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The International Practice of the European Communities: Current Survey1.2. Administrative Determinations 1. Dumping1.1. General DevelopmentsUruguay Round The fact that the Uruguay Round was not successfully concluded in
Brussels in December 1990 is common knowledge. The controversies with respect
to agriculture were - and still are - regarded as the main obstacle for
success. The anti-climax of what should have been a successful conclusion has
been reported extensively elsewhere.4
Further revisions of the 1979 GATT Anti-Dumping Code [Mc Phail II and III] were
tabled in Brussels, but no consensus reached. The negotiations were not
recommenced seriously until October 1991. The Commission issued two annual reports within a period of five
months.5 Although the eighth annual report does provide background information on
Commission practice regarding certain items such as the sunset clause, reviews,
circumvention and the Uruguay Round Negotiations, the ninth annual report is
the most informative of the last decade. The ninth report describes fairly extensively Commission practice with
respect to price undertakings, the use of the injury threshold, terminations,
refunds, reviews, and anti-circumvention. Furthermore, a review of six major
anti-dumping proceedings is included,6 as
well as a description of three ECJ cases.7
Finally, a description of the Commission's activity in the period 1981-1990
contributes to this report. The report is also notable because of the tables
provided, with statistics over the period 1981-1990. One comment concerning the format and lay-out of the report cannot be
omitted. The report is issued on thirty-four A4 size papers, stapled together.
By contrast, the Report on Competition Policy,8 is a neatly printed book with an outside cover.
The report on anti-dumping and anti-subsidy policy should merit the same
treatment in the light of its importance. The German Democratic Republic unified on 3 October 1990 with the
Federal Republic of Germany. The GDR therefore became an integral part of the
European Communities. The basic Regulation protects the European Economic Community against
dumped imports from non-EEC countries. Therefore, anti-dumping measures aimed
at products from the GDR no longer have any legal basis since that country no
longer exists. Five measures (two duties, three undertakings) are therefore
inapplicable. This was communicated in the Notice concerning measures on
products from the former GDR, OJ (1990) C 327/14. 1.2. Administrative DeterminationsPure silk typewriter ribbon fabrics from China, OJ (1990) L 174/27 (provisional; undertaking); OJ (1990) L 306/21 (definitive) This Community industry consisted of a single producer in Germany. In
fact, the Chinese producer reportedly was the only other producer of the
product in the world. The normal value was therefore determined in accordance
with Article 2(5), i.e., by reference to the price actually paid or payable in
the Community, duly adjusted to include a reasonable profit margin (5%). A
dumping margin of 47.2% was established. The injury margin amounted to 24.6%.
For the calculation of the injury margin a 5% target profit was used.
Quaere how this difference between dumping and injury margins is
possible in view of the fact that essentially the same parameters were used to
calculate both. The Chinese producer offered a price undertaking which was accepted. To
safeguard the effectiveness of the undertaking and to prevent possible
circumvention by the appearance of other exporters in the future, a residual
ad valorem duty limited by the injury margin was also imposed. This was a review proceeding under Article 15. The Commission verified
whether expiry of the measures would lead again to injury and also investigated
dumping aspects of the case [a mixed Article 14/15 review]. Normal value was
established on a monthly basis in view of the high inflation rate in Brazil,
resulting in a dumping margin of 28.1%. The Commission accepted an undertaking of the sole exporter/producer of
oxalic acid in Brazil. No residual duty was imposed. India was the surrogate country. In the construction of the normal
value, the target profit was 5%. For the calculation of the injury margin the
target profit for the Community industry was 9.4%. The provisional and definitive duties were 43.4% (limited by the injury
margin - the dumping margin was 80.8%). The Chinese exporter argued that most of the Chinese sacks were only
temporarily imported in the EC, and destined for re-exportation, and that sacks
produced in the EC were mostly consumed in the EC. This argument was refuted.
The Commission maintained that the temporarily imported sacks were in
competition with Community industry sacks because the persons who use the sacks
for export could just as well use EC-produced sacks.9 The proceeding covered Linear Tungsten Halogen (LTH) lamps for a voltage
exceeding 100 volts, of 100 watts or more, double-ended with R7s caps, of a
type used for indoor or outdoor illumination. This meant that LTH lamps which
could be used only as components of specialized appliances, such as
photocopiers or photographic lamps, were not covered by the proceeding. Also
the JD lamp - a different type of Halogen lamp - was not considered to be a
`like product'. Two of the three Japanese producers/exporters that cooperated in the
proceeding sold less than 5% of their EC export quantities on the domestic
market. The Commission constructed their normal value. The Commission did not
accept the proposals of these producers to include the SG & A and profit
made on their export sales, respectively sales of the JD lamp. It refused to do
so because one company did sell enough lamps on the domestic market,
and, according to Article 2 (3)(b)(ii), the SG & A and profit shall then be
calculated by reference to the domestic SG & A and domestic profit of such
a company. The latter company claimed that this figure should be adjusted
downwards to allow for `negative transactions' which it claimed were
effectively `notional' transactions connected particularly to cancelled sales
orders and the transfer of sales from one year to the next. The effect would be
that less than 5% of its sales would have been sold on the domestic market. The
argument was rejected by both the Commission and the Council. For the OEM sales the profit margin for the normal value determination
was set at 50% of the profit margin realized on the exporter's domestic own
brand sales or, if the exporter had no such sales, 50% of the average own brand
profit made by the producer/ exporter with sufficient home market sales. In the
definitive determination this profit margin was set at 33% of the own brand
profit margin, instead of 50%. The provisional dumping margins were 146.9, 97.3 and 123.1% ad
valorem for the companies Iwasaki, Sigma and Phoenix. The provisional
injury margins were 71.7, 84.2 and 85.4% respectively. In the definitive
determination the dumping margins were expressed as an amount in ECU (specific
duty), adjusted to take account of the revised estimate of the differences
between the profit margin on own brand sales and that on sales to OEM, and
amounted to 2.3, 1.2 and 1.5 ECU per unit for the three companies. The injury
margins definitively established were 35.6 (Iwasaki), 45.5 (Phoenix) and 46.5%
(Sigma and residual). The duties were limited by these injury margins.10 The investigation period covered 14 months. This long period was due to
the complexity of the proceeding, in particular the difficulties met by the
Commission in obtaining the relevant data of some of the interested parties.
The market shares of the exported product from the countries involved
were found to be de minimis, except for the Yugoslav exports. The
respective market shares were: Hungary: 0.58%; Poland: 0.25%; Romania: 0.15%;
Yugoslavia: 1.94%. The proceeding was terminated because of withdrawal of the
complaint after the complainants had been informed by the Commission that it
had not found injury. No material changes, compared with the provisional determination11 have taken place, and, consequently, the
definitive duty is set at 60%. In all the proceedings the Commission confirmed the provisional duties.
In Tungstic oxide and tungstic acid and in Tungsten carbide and fused
tungsten carbide undertakings were accepted. The Commission established the normal value on the basis of the price
payable in the Community for a like product, including a reasonable profit
margin. This led to a dumping margin of 38.73%. The target profit for the
Community industry was set at 6.5%, and this led to calculation of an injury
margin of 18.7% The Commission found that the export prices of the Chinese
exporters/producers had further decreased by approximately 10% after the
investigation period. The Commission, however, considered it inappropriate - in
conformity with standard practice - to take account of facts which have
occurred after the investigation period. Therefore, the provisional measures
could be confirmed. Indirectly, the Commission did take the continuous price decrease
after the investigation period into account by making the duty a
specific one, expressed in ECU, and calculated on the basis of the
injury margin during the investigation period. If the duty - as the provisional
one - had been set on an ad valorem basis, it would have decreased
together with the price. [Another solution would have been to impose a variable
duty.] The normal value for Turkey was established on a monthly basis, to take
into account high inflation in this country. For five of the eleven companies investigated either no or de
minimis dumping margins were found, de minimis being defined as less
than one per cent. In addition to de minimis dumping, there was also no
material injury. The market share of the dumped exports had decreased from 4.4%
in 1987 to 2.8% in 1988. This was the major reason for the conclusion that the
injury sustained by the Community industry could not be considered to be
material. In the light of the above, the proceeding was terminated. A very high proportion of the Community industry failed to reply to the
questionnaire, despite the fact that the original deadline for the reply was
extended by the Commission. The combined proportion of those who did
reply did not constitute a major proportion of the Community production as set
out in the complaint. Therefore, the Commission was unable to establish whether
expiry of the measure would lead again to injury or threat thereof, and
terminated the review. The investigation covered the period from 1 January 1989 to 31 December
1989 for China, Korea and Thailand. For Japan the period covered 1 January 1989
to 30 June 1990. The Commission excluded `piezo lighters' from the product definition
because they had different physical characteristics. The normal value for Thailand was constructed and a profit margin of 8%
used. This was considered reasonable in view of the higher profit margin
realized by other exporters from other countries and because R & D costs
were very low in Thailand. The Commission used Thailand as the analogue country for China. For the Japanese normal value determination, the lighters for
advertisement were found to have a higher price due to higher cost of
production and, moreover, they were not exported. The Commission therefore
excluded such lighters from the normal value determination. The Commission constructed Japanese export prices using a 9% profit
margin. The Commission used a 15% target profit for the Community industry for
calculation of the injury margin. The duties were: 15% for Thailand, 17.8% for China, 35.7% for Japan and
22.7% for Korea. On one Thai company 5.8% was imposed. Of the duties for the
four countries involved, the duties for Japan and Korea were limited by the
injury margin.12 With respect to the construction of the export price, the Commission
used a profit margin for related importers of 6%, as in the previous
investigation. The profit margin for the Community industry (establishment of
target price for purposes of calculating the injury margins) was set at 15%
(shortfall of 7%), which is the same as the one used for the Community industry
in Ballbearings from Thailand not exceeding 30 mm, concluded one month
later. The Commission found that the response to the questionnaire of Nippon
Seiko, was insufficient in the light of the findings at the verification. In
particular, the Commission found that the report of the discounts given on the
domestic market was incorrect; the comparison of the normal value was based on
types which were similar and not identical; some replies (of related companies)
were totally incomplete and there were substantial errors in some replies
concerning transport costs and customs duties. Moreover, it proved impossible
to verify the data relating to the cost of production. Consequently the
Commission determined that it would reward non-cooperation to assume that the
dumping margin for Nippon Seiko was lower than the highest dumping margin
found. This latter conclusion also applied to two related companies of Nippon
Seiko, despite the fact that one of these two related companies (Inoue Jikuuke
Kogyo) provided a full and satisfactory reply to the questionnaire. The Commission found the following dumping and injury margins for the
Japanese Companies:
It is noteworthy that although the Commission based its findings for the
dumping margins for the three last mentioned companies on the best facts
available, it did not do so with respect to the injury margins and the duties
related thereto. It is uncertain what the ratio is for this decision. In February 1990, the Commission initiated a review proceeding under
Article 14 at the request of the sole USSR exporter. The only known Community
producer withdrew from participation in the investigation because it had
definitively ceased production. This meant that there was no longer a Community
industry for the product concerned. Consequently, the anti-dumping duties could
be repealed. On the `like product' determination, other watchmakers - from the quartz
segment of the market - had argued that dumped imports could influence the
marketability of all other wristwatches. But the Commission refuted this
argument by stating that: ...[t]his argument has little or no relevance since quartz watches use a completely different movement technology in comparison with mechanical watches and cannot therefore be considered a like product within the meaning of Article 2(12)... Furthermore, the Commission stated that the repeal of duties with
respect to the watches concerned would not retard the re-establishment of a
Community industry producing mechanical watches. In the opinion of the
Commission, the revival of this industry is limited to the medium and
high-quality segment of the market, and not the low quality end of the market
where the USSR product is positioned. An unusual end came to the proceeding when it appeared that the product
imported actually did not originate in the USSR, but in Romania. The small
portion which did originate in the USSR was imported outside the reference
period. The preliminary determinations on dumping therefore were invalidated
insofar as they referred to imports from the USSR. The same was true for the
injury determination. Since therefore no dumping had occurred from the USSR,
and consequently, no injury had resulted therefrom, the Commission terminated
the proceeding.13 The Council confirmed the original findings of the Commission
Regulation. The target profit margins which were used for the calculation of
the constructed normal value and for the calculation of the injury margin were
32 and 15% respectively. The 15% target profit for the Community industry was
set because the present profit of 8% was not considered to represent a
reasonable return on sales for the Community industry. The Commission published a notice of impending expiry in February 1989.
A full (Article 14) review was initiated in March 1989. Because the review had
not been concluded in July, the Commission announced that the measures would
remain in force after the end of the relevant five year period, pending the
outcome of the review. The investigation of dumping covered the period from December 1987 to
February 1989 (15 months!). The Commission first determined whether enough profitable sales had been
made on the home market. It found that, although substantial quantities had
been sold at a loss, the volume of sales which could be taken into account
amounted to some 30% of the EC export sales. The normal value was, in general,
established on a monthly basis. No particular reason was provided. The Commission reconstructed some export prices (related importer) using
a 3% profit margin. With respect to the adjustment of the export price, costs were deducted
resulting from non-recoverable waste caused by successive loading and unloading
of the export consignments. The dumping margins for the four companies under investigation were 2.9,
12.8, 9.8, and 11.9% respectively. The average margin of undercutting amounted to 6%. The market share of
the imports was 3.2% in 1983, and fell to 1.4% in the period thereafter
remaining at that level. The Commission determined that this insignificantly
limited the volume of imports (at recital (36)), and undercutting had made
practically no effect on the price levels. The Commission recognized that it
had not been established that the expiry of the current measures in force would
(threaten to) cause material injury to the Community industry. Only a large
increase of exports would be able to succeed in influencing the general price
levels to the Community. Therefore, the Commission terminated the review in
October 1990. The Commission determined that audio tapes in cassettes and audio tapes
on reels are two different products, because of differences in physical
characteristics and uses. The audio tape in a cassette is the finished product,
and the audio tape on a reel is the semi-finished product. Although the
initiation of the proceeding refers to both products, the proceeding continued
only with the coverage of audio tapes in cassettes.14 With respect to adjustments one Japanese exporter claimed that various
free items (give-aways such as index cards, photographs) should be treated as a
rebate and deducted from the domestic price. The Commission did not allow this
claim; it considered these costs as promotional expenses for which no allowance
may be made. For the constructed value the Commission used a `reasonable' profit
margin. One exporter claimed that this profit margin should be less because
sales were made on an OEM basis. The Commission initially did not agree because
it did not consider these sales to have been made on an OEM basis. In the
definitive determination, however, the Commission granted this claim and
reduced the profit margin used in the constructed normal value by 50% for OEM
sales. It should be noted15 that the
Commission is becoming increasingly stringent in allowing OEM-claims - both
with respect to the identification of OEM sales and with respect to the setting
of an appropriate profit margin to be used in the constructed normal value for
OEM-sales. On the basis of recent cases it would seem that the Commission requires
not only OEM-customers' specifications, but also differences in quantities sold
and prices charged to OEM and own brand customers in order to determine that
`genuine' OEM sales exist. With respect to the appropriate profit, the
Commission in recent cases has no longer used the fixed five per cent profit
margin, but rather more flexible thresholds, such as 33% or 50% of the profit
generated on domestic own brand sales. Some Korean companies had claimed an allowance for salaries of part-time
salesmen. This was not granted and only salaries for personnel wholly engaged
in sales services were allowed.16 In this
context, the Commission also disallowed sales staff expenses such as for car
and telephone because these expenses in the view of the Commission did not form
part of the salaries but are part of the general selling expenses of the
exporters. The Commission verified more than 70% of the export transactions for
each exporter. The export transactions from Korea had all taken place in US
Dollars, and therefore had to be converted into Won. The exporters had used for
this purpose an average yearly exchange rate. The Commission did not accept
this, and instead used monthly currency rates, because of the serious
fluctuations of the Won during the reference period. Where the exports were made through a subsidiary, prices were
reconstructed. In one case, the Commission deducted advertising costs paid by
an associated exporter. A profit margin of 5% was used in the construction of
the export price. The Commission found dumping margins between 0.43 and 80.20%. The
margins of 0.43% and 0.50% were considered de minimis. For the calculation of injury17 the
Commission found that a price erosion of 12% had taken place in the period
between 1985 and 1988. The global profitability of the two German producers
BASF and AGFA amounted to 1.89%. In the view of the Commission, this
profitability only partly reflected the state of the Community industry because
the Community industry had only focused on those sales which had been
reasonably profitable with a continuous decrease of non-profitable sales. The Commission therefore determined that the injury consisted of a
reduced profitability and considerable loss of sales. For the purposes
of the injury calculation the target profit was set at 12%. Given, however, the
particular circumstances of the Community industry, the target profit was then
adjusted to take account of the price depression and the global profit
shortfall. The adjusted target profit led to a calculation of a necessary price
increase of 17.36% for the Community industry. The Commission adjusted this latter figure for each exporter to take
account of the relative price level of each exporter and the relative volume of
the dumped imports in relation to the other exporters. Several exporters
contested this so-called volume factor (a novel element in EC injury margin
calculations). They argued that the comparative volume of imports bore no
relationship to the injury suffered. The Council did not accept this argument,
stating that the adjustment - a variance of 20% above and below the average
according to the volume of exports of each exporter - was far from
unreasonable. The argument of Japanese exporters that their exports had decreased from
42% in 1985 to 35% in 1988 (and could therefore not attribute to injury) was
not accepted by the Council. The market share of Japanese imports had indeed
decreased but had still remained very large (i.e. 35%, double the Community
industry's market share). The duties imposed were limited to the injury margins (15.2-25.2%) in
the case of Japan. It should be noted that, although Sony did not cooperate in
the investigation of the dumping, Sony had done so for injury purposes and
therefore, despite the fact that it had received the highest dumping margin, it
did not receive the highest duty because of injury reasons (23.4 instead of
25.2%). For Korea, the duties were limited to the dumping margins (9.2 and
2.6%). The Council stated explicitly that in cases where the exporting company
is not the same as the producing company, the rate pertaining to the producing
company shall be imposed in order to deal with `trading houses'. Imports from Hong Kong were decumulated because they were de
minimis: 1.5% in 1985 and 1.6% in 1986. We mention two miscellaneous items about this investigation: For one of the Korean companies, Nakayama, the documents were
investigated at the premises of its Japanese parent company. This is fairly
unusual as the Commission normally prefers to conduct verifications at the
place where the source records are normally checked. The definitive determination sums up the criteria for cumulation of
imports from several countries: interchangeability, sales on the same
geographical market, similar distribution channels, simultaneous presence, and
non-de-minimis. In a reaction to the provisional duties, Japan stated that it would seek
action under the GATT Anti-Dumping Code if the Commission would impose
definitive duties.18 The duties would
violate Article VI of the GATT and the Anti-Dumping Code, essentially on injury
grounds. The complaint had been lodged by the sole producer of aspartame in the
Community. For the normal value of aspartame from the US, the Commission verified
whether the sales had been made in the ordinary course of trade. The comparison
between the average cost of production with the average ex-factory domestic
prices revealed that domestic sales were made at prices which permitted
recovery of all costs. The US exporter alleged that the prices in the US would not allow a
proper comparison and therefore it requested that the normal value be based on
the constructed value rather than on the domestic sales prices. It argued that
there were differences in the price elasticity between the US and the Community
markets because of a higher degree of health awareness in the US and therefore
preference for aspartame in the US. In addition the Community market for
aspartame developed later, and therefore the product was less well-known. The Commission fully agreed that there might be a difference in price
elasticity, but not surprisingly took the view that price elasticity is
in fact a prerequisite for price differentiation; if adjustments had to be made
on these grounds dumping could never be found. Furthermore, the exporter claimed that in the Community patents had
lapsed, whereas on the US market the product was sold under patent. The
Commission also rejected this claim. Price discrimination causing injury is
condemned by the Community and international law irrespective of the reasons.
Consequently, the normal value was determined on the basis of the weighted
average domestic price, net of all discounts. Some of the export sales were made to customers in the US for subsequent
export to the Community. The exporter claimed that these sales therefore should
not be included as export sales. The Commission could not accept this argument
since the producer was aware of the final destination of the product. The provisional dumping margin with respect to the US exceeded 100%. In
the definitive determination the dumping margin was expressed in ECU, and
amounted to 66 ECU/kg for the US imports. It was limited to the injury margin:
25.15 ECU/kg. For Japan, the Commission used the `best' information available (US
figures) in the provisional determination. The reason was that the Commission
was not able to verify the domestic sales. Also the export sales could not be
verified. The export sales were all made through a related party in Switzerland
and the Swiss authorities refused the Commission permission to carry out an
on-the-spot investigation. The dumping situation for Japan was reconsidered in the definitive
determination. The Commission found with respect to normal value that the product was
not imported to the Community directly from Japan, but was first imported to
the US. The situation envisaged in Article 2(6)19 had therefore occurred: [t]he investigation revealed that the product was not merely transhipped through the USA but was actually sold to and imported by the US producer/exporter in the USA before exportation to the Community. The investigation also showed that there was substantial production within the USA and that there was a comparable price for aspartame in the USA. The Commission therefore based normal value on US domestic prices.
However, the dumping margin for Japan (based on the same data as for the US)
was much lower: 47 ECU/kg (not 66 ECU/kg). Nonetheless, the injury margin and
therewith the duty are higher: 27.21 ECU/kg (not 25.15 ECU/kg). At first sight,
this seems strange as it would appear that normal values for the US and the
Japanese products were similar whereas export prices of the Japanese products
presumably were higher (lower dumping margin). Yet, the injury margins for the
Japanese products were higher. The amendment was the result of a newcomer review. The Commission
constructed the normal value because the company did not sell on the domestic
market. A profit rate of 8% was used. There had been no exports so it was not
possible to calculate the dumping margin. Therefore the Commission imposed a
variable duty with a floor price set at the level of the constructed normal
value. Another newcomer review proceeding was initiated one month later. The
establishment of the expedited newcomer review possibility is a welcome but
under utilized innovation in EC anti-dumping practice. The investigation period covered the whole of 1988 even though the
initiation was published in December 1989. The 1988 period was selected
because most of the Community producers and importers were small firms. This
meant that the finalized and audited results of 1988 were the most recent
available. The dumping margin in the provisional determination was 93.3% and the
injury margin 221% (taking into account a target profit of 7% for the Community
industry). In the provisional proceeding, the Commission took the view that the
product in question, although categorized under two different CN codes - and
corresponding to three different types of slippers - constituted one
product. In the definitive determination, however, the Commission categorized
the product into two different products (`A' and `B' slippers), on the basis of
the two different CN codes. The surrogate country which was chosen was Uruguay, and the profit
margin for the construction of the normal value was set at 7%. In the definitive determination an allowance was granted for physical
differences for both the `A' and `B' category of slippers. This resulted in
respective dumping and injury margins of 105.3% and 255.7% for type A and 70.3%
and 154.9% for type B slippers. The duties were limited by the dumping
margins. The investigation period was ten months. For the product determination
the Commission stated that SCTVs with a screen size of less than six inches are
not in direct competition with the larger ones (mainly 14-16 inch) and these
smaller SCTVs were therefore excluded from the scope of the proceeding.
Features such as radio broadcast receivers, or a clock were not considered
physical differences which would materially affect the definition of the
product under consideration. The Commission further determined that for `like product' the important
features are: the screen size, the presentation (e.g., glass plate), the tuning
control system (e.g., remote control), the connections (video, audio) and the
available sound output. Conversely, this was not the case with features such as flat square
screens, teletext modules, a digital chassis and the adaptation of the
television receiver to a different broadcasting standard. These features do not
affect the basic technology employed, or the consumer perception and
usage of the product. For the normal value of Hong Kong, the Commission accepted for one
exporter the claim to disregard certain own brand domestic sales through a
department store, since this trade channel was not comparable with that used
for own-brand export sales. For another Hong Kong producer/exporter where the sales had been made
through a related trading company, it was found that: [c]ommissions paid by the producer/exporter to the related trading company have not been taken into account as allowable selling expenses, since the two companies concerned form part of the same economic entity. In the case where three Hong Kong producers/exporters had made export
sales on an OEM basis, but where the normal value had to be constructed, the
Commission used a profit margin of five per cent. This was also the case for
the construction of the normal value for China, since almost all the export
sales from China had been made on an OEM basis. In the construction of the export price for China the Commission used a
10% profit margin. One Hong Kong exporter had claimed an adjustment for credit expenses of
domestically sold products. The Commission refused to grant this adjustment,
because all the domestic sales had been made under cash on delivery terms. The injury calculation took place by way of, inter alia,
cross-cumulation20 with the Korean SCTV
proceeding. Furthermore, the argument was made that injury could not be suffered at
present, because four Member States had already enforced quantitative
restrictions. The Commission refuted this argument on the ground that the
injury was price rather than quantity related. For the calculation of the
amount of undercutting a target profit of 10% was used. The duties were limited by the dumping margin, except for one
Sino-Japanese joint venture (Fujian-Hitachi) for whom the injury margin (13.1%)
was lower than the dumping margin (17.04%). The duties varied between 2.1 and
4.8% for Hong Kong and 7.5 and 17.4% for China. With respect to the definition of the Community industry, the regional
industry exception was applied. This resulted in the Community market being divided into several
competitive markets, and the producers in Italy regarded as the Community
industry. The Commission found that the Italian industry (1) sold almost all
its production (99%) on the local market, and, (2) the demand in the Italian
market was not in any substantial degree supplied by producers located
elsewhere in the Community. The Commission found that four areas within Italy were
particularly affected by imports from Yugoslavia. The Commission therefore
considered whether these areas, in turn - either individually or collectively -
could constitute a Community industry. It found that this was not possible. The market share of the imports rose from 0.78% to 1.49%. The Commission
did not explicitly state that this constituted a de minimis market
share, but the proceeding was terminated because of a no injury. Despite the fact that the deadline for reply to the questionnaires for
Community producers was extended by the Commission, many of the producers did
not reply. The number which did reply did not constitute a major
proportion of the Community industry and the Commission terminated the
proceeding. The complaint was filed by the Federation of Manufacturers of
Construction Equipment and Cranes on behalf of hydraulic excavator producers
whose collective output was alleged to constitute the majority of the Community
production of the product in question. The information submitted was sufficient to initiate a review. But a
very high percentage of the Community producers failed to reply to the
questionnaires. The Commission found that their combined production did not
constitute a major proportion of the Community industry, and this prevented the
Commission from establishing whether expiry would lead again to injury or
threat thereof and it terminated the review. Barium chloride from China, OJ (1991) L 60/1 (definitive) The proceeding was dropped with respect to German products due to the
German unification. The previously made distinction in the product determination between the
crystallized and anhydrous forms of barium chloride was abandoned because it
became clear that the differences were negligible. The Commission did not succeed in using the US as a surrogate because of
reasons beyond its control. Therefore the normal value was determined on the
basis of the price paid or payable to the Community. Normal value was
determined on a monthly basis, adjusted to include a profit margin of less than
10%. The recalculated dumping margin was 50.13%. On injury grounds the duty was
limited to 25.8%. The investigation period ran from April 1986 to March 1987. The
examination of injury covered the period from 1983 to 1987. For the like product determination the Commission considered that
`processed wafers and dice are like finished EPROMs' and `different densities
of EPROMs constitute different like products'. For the determination of the
Community industry, the Commission considered that companies which import
wafers and dice for assembly in the Community, from related Japanese exporters,
should be excluded from the definition of the Community industry. The normal value was constructed because less than 5% of the export
sales-quantities were sold with profit on the domestic market. The profit
margin used in the construction was that of the sales which were
profitable on the domestic market. An argument which was raised in order not to construct the normal value
was that, although sales of some devices might have been made at a loss, all
costs would have been recovered in the long run. The Council did not accept
this argument because in its view EPROM devices which are sold at prices which
do not permit recovery of all costs within the one year investigation period,
cannot be regarded as having been made in the ordinary course of trade. Claims for patent fees were not accepted because such adjustments
equally affect the normal value and the export price. The injury margin was calculated with a 25% target profit for the EC
industry and amounted to 94%. This was lower than the highest dumping margin of
106%. Undertakings offered by seven exporters were accepted. The product under consideration was fresh and chilled Atlantic salmon.
Although salmon can be qualified into three categories all salmon was
considered as one like product. Because of the large number of operators involved in the proceeding,
both in the Community and in Norway, the Commission resorted to sampling. In the Community, the Commission made a representative selection on the
basis of size and location of the total 180 production units. Out of the about 1,000 Norwegian producers/exporters, a selection was
made on the basis of proposals from the Norwegian industry, the volume of their
sales, and their geographical location. An additional criterion was the quality
of the answers to the questionnaire. The Commission constructed the normal value because practically all the
domestic sales are made at a loss. A 5% profit margin was used. The export
price taken was the actual export price. The weighted average dumping margin
which the Commission established was 11.3%. The underselling margin calculated (prices of Norwegian imports compared
with Community's production costs plus transport costs plus 15% profit)
amounted to 29.6%. Nevertheless, no measures were adopted so far because the Norwegian
Government in 1989 adopted a series of measures which restricted the volume of
salmon which was supplied to the European market. Also the Norwegian industry
has taken similar measures itself. The result of these measures was a recovery
in prices on the Community market during 1989. Furthermore, intentions of
goodwill also led the Commission to conclude that measures are unnecessary at
the moment but developments will be monitored closely from now on. The advisory
Committee - except for Ireland and the UK - agreed with the Commission.
Therefore the proposal to terminate was forwarded to the Council. Since the
Council did not decide otherwise, within one month the proposal of the
Commission was adopted. It should be noted that the legal basis of this voluntary restraint
agreement as a matter of EEC anti-dumping law is unclear as it is clearly not
envisaged by the basic Regulation. Political pressure exerted by the Norwegian
Government and the ongoing EEA negotiations probably played a large role. The exports of the Venezuelan Company Conduven were channelled through
Connectors Inc., located in New York. Connectors had the function of an export
department of Conduven. Connectors handled no other exports, and was fully
controlled by Conduven. The export contracts, invoicing and collection of
payments were made by Connectors; the handling and shipping of the goods was
carried out by Conduven, which shipped the goods directly to the Community. The
exporting country is therefore Venezuela. The export price was taken to be that
invoiced by Connectors, since this company merely performed the functions of an
export department of Conduven which would otherwise have been carried out in
Venezuela. This is the second time that the Commission has decided to treat a sales
subsidiary of a foreign exporter, located in a third country, as part of the
exporter's exporting network rather than as part of its importing network. The
distinction is of great practical importance because under the former
determination, the Commission will deduct only direct selling expenses,
incurred by the sales subsidiary, from the export price while, under the latter
determination, direct and indirect selling expenses as well as a
reasonable profit margin - normally 5-6% - will be deducted. 22.1% dumping was found for Conduven. The undercutting margin was 25.8%.
The market share of 1.9% was considered to be significant. For Turkey the normal value was calculated on a monthly basis. Dumping
margins of 18.5 and 8.1% were found for the Turkish producers. The respective
undercutting margins were 21.2 and 7%. The market share of Turkey of 3.9% was
considered significant. The Commission accepted price undertakings of the companies
investigated, and imposed residual duties at the rate of the dumping margins
(22.1% for Venezuela and 22.1% for Turkey). No producers in surrogate market economies were found willing to
cooperate with the Commission to calculate the normal value. Therefore the
normal value was established in accordance with Article 2(5)(c).21 The profit margin was for this purpose set at
12%. An association representing enterprises with foreign investments
in China claimed that the companies concerned operate on a market economy
basis. Therefore, the companies should be treated on an individual basis -
differently from the state-owned companies in China. The Commission refuted
this argument by stating that these foreign companies were not sufficiently
independent from the market economy forces that prevail in China. Consequently,
only one uniform dumping margin for China was calculated: 122.9%.22 For the injury calculation a price undercutting of 59.9% was found.
Moreover, the Commission determined that a target profit of 12% was necessary.
The duty was set at 25.8%. The Commission calculated normal values on a monthly basis to offset the
inflationary effect of domestic prices. Dumping margins between 0 and 66.56%
were found. The residual duty was 39% and limited by the injury margin. Six
firms offered undertakings which were accepted. It should be noted that this determination was the result of a review
request of the Brazilian industry and that for some companies, for example Rima
Eletrometalur, the result was far worse than that in the original 1987
proceeding. Rima has challenged the determination of the Council in
Court.23 The normal values were compared with the export prices on a monthly
basis. The dumping margin was 29.7%. Price-undertakings were offered and
accepted at a level which was sufficient to eliminate the injury.24 This investigation was initiated under the Articles 13(11) and 14. This
was the first time that an investigation has been opened under Article 13(11)
(`anti-absorption'). Article 13(11) prohibits anti-dumping duties being borne
by the exporter. This was the second proceeding concerning polyester film. After the
Commission had determined in the first proceeding that the exports had not
caused injury to the film sector, nor material injury to the thin film (film
from 12 to 36 microns) sector, the Community withdrew its complaint only to
file a new complaint a mere eight days later for film which is thinner than 25
microns. The Commission found that the Korean imports did not undercut those of
the Community producers and, given their small (less than 5% and declining)
market share, they could hardly have caused price depression. In the absence of injury, the Commission considered it unnecessary to
take protective measures and terminated the proceeding. It should be noted that
although the Commission did not calculate dumping margins it did remark that
there were indications of dumping practices in 1989. 1.3. Court Cases25Case C-49/88, Al-Jubail Fertilizer Company and others v. Council of the European Communities, Judgment of 27 June 1991 (Urea) (not yet reported) In this case, two Saudi Arabian Companies sought a declaration that
Article 1 of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3339/87 of 4 November 1987, imposing
a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of urea, is void insofar as it
concerns them. The duty under consideration was an ad valorem duty of
40% which was later (Regulation No. 450/89 of 20 February 1989) adjusted to
12.8%. The applicants argued their case on the basis of four different grounds,
alleging in turn the denial of their right to a fair hearing, an inadequate
statement of reasoning behind the Regulation imposing the duty, manifest errors
of appraisal and, lastly, errors of law and misrepresention of the facts. The Court only focused on the first of these four grounds, the denial of
a right to a fair hearing. In support of their position with respect to this
head of challenge, the applicants made separate allegations. The applicants first alleged that they were adversely affected by the
method used to calculate the definitive duty, given that it was different from
that used in calculating the provisional duty and that they received no prior
warning of this change in method. Specifically, the provisional duty consisted
of a floor price of 133 ECU, whereas the definitive duty was set at the
abovementioned 40% ad valorem, later adjusted to 12.8%. The Court
concluded that, whereas the amount of the duty is information essential to the
parties, the same is not true for the method of calculation nor for the type of
duty. The absence of such information cannot be said to influence adversely the
rights of defence and the Court therefore rejected the applicants' argument
with respect thereto. Second, the applicants argued that the Community institutions had failed
to supply them with information concerning allowances, thereby hampering the
defence of the applicants' interests. In defence of its position, the Council
referred solely to an internal mission report and to the summaries of two
internal meetings with representatives of the parties involved. Given that the
Council did not provide adequate proof that this information was made available
to the applicants, the Court held that the Commission did not discharge its
obligation to inform the applicants adequately. The third argument of the parties related to the failure to reply to the
applicants' questions regarding the determination of the threshold of injury.
This question's main objective was to determine the production costs of the
Community producer chosen by the Commission for establishing the threshold. The
applicants criticized the Commission for the inadequacy of the information
supplied on this point. The Council referred to a letter from the Commission to
counsel for the applicant, which the applicants claim they did not receive.
This letter, dated 8 September 1987, in the view of the Council, contained
relevant information on these questions. The Court found, however, insufficient
proof of receipt of this letter by the applicants, and held that the Commission
again failed to fulfil its obligations to provide the information required by
the interested parties. Since two main allegations of the applicants with respect to the lack of
a fair hearing were considered to be relevant, i.e., both relating to the
failure of the Community institutions to fulfil their duty to put at the
disposition of the applicants information necessary to defend their interests,
the Court annulled the definitive duty imposed. The Court stated, inter alia, that in the interpretation of
Article 7(4) of the basic Regulation, account must be taken of the fundamental
rights of defence. This is especially so, given that EC procedure does not
contain all the safeguards envisaged under certain national laws. The Court
stated: [a]ny action taken by the Community institutions must be all the more scrupulous in view of the fact that, as they stand at present, the rules in question do not provide all the procedural guarantees for the protection of the individual which may exist in certain national systems. The interested parties therefore must, in any event, be given the
opportunity in the course of the proceedings to make known their points of
view. With respect to providing information, the Court finds that the
institutions must act with all necessary diligence to give to the parties
concerned the required information, provided that the business secrets of the
other parties are respected. The Court has clearly not gone as far as the proposal of the Advocate
General, namely to constitute the establishment of a system similar to that
found under American law, i.e., the `administrative protective order'.26 However, the Commission will in the future
probably be more attentive to respecting procedural safeguards provided for in
the basic Regulation. The ECJ upheld the Commission's calculation method under the basic
Regulation concerning the constructed value. The ECJ stated that the
constructed value for Nakajima had been calculated in a similar manner under
the old basic Regulation. The other features of the case concerned a wild variety of procedural
questions all of which were rejected by the ECJ. An interesting facet is that the ECJ examined whether or not some
Articles of the basic Anti-Dumping Regulation are
`Anti-Dumping-Code-compatible'. Whereas the ECJ explicitly states that the Code
has no direct effect, it reserves the right to inquire whether internal EC law
complies with the Code, because the EC is bound by the Code. The provision
under attack, however, did not violate the Code because it was reasonable
within the parameters of the Code provisions. Finally, Extramet should be mentioned. In this case, the Court
considered admissible the appeal brought by Extramet, an independent importer
of calcium metal from China and the Soviet Union: Extramet was not only the
single most important importer, but also an end user of the product. Its
economic activities in view of the Court depended to a large extent on the
imports and therefore the contested Regulation because of the small number of
calcium producers and because it had experienced problems in obtaining the
product from the main EC producer (and complainant) Pechiney, which was
simultaneously its main competitor in the processing market.
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