refugees on Iraqi territory close to the borders with Turkey and Iran under the supervision and detailed management of the United Nations.²⁹

On 8 April 1991, a White House spokesman stated that the United States had `no position' on the question of Kurdish `safe havens' and a State Department spokesman was unable to give the proposal `specific endorsement'.<sup>30</sup> Nevertheless, on 11 April 1991, the President of the United States denied reports that there was a rift between the United States and its European allies over the issue of Kurdish `enclaves'.³¹ In fact, on 10 April 1991, the United States took a significant step to protect the Kurds by requiring Iraq to cease all military activity north of the 36th parallel. This included a part of Kurdish territory from the Turkish border up to a line south of Mosul but excluded the oil area of Kirkuk. The United States also warned Iraq that it would use force if there was any military interference in international relief efforts for the Kurds.³²

While the Government of Iraq dismissed the `safe haven' plan and threatened to prevent its implementation by all available means,<sup>33</sup> the Kurdish leader Barzani welcomed it as `a big humanitarian and political step forward' and called upon all states `to back it and implement it as soon as possible'.<sup>34</sup> Iran, on the other hand, made it clear that it was unlikely to accept Kurdish `safe havens' near its border.³⁵ Iran also criticized the international relief effort, in particular the United Nations, for channelling aid through Turkey without considering Iran's needs.

On 17 April 1991, armed forces of the United States and other countries began to move into northern Iraq with the declared aim of setting up camps to secure the safety of Kurdish refugees and of coordinating relief supplies. As stated by the President of the United States, the intention was `to turn over the administration of, and security for these sites as soon as possible to the UN.'³⁶

Iraq denounced the allied action but it did not respond militarily. It continued to negotiate with both the United Nations Mission led by Eric Suy, Personal Representative of the UN Secretary-General, as well as with the United Nations Inter-Agency Mission led by Sadruddin Aga Khan, Executive Delegate of the UN Secretary-General for the United Nations Humanitarian Programme for Iraq, Kuwait and the Iraq/Iran and Iraq/Turkey Border Areas.³⁷ On 18 April 1991, the Government of Iraq and Sadruddin Aga Khan, for the United Nations, signed a Memorandum of Understanding concerning the role of the United Nations in providing humanitarian assistance in Iraq.³⁸

Under the name `Operation Provide Comfort' the allied intervention force established a small triangle zone at the border in the north of Iraq between Zahko, Amadiya and Dohuk, but excluding the city of Dohuk.<sup>39</sup> This was declared to be a security zone under the protection of the allied troops and non-accessible to Iraqi forces. The Kurdish refugees were brought from the mountain slopes into this area where they were supplied with food and tents. Many returned to their own quarters in neighbouring cities. The occupation of almost 10,000 square km of Iraqi territory (extending some 100 km along the Iraqi-Turkish border and some 60 km south<sup>40</sup>) by more than 13,000 soldiers from various countries, including the United States, Britain, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy and Australia, lasted about 3 months.<sup>41</sup> The operation guaranteed 450,000 Kurdish refugees a safe return home. The last Turkish border camp (at Cukura) was closed on 3 June 1991.<sup>42</sup> According to US official figures, about 13,000 Kurds who had sought refuge in the mountains on the Iraqi-Turkish border had died before reaching allied `safe havens'.⁴³

At the same time as the creation of the security zone, UN observers were dispatched in the whole of Iraq in critical areas, including the Kurdish cities outside of the security zone.⁴⁴ But beyond humanitarian care, the role of the United Nations in the northern enclave remained undefined for some time.⁴⁵ In May 1991, negotiations between the United Nations and Iraq continued on the deployment of a small police force (of about 500) in the north of Iraq to replace the allied troops.⁴⁶ While the United States and the other allies were in favour of transferring their responsibility in the north of Iraq to such a UN contingent, Iraq at first resisted the proposal. In mid May there were positive signs that a preliminary agreement would be reached with Iraq, the main issues apparently concerning the size of the force and the question whether it should be armed.⁴⁷

The Kurdish city of Dohuk, a provincial capital with about 380,000 inhabitants prior to the exodus of the Kurds, became a test of the effectiveness of the security provided to the returning refugees by the allied presence. It was not included in the security zone and the allies used their stand-off from the city as a bargaining chip in persuading Iraq to accept the substitution of the allied troops in the security zone by a UN contingent. On 22 May 1991, an agreement was reached.⁴⁸ It provided for the withdrawal of Iraqi military from the city and its environment and for its deployment 10 km to the south. Furthermore, Iraq consented to withdraw its special police. Finally, the agreement permitted members of the allied forces to enter Dohuk to help restore public facilities. The commander of the US forces in the north later explained that the accord did not signify the extension of the allies' security zone.⁴⁹ When Iraq finally agreed to admit a maximum of 500 `United Nations Guards', the UN immediately sent 10 officers from Geneva to Dohuk on 19 May 1991.⁵⁰

At that time, the Kurdish part of Iraq was divided threefold. The security zone in the north-west was occupied and controlled by about 11,000 allied soldiers. Kurdish forces held a broad strip along the border to the east and the south, including several towns (Halabja, Qala Diza, Ranja, Rawandiz) and, surrounded Iraqi garrisons in other places. The remainder was under the control of the Iraqi army.⁵¹

On 29 May 1991, a US military spokesman announced that the allies would begin withdrawing their troops from northern Iraq on 15 June 1991.⁵² However, US troops suspended their planned withdrawal from northern Iraq on 21 June 1991 in view of the decision by the Western allies to deploy a rapid reaction force (RRF) based in the south of Turkey to ensure further protection of Kurdish refugees.⁵³ The last 3,000 soldiers of the allied forces in the security zone withdrew in mid July 1991.⁵⁴ With the consent of Turkey, however, an intervention force (`Operation Raised Hammer'⁵⁵) of about 5,000 soldiers from the United States, Britain, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey,⁵⁶ remained positioned in the south of Turkey (Silopi and two other cities) to intervene in Iraq if necessary.⁵⁷ These troops left on 10 October, but some American, British and French aircraft remained at the Turkish base of Incirlik.

4 Meyers Grosses Taschenlexikon, Vol. 12 (2nd. ed. 1987) 282 states that almost half of the Kurdish people live in the eastern part of Turkey, about a quarter in Iran, some 20% in Iraq and the others in Syria and the USSR.

5 For an analysis of the Kurdish problem see M. Short, A. McDermott, The Kurds (Minority Rights Group Report No. 23, 1975); G. Chaliand (ed.), People Without a Country (1980); S.C. Pelletiere, The Kurds: An Unstable Element in the Gulf (1984); D. McDowall, The Kurds (Minority Rights Group Report No. 23, rev. ed. 1985); H. Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination. The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights (1986), Chapter 9 `The Kurds', at 178-202; Slugett, `The Kurds', in Cardri (ed.), Saddam's Iraq - Revolution or Reaction? (1989); Hippler, `Kurdistan - ein ungelöstes Problem im Mittleren Osten', 38 Vereinte Nationen (1990) 202-205.

6 Hannum, supra note 4, at 179, with references. Bradshaw, `After the Gulf War: the Kurds', The World Today, May 1991, at 78, states that the Kurds, as the fourth largest national group in the Middle East after Arabs, Persians and Turks, amount to 20-25 million in total, with 9-10 million in Turkey, 5 million in Iran, and 4 million in Iraq. Hippler, supra note 4, at 202, suggests that the total number of Kurds today exceeds 15 million.

7 See Short, McDermott, supra note 4, at 6, also claiming that the `most famous Kurd of all times was Saladin, who fought Richard the Lionheart and the Crusaders and regained Jerusalem for Islam in 1187'.

8 Hannum, supra note 4, at 178.

9 See Hippler, supra note 4, at 202-203.

10 The following is based upon the instructive summary given by Hippler, supra note 4, at 203-204.

11 Hippler, supra note 4, at 204.

12 Hippler, supra note 4, at 204.

13 Mayall, `Non-Intervention, Self-Determination and the New World Order', 67 International Affairs (1991) 421, 428 reproduces the following remarks made by President George Bush to the American Academy for the Advancement of Science on 15 February 1991 from the Financial Times, 16-17 February 1991: `But there's another way for the bloodshed to stop, and that is for the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hand to force Saddam Hussein the dictator to step aside and to comply with the UN and then rejoin the family of peace-loving nations'.

14 Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 37 (1991) 38, 127.

15 For a similar view see Ruehl, `Der Krieg am Golf. Militärischer Verlauf und politisch-strategische Probleme', Europa-Archiv (8/1991) 237, 246.

16 Mayall, supra note 13, at 426.

17 Hottinger, `Die arabische Welt nach dem Golfkrieg', Europa-Archiv (15-16/1991) 437.

18 Ibid., 438 et seq.

19 Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 37 (1991) 38, 126 (News Digest for April 1991). This source also quotes the Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Vellayati, as having stated on 3 April 1991 that `more than two million Kurds are leaving under constant bombardment'.

20 Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 37 (1991) 38, 126 (News Digest for April 1991).

21 Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 37 (1991) 38, 127 (News Digest for April 1991).

22 Hottinger, supra note 16, at 440.

23 Letter of 2 April 1991, S/22435.

24 Letter of 4 April 1991, S/22442.

25 Letters of 3 and 4 April 1991, S/22436 and S/22447.

26 Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 37 (1991) 38, 127 (News Digest for April 1991) mentions that the permanent representative of Iraq to the UN lodged with the Secretary-General a formal protest against the resolution.

27 Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 37 (1991) 38, 127 (News Digest for April 1991) mentions the following: On 5 April 1991 NATO, accusing the Government of Iraq of `massive human rights violations', demanded that `every pressure ... be brought to bear to bring Iraqi authorities to stop the repression without delay'. Germany's Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, described Iraq's actions as `genocide' on 5 April 1991 and, on 13 April 1991, suggested a trial of President Saddam Hussein for `crimes against humanity'. According to reports, the Prime Minister of Australia, Bob Hawke, also called for international action in favour of the Kurds.

28 Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 37 (1991) 38, 127 (News Digest for April 1991).

29 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 10 April 1991 at 1-2.

30 Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 37 (1991) 38, 127 (News Digest for April 1991).

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 10 April 1991 at1.

34 Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 37 (1991) 38, 127 (News Digest for April 1991).

35 Ibid., at 38, 128, citing a statement by Vellayati on 21 April 1991.

36 Ibid., at 38, 127.

37 Appointed on 9 April 1991 by the UN Secretary-General in response to Resolution 688.

38 Letter dated 21 April 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/22513, 22 April 1991, which contains, as an `Annex', a Letter dated 21 April 1991 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General, and as an `Enclosure', the 18 April 1991 Memorandum of Understanding.

39 Hottinger, supra note 16, at 442.

40 The Economist 11 May 1991 at 55 et seq.

41 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 16 July 1991 at 6. It seems that originally more than 17,000 troops from France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States were expected to participate, see Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 37 (1991) 38, 127 (News Digest for April 1991).

42 Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 37 (1991) 38, 308 (News Digest for April 1991).

43 Ibid. Another report mentioned states that up to 6,700 Iraqi refugees, mostly children under five, had died during a two-month period in Turkish camps along the border.

44 Hottinger, supra note 16, at 442.

45 The Economist 11 May 1991 at 56.

46 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 16 May 1991 at 7.

47 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 16 May 1991 at 7.

48 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 23 May 1991 at 1.

49 Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 37 (1991) 38, 211 (News Digest for May 1991).

50 The Economist 25 May 1991 at 60. Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 37 (1991) 38, 211 (News Digest for May 1991), reports that moves to create a UN force in the north were rejected by the Government of Iraq on 9 May 1991. It further notes that the Iraqi Government agreed on 20 May to allow a UN observer team to enter Dohuk. The relevant agreement between Iraq and the United Nations was negotiated on 17 and 18 May 1991 and identified as an `Annex' to the 18 April 1991 Memorandum of Understanding. This annex is reproduced in 30 ILM (1991) 862. It states that as `a first step, ten United Nations Guards have been dispatched to Dohuk, on 19 May 1991, in order to establish a United Nations presence at the sub-office and depots of the town' (para. 2.). The annex later notes that the `number of Guards in the Contingent will be kept under review as further units are dispatched [other assignments than in Dohuk are mentioned in the preceding para. 3., PM], but will not exceed a total strength of 500' (para. 4.).

51 The Economist 8 June 1991 at 64.

52 Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 37 (1991) 38, 211 (News Digest for May 1991).

53 Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 37 (1991) 38, 308 (News Digest for June 1991), notes that US Secretary of State James Baker had indicated on 7 June, after talks with UK Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd in Copenhagen, that the USA would consider postponing troop withdrawals until `the security of the Kurdish population is assured'. On 25 June, UK Prime Minister John Major stated that the UK forces would remain in northern Iraq until the Kurdish population received assurances guaranteeing their safety.

54 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 16 July 1991 at 6.

55 According to Hottinger, supra note 16, at 442. Other sources mention the name `Poised Hammer', NRC Handelsblad 12 September 1991 at 12.

56 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 23 September 1991 at 5, mentioning a figure of 4,600 allied soldiers under American leadership.

57 Hottinger, supra note 16, at 442, alleges that this force was not only placed there to intervene in case the Iraqi Government once more resorted to the massive use of force against its own civilians, but also in case cease-fire conditions were not met. However, there is no indication that this particular assembly of forces was designed to do more than protect the Kurds.

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