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The International Practice of the European Communities: Current Survey1.2. Administrative Determinations Commercial Defence Actions and Other International Trade Developments in the European Communities: 1 July 1992 - 31 December 1992 Edwin Vermulst1 and Folkert Graafsma2 Full text available: PDF format * This is the fifth in the series of reports on developments in the field
of EC international trade law.3 This report
will cover developments that occurred during the six months period 1 July 1992
to 31 December 1992. 1. Dumping1.1. General DevelopmentsUruguay Round The Uruguay Round negotiations have essentially been on hold pending
expected action on the part of the Clinton Administration to fix a time limit
on the fast track extension that will probably be requested of the US Congress.
Accordingly, there have been no new developments concerning the revised
Anti-Dumping Code since our previous report.4 The proposal for the new decision-making procedure, which we discussed
in our previous report,5 has been published
in the Official Journal.6 High level GATT meetings took place between EC and Japanese officials
concerning the audio tapes in cassettes proceedings. Japan opposes the
calculation of injury and injury margins, whereas the EC argues that the duties
were more moderate than the actual dumping margins, and that injury has in fact
further increased since duties were imposed. Since the entry into force of the trade provisions of the Association
agreements, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak Republics,7 have been considered market economies for
anti-dumping purposes.8 Also the Baltic States are now considered market economies.9 To preclude companies in the Baltic States from
requesting a review, DG-I-C has annulled all dumping measures insofar as they
relate to the Baltic States.10 All other East European countries continue to be qualified as non-market
economies for anti-dumping purposes.11 1.2. Administrative DeterminationsVideo cassettes from Hong Kong, OJ (1992) L 182/6 (amendment) This was the result of the newcomer review requested by Bico Magnetics.
The reference period was six months which is rather normal in newcomer reviews
and, in the absence of any home market sales, normal value was based on
constructed value. Despite the fact that the Commission used an 8% profit
margin in the constructed value no dumping was found. Accordingly, Bico
Magnetics was exempted from the duty. Basically, the provisional determination was confirmed, except for two
Brazilian companies that managed to obtain lower dumping margins. The investigation covered the odd period from 1 January 1990 to 31 March
1991 (fifteen months). For Egypt the Commission based normal value on constructed value. For
Poland, Norway was considered an appropriate reference country. In Norway the
Commission also resorted to constructed value. A six percent profit margin was
imputed for the constructed value in both Egypt and Norway. The export prices were based on the actual export prices. On this basis
the dumping margins found were significant: 43.9% for Poland and 61.5% for the
cooperating Egyptian producer. The injury margin was calculated on the basis of underselling with a
target profit of 6% for the EC industry. On this basis, a 32% injury margin was
established. In accordance with the lesser-duty rule,12 the provisional duty was set at 32% for both
countries. The sole cooperating Egyptian producer offered an undertaking which was
accepted. On the basis of Article 2(5)(c) the Commission took Community prices as
the basis for establishing normal value (with a 5% profit margin). The dumping
margin was 47.2% and the injury margin 24.6%. The duty was based on the injury
margin and a price undertaking was accepted from the one known exporter of the
product under consideration. For China, the complainants suggested South Africa as the surrogate
country. The Commission imposed provisional duties on all Korean companies except
Cheil. The anti-dumping duties imposed varied between 1.7 and 9.0%. For the Indian companies the provisional duties varied between 12.6% and
15.9%. These duties were limited by the injury margin. The dumping margins
exceeded the injury margins because the Commission did not make an allowance
for differences in import charges and indirect taxes (duty drawback).13 Although the principle of the Indian system was clear (the import
charges and indirect taxes payable are borne by materials incorporated in the
Polyester Staple Fibre [PSF], when the PSF is sold on the domestic
market; these import charges and indirect taxes are refunded when PSF is
exported), the proof of the system was not so easy. The reason for this initial
difficulty of evidence was that the Indian implementation of the system is
quite complicated (advance licence and replenishment system) and that some of
the proof of the system was in the hands of third parties that had no interest
in providing the proof. On 17 July, a partial review was initiated of the anti-dumping measures
applicable to EPROMs from Japan. The products under consideration include in
particular Flash EPROMs and one-time programmable read only memories (OTPs).
The review was requested by Intel Corporation. This company alleges that it
should be considered as a newcomer. In 1977 the Council had imposed a special duty on imports of certain
nuts of iron and steel from Taiwan.14 On 16
March 1982 the Commission initiated a review of the case.15 On 27 August 1982 the Commission terminated the
review and confirmed the duty.16 Ten years
after the 1982 review the Commission considered that a further review of the
measures was warranted in order to examine the advisability of the duty
continuing in force. The Community industry did not bother to react to the questionnaires and
accordingly the Commission determined that there was no injury. One may wonder
why the Commission did not, by analogy with an anti-dumping duty, announce the
impending expiry under the sunset clause in 1987 and open the possibility for
interested parties to request a review. On the other hand one could question
why the producers/exporters concerned did not request a review themselves in
1987. In any event, 15 years of duty is one of the longest in the history of EC
anti-dumping practice. The products covered are TRB cups, which are defined as: outer rings of tapered roller bearings, further worked than turned, originating in Japan and falling within CN code ex 8482 99 00 (Taric codes 8482 99 00*11 and 8482 99 00*91). This is the one of the recent proceedings against a part of a
finished product (the Tapered Roller Bearing). This trend started after the
GATT Panel declared the screwdriver provision in violation of GATT and has also
been found in cases such as Capacitors and Parts of pocket
lighters. In view of the ongoing negotiations in the Uruguay Round, this
trend can be expected to continue. The duties were 6% for NTN Corporation and 12.4% for any other
producer/exporter. This was a notice as foreseen under Article 15(4) of the basic
Regulation. The case commenced on 25 July 1992. Brazil was suggested as the surrogate country. South Africa was suggested as the surrogate country. As a result of the review the Commission found a 14.4% dumping margin,
which was lower than the injury margin. On this basis the Commission imposed a
floor price of 44 ECU per 1,000 kilograms. This duty does not apply to three
companies that had offered undertakings that were accepted. Several Brazilian producers deducted interest earned on currency
operations from their financing costs and deducted financial profits from
production costs. In this regard the Commission took the following
position: The Commission, however, takes the view that such profits may be taken into account only if connected with a firm's main production activity and the ensuing sales, and then only to offset financial costs resulting directly from that production and those sales. This net financial profit may in no circumstances be offset against the firm's production costs. Again it is submitted that the offset should be allowed,17 in particular because non-operating
expenses are routinely included when calculating the firm's production
cost. As a second best alternative the Commission should in the case of
operating expenses also carefully check whether they are related to the firm's
production costs. The dumping margins vary between 18.3 and 67%. The Commission calculated injury margins on the basis of underselling
using a 6.5% target profit for the EC industry. The injury margins were lower
than the dumping margins for three of the six cooperating companies. All exporters tried to offer undertakings but the Commission did not
accept these. The undertakings were, according to the Commission, not such as
to remove the injury and would need frequent adjustments in view of the
fluctuating price of silicon metal on the world market. Accordingly,
anti-dumping duties were imposed. The duties varied between 18.3 and 36.8%. Two issues were important in this proceeding: the level of trade and the
credit costs. First of all, the Commission faced a level of trade problem. In the
Korean market, Korean producers mostly sold their car radios either to related
or unrelated car manufacturers. The reason is that in Korea cars come
pre-equipped with a car radio. This means that the remaining market in Korea is
essentially limited to the so-called replacement market. In the EC, on the
other hand, cars are generally sold without a car radio, and the car radio is
therefore an option. Most Korean exports of car radios to the EC were made to
unrelated distributors, who sold them to the options market. The Commission, in
its provisional determination, had solved this by comparing sales made to
unrelated distributors in both Korea and the EC, despite the fact that the
sales to unrelated distributors in Korea were made in much smaller quantities.
In its definitive determination, the Commission partially changed its view: ... given the fact that sales quantities [in Korea] to distributors or retailers were in general relatively low, the Commission, in order to estimate a reasonable profit margin for sales in large quantities to distributors [in the EC], based itself on the profit achieved on profitable sales to car manufacturers [in Korea], but adjusted it upwards by an estimated margin of 3.9%, due to the clear differences in the nature of these customers to those on the export markets. In other words, the Commission applied a selective normal value with a
special profit margin (in constructing normal value) to estimate the effect of
differences in quantities sold. Secondly, there was the issue of the credit costs. The Commission
changed policy towards allowing the open account system: [t]wo exporters ... requested that this [credit cost] adjustment should be calculated on the basis of the average period of credit granted to its [sic] domestic customers for accounts and notes receivable and the normal interest applicable in Korea for short-term borrowing. This is the first time that the EC Commission fully rejected the Korean
open account system. As there is a high likelihood that the EC Commission will
take a similar approach in future cases, Korean companies might want to
consider explicitly laying down payment terms in their contracts with Korean
customers. Another interesting aspect of the case was the interpretation of Article
2(10)(e) of the basic Regulation. A number of exporters had objected to the
fact that the Commission had not accepted their claims that the export price
should not be reduced by the amounts for insignificant adjustments. However,
the commission considered that: [t]he exclusion of insignificant adjustments in accordance with Article 2(10)(e) of [the basic] Regulation ... refers to adjustments mentioned in Article 2(9)(a) and 2(10)(a) to (c). These adjustments can only be claimed for `differences affecting price comparability'. An allowance was consequently only considered to be de minimis if the `difference' between the allowance for the export price and the normal value was less than 0.5% of the respective price or value... This view was confirmed by the Council. The case was initiated on 8 August 1992. At the request of the EC industry the Commission expanded the product
scope of the review. The relevant part of the notice of initiation reads: [t]he product concerned is the same as the one that was the subject of the proceeding that resulted in Regulation (EEC) No. 1305/87, namely outboard motors of up to 63 kW used for commercial or recreational purposes... Pig-iron from Turkey, OJ (1992) L 230/30 (termination) The case was terminated because of no injury. The Turkish imports were
considered to be of an accidental and temporary nature. The product scope of the review was larger than in the original
proceeding. High-speed copiers now also form part of the investigation. The ECJ in the Extramet case18 had declared void the Regulation imposing
anti-dumping duties on Calcium metal from China and the Soviet Union. This
notice reminded importers of calcium metal, who had been paying these
anti-dumping duties, that they may request a reimbursement of the duties. This investigation was initiated in March 1991. Verifications were held
in Korea in December 1991. In May 1992, the Commission disclosed to the three
companies involved (Samsung, Hyundai and Goldstar) the methodologies used in
computing the dumping margins. They are characterized by the use of cost
allocation formulas which are different from those normally used under the
generally accepted accounting principles [GAAP] in Korea. This is the first
time that the EC Commission has rejected Korean GAAP. In all previous EC
anti-dumping proceedings, Korean GAAP have been accepted by the EC
Institutions. The dumping margins provisionally established were:
On 16 September, effective 18 September, the provisional anti-dumping
duties were imposed. However, the provisional duties were limited by the injury margin, which
was set at 10.1%. On 18 September 1992 the Commission initiated this proceeding against
micro-disks from Korea and Hong Kong. This was a newcomer review, requested by four Brazilian and a Turkish
company. These were two similar cases that had been initiated almost
simultaneously. The provisional Commission Regulations were delivered on the
same day. Deadburned magnesia falls within CN Code 2519 90 30 and caustic
magnesite is imported under CN Code ex 2519 90 90. Also the chemical
composition of the two products is very similar: both have a magnesia content
ranging from about 80 to 98% MgO (magnesium oxide) and share the following
principle impurities: SiO2, Fe2O3,
Al2O3, Cao, and B2O3 (silicon
oxide, iron oxide, aluminium oxide, calcium oxide, and boron oxide). Further,
both products are mined in an ore, crushed and sorted, which are then burnt in
a kiln. The difference between the products is the temperature at which the two
products are burnt: deadburned magnesia is burnt at between 1,500 and 2,000 _C
whereas magnesium oxide is burnt at between 700 to 1,000 °C. For both proceedings Turkey was used as the reference country. The
duties were calculated on the basis of the dumping margin and set in the form
of a floor price. These variable duties were ECU 69 for deadburned magnesia and
ECU 34 for magnesium oxide. This modification was the result of an Article 14 review. The Commission based its calculations on those types of bearings which
were most important in terms of export volume to the EC of each separate
manufacturer. The minimum threshold for an export volume to be considered
representative was set at a minimum of 70% of the total sales to the EC. The export prices were constructed with a 6% profit margin. The
Commission based the construction on the resale prices in the United Kingdom,
Germany, and France, representing more than 70% of the total Japanese exports
to the EC. Seven companies obtained a zero margin, whereas for five others the
dumping margins varied between 25.3 and 50.6%. For the determination of the situation of the EC industry, the
Commission first had to determine what companies actually formed part of the EC
industry. Some of the companies were related to the exporters in question and
in accordance with Article 4(5) were not considered part of the EC industry.
For the determination of the actual level of injury, the Commission resorted to
the CDP methodology of determining injury.19 In other words, the Commission did not
calculate the difference between the target price of EC models and the prices
of the imported models, but rather increased the prices of the imported models
by the amount of difference between the sales price and the target prices of
the directly competitive EC models. In all instances the injury margins were
considerably lower than the dumping margin and accordingly the duties were set
at this level. This proceeding concerned a request by three Korean companies located in
Indonesia for a `newcomer review'. They are Cheil Samsung Astra, Indomiwon
Citra, and Miwon Indonesia. This was the first time Korean companies had asked
for a newcomer review. The newcomer review distinguishes itself from the normal
review in that it can be requested even within one year after the
conclusion of the original proceeding (the one year minimum, applicable to
normal review requests, therefore does not apply to newcomer reviews). To be
considered a `newcomer', and thus having the possibility to ask for a newcomer
review, a company must fulfil three requirements: (1) it must not have exported the product under investigation to the EC
during the investigation period (either directly or indirectly); (2) there may be no links with the companies involved in the original
proceeding (`links' are interpreted broadly); and (3) the company must have the intention to export to the EC (or have
exported to the EC after the investigation period). This third requirement can
be fulfilled, for example, by giving the names of potential importers,
providing documentary evidence of sales offers. As a result of the review the Council modified its duties on MSG and the
Commission accepted certain undertakings. Cheil Samsung Astra and Indomiwon
will from now on be exempted from the original Regulation imposing definitive
duties. The Commission accepted undertakings from these companies. For Miwon
the case is different. It had not been able to show the third requirement
(intention to export) and accordingly was not classified by the Commission as a
genuine newcomer. Therefore, Miwon will remain subject to the original
duty. This proceeding was the result of a review requested by the `Association
of Importers of Synthetic Polyester Fibres'. For Taiwan the Commission based normal value on constructed value
because of the 5% rule. The imputed profit margin varied between 6 and 11%. For Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Turkey the normal value was based
on home market sales. For Romania, the Commission chose Taiwan as the reference country. Actual export prices were taken, except for the Turkish producer whose
export prices were constructed because he sold through subsidiaries or
associates based in the Community. The dumping margins varied between 5.9 and 15.6%. Since these margins
were lower than the injury margin, the duties were based on the dumping
margins. No dumping margins were calculated for the United States and Mexico. The
amount of imports of these countries were decumulated from the other imports.
Their amount of imports was considered de minimis (between 0.1 and 0.5%
for Mexico and 0.8% for the United States). In accordance with consistent
Commission practice it was considered that these small amounts of imports could
not have contributed to the injury. It should be recalled that in the provisional determination the
Commission had found that there are three basic specifications for Potassium
chloride. The third type of K2O had been excluded from the
provisional determination.20 However,
after hearings, the Commission decided to consider also the third type of
potash to be one and the same product. As previously reported the Commission used Canada as the reference
country. In this regard it is interesting to note that although the Canadian
production costs were greater than the Canadian and US market prices (sales at
a loss) the Commission decided to disregard the production costs. It did so for
the following reason: It then emerged that the firm was bearing temporary and exceptional costs because of the special situation of the area in which its mine was located, and because the mine had started operations a short time before. To add these costs to those of the exports from the former USSR would have been unfair and contrary to Article 2(5)(a) of Regulation (EEC) No. 2423/88. The duty finally established was based on the 24% dumping margin despite
the fact that the injury margin was not greater than the 12% originally
established.21 One may wonder why no
objections were raised. The Commission again set variable duties in view of the room for
manoeuvre enjoyed by exporters in countries still without market economies and
in view of the impact of even the slightest undercutting on the potash market.
The variable duties differed based on the K2O content of the
potash. As a result of an Article 14 review the Council has modified its duties
on DRAMs from Japan. In this regard also an undertaking from Motorola was
accepted. The Regulation imposing definitive duties on Calcium Metal had been
declared void by the ECJ in the Extramet case.22 Since no duties were applicable any longer, the
Commission decided to open a new investigation. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned the case will now be restricted
to Russia since this is the only state from the former Soviet Union where the
product concerned is produced and exported. The Commission initiated a review of the case. The review is limited to
the injury aspects of the case. Although the exporters have provided their comments on the injury, it is
especially the sole European producer Orsan which is subject to the
investigation. Apparent issues at stake are (1) whether the Brazilian imports,
which have undercut the other exporters' prices, can remain outside the scope
of duties, and (2) whether the exchange rates of the undertaking will be
changed. With regard to the first issue it is expected that in the future also
Brazil will be subject to investigation. With regard to the second issue the
options are uncertain. The complainants requested that the Commission use the regional industry
concept.23 On the basis of this regional
industry concept, the UK industry of the product allegedly is suffering injury
through the effects of dumping. The Commission agreed and opened a proceeding
on this basis. The complainants suggested Canada as a reference country. The Colour Televisions proceeding was initiated on 25 November 1992. The
products covered in the investigation are Colour Television Receivers
[CTVs], with integral tube, with a diagonal measurement of the screen
exceeding 15.5 cm (6") originating in Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and
Turkey. Further covered are CTVs with integral tube with a diagonal measurement
of the screen exceeding 42 cm (16") originating in Korea and China. For CTVs from Japan and Hong Kong the Commission considers a
clarification on the origin of the product appropriate. Pending such
clarification, the Commission decided, in view of the apparently declining or
low level of imports of CTVs from Japan and Hong Kong, to defer the initiation
of the proceeding in respect of the imports of CTVs from these two countries.
If, after such examination, it appears necessary to include imports originating
in Japan and Hong Kong in the proceeding, the Commission will do so
expeditiously and will use the same reference period for this investigation as
for the other countries concerned (1 July 1991 - 30 June 1992). The relevant CN codes are: 8528 10 71, 8528 10 73, 8528 10 75, and 8528
10 78. The complaint also included chassis and kits falling under CN codes 8528
20 99 and ex 8529 90 70. However, the Commission decided not to include these
in the proceeding. The volume of imports of these products did not warrant at
this stage the initiation of a procedure. The complaint was filed by the Society for Coherent Anti-Dumping
Norms [SCAN] on behalf of: - Bang & Olufsen AS, Denmark; Capacitors from Japan, OJ (1992) L 353/1 (definitive) This was a final decision of the EC Council on 30 November 1992,
published on 3 December 1992, and effective from 4 December 1992, to impose
definitive duties on LAECs from Japan and to definitively collect the
provisional duties. The Japanese producers argued that Philips should be excluded from the
Community industry because: (1) Philips was itself an importer of the dumped products; and (2) the price advantages obtained as a result of the purchases of LAECs
in Japan by Philips must have outweighed the corresponding losses of Philips in
the Netherlands (the producer). The Commission determined in this respect that Philips had suffered
injury through the effects of dumping and was therefore not shielded from the
`unfair business practices'. The Commission further determined that whatever
advantages Philips may have obtained, these had not offset the disadvantages
suffered by Philips. These circumstances sufficed for the Commission to
determine that Philips should not be excluded from the Community industry. One exporter argued that a separate injury finding should have been made
in respect of two different types of capacitors. The Commission rejected this
argument because the two types of LAECs have been considered like products and
are interchangeable in their uses, especially in light of the fact that the
exporter making this claim did not introduce arguments nor evidence indicating
that the two products cannot be considered as like products. One exporter (Nichicon) cooperated in the first part of the proceeding
but failed later to respond to a certain number of requests for information
addressed by the Commission. Nichicon was informed by the Commission that
through its behaviour conclusive findings might be made on the basis of the
facts available. Nichicon then confirmed that it would not further participate
in the investigation. It became therefore subject to the residual duty whereas
in the provisional determination it had a dumping margin of 20.1%. The Council upheld the Commission methodology to calculate the dumping
margin.24 The margins found, expressed as
a percentage of the total CIF value, were as follows:
Several exporters offered price undertakings to the Commission. The
Commission examined the offers and considered that: in view of the wide variety of different types of LAECs and the rapid technology developments, efficient monitoring of the adherence of the exporters to the terms of the undertaking would not be practicable. The residual duty for non-cooperating producers in the definitive
determination remained at the same level as the provisional determination
(75%). As noted in our previous report, it is becoming increasingly common to
impose a residual duty higher than the highest duty imposed with respect to any
cooperating producer when a substantial proportion of the foreign producers
does not cooperate. The legal basis for the application of this
best-information-available rule is Article 7(7)(b) of the Basic
Regulation: In cases in which any interested party or third country refuses access to, or otherwise does not provide necessary information within a reasonable period or significantly impedes the investigation, preliminary and final findings, affirmative or negative, may be made on the basis of the facts available. Where the Commission finds that any interested party or third country has supplied it with false or misleading information, it may disregard any such information and disallow any such claim to which this refers. Video cassettes from Hong Kong, OJ (1992) L 354/1 (amendment) As a result of the newcomer review Inter-cassette a dumping margin of
1.4% was found. In accordance with consistent Commission practice this was
considered de minimis and Inter-cassette was exempted from the duty. The case was extended to include Brazil and Poland. This was the first
case where Poland is going to be treated as a market economy. The dumping and injury margins provisionally established were confirmed.
One Polish exporter was exempted from the duty because he had offered an
undertaking. The Polish exporter Huta Laziska offered an undertaking which was
accepted. Since the imposition of the definitive duties in April 1992,
approximately twenty-five Indian companies had started exporting, or intended
to start exporting, to the EC. Accordingly, they requested to be qualified as
newcomers because they had no links with the companies previously investigated,
nor had they exported to the EC during the original period of
investigation.25 It is expected that in view of the large amount of newcomers (more
companies than in the original proceeding) the Commission will resort to
sampling. 1.3. Court CasesThe transfer of jurisdiction of anti-dumping proceedings to the Court of
First Instance has been approved by the Parliament. The actual transfer has not
yet taken place. The transfer has been linked to the adoption of the
`streamlining' proposal of the decision-making procedure. Therefore, once the
Council takes a positive decision on the latter, the jurisdiction can be
transferred. It is our understanding that either the Council will take a
unanimous decision before 1 July 1993, or a decision by qualified majority
after that date. An interesting corollary of the Al-Jubail case26 was written question No. 3146/91 of Sir
Christopher Proust of the European Parliament.27 Sir Christopher Proust asked what amendments to
existing anti-dumping legislation the Commission intended to propose to meet
the criticism of the Court as expressed in the Al-Jubail judgment. In its own interpretation of the Al-Jubail case the Commission
answered that it considered that the Court had merely found that the Community institutions could not prove that the relevant information had been provided to the applicants. Accordingly, the Commission stated that it had modified its
administrative procedure to be able to make available such proof in the future
but further saw no need to amend the present provisions in the Community's anti-dumping legislation on due process in particular when this issue is a major subject in the Uruguay Round. Otherwise, no developments took place during the period under
investigation.
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