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The International Practice of the European Communities: Current Survey1.2. Administrative Determinations Commercial Defence Actions and Other International Trade Developments in the European Communities VII: 1 July 1993 - 31 December 1993 Edwin Vermulst1
and Folkert Graafsma2
This is the seventh in the series of reports on developments in the
field of EC international trade law.3 This
report will cover developments that occurred during the six months period 1
July 1993 to 31 December 1993. 1. Dumping1.1. General DevelopmentsAnnual Anti-Dumping Report for 1992 The Commission has released the draft annual report for 1992 to be
approved by the European Parliament. The report provides an across the board
overview of all EC developments regarding anti-dumping in 1992. The report is
more detailed and complete than usual, and provides overview tables which
contain statistics. Unfortunately, a long period of time has lapsed since the
events that are described in the report occurred, rendering it less interesting
than it otherwise may have been. The most critical developments relating to the Uruguay Round occurred
during the first two weeks of December, and culminated in a successful
conclusion to the negotiations on 15 December. That same day, the EU Council of
Ministers endorsed the accord, although only after several Member States had
won major concessions from their EU partners. These Member States included
France, which won concessions from Germany on revisions of the EU's trade
instruments, and Portugal, which won a commitment for a substantial
compensation package to offset any damage to Portugal's textile sector
resulting from the Uruguay Round accord. On 16 December the European Parliament gave a preliminary endorsement to
the Uruguay Round accord. The Parliament had previously considered attempting
to force a resolution on the question of which legal basis would be used for
the accord, and whether - as a result of the Maastricht Treaty - the Parliament
has an actual right of assent to the accord. However, the Parliament chose not
to force this issue for the time being. Instead, the Parliament indicated that it would reserve the right to
raise this issue at some point in the future. In his presentation to the
Parliament, Commissioner Karel Van Miert acknowledged that the question of the
appropriate legal basis was a highly delicate one, and one which was still
under consideration by the Commission and the Council. The revised Code provides for greater clarity and more detailed rules in
relation to the method of determining that a product is dumped, the criteria to
be taken into account in a determination that dumped imports cause injury to a
domestic industry, the procedures to be followed in initiating and conducting
investigations, and the implementation and duration of anti-dumping measures.
In addition, the new agreement clarifies the role of dispute settlement panels
in disputes relating to anti-dumping actions taken by domestic authorities. On the methodology for determining that a product is exported at a
dumped price, the new agreement adds relatively specific provisions on such
issues as the criteria for allocating costs when the export price is compared
with a `constructed' normal value, and rules have been added to ensure that a
fair comparison is made between the export price and the normal value of a
product, so as not to arbitrarily create or inflate margins of dumping. The agreement strengthens the requirement for the importing country to
establish a clear causal relationship between dumped imports and injury to the
domestic industry. The dumping investigation must include an evaluation of all
relevant economic factors bearing on the industry concerned. The agreement
confirms the existing interpretation of the term `domestic industry'. Subject
to a few exceptions, `domestic industry' refers to the domestic producers of
like products, or to those of them whose collective output of the products
constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those
products. Clear-cut procedures have been established under the Uruguay Round
Anti-Dumping Code on how anti-dumping cases are to be initiated and how such
investigations are to be conducted. Conditions for ensuring that all interested
parties are given an opportunity to present evidence are set out. Provisions on
the application of provisional measures, the use of price undertakings in
anti-dumping cases, and on the duration of anti-dumping measures have been
strengthened. The addition of a new provision under which anti-dumping measures
shall expire five years after the date of imposition, unless dumping and injury
would be likely to continue or recur, is a significant improvement on the
previous rules. This latter provision however will have no impact on EC
Anti-Dumping law where this provision has already been a feature of the basic
Regulation since 1984. A new provision requires the immediate termination of an anti-dumping
investigation in cases where the authorities determine that the margin of
dumping is de minimis (which is defined as less than 2 per cent,
expressed as a percentage of the export price of the product) or that the
volume of dumped imports is negligible. The agreement calls for prompt and detailed notification of all
preliminary or final anti-dumping actions to a Committee on Anti-Dumping
Practices. The agreement will afford parties the opportunity of consulting on
any matter relating to the operation of the agreement, or the furtherance of
its objectives, and request the establishment of panels to examine
disputes. The Community and Japan reached an agreement on the terms of reference
for the work of the GATT panel set up to examine the anti-dumping duties
imposed by the Community on audio-cassettes imported from Japan. Following the
decisions of the US authorities to impose countervailing and anti-dumping
duties on various European steel products, the Community asked that a GATT
panel be set up to examine the validity of such decisions. Certain changes have been proposed during the period under
investigation.5 We recall that the proposals
concern the streamlining of various aspects of the Regulation, in particular
with regard to time limits and the decision-making procedure. All the changes
should be adopted by 30 June 1994, and we will discuss them in our next report.
More generally, in view of the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round, a
major overhaul of the Basic Regulation is expected towards the end of 1994 to
take account of the new GATT Anti-Dumping Code. 1.2. Administrative DeterminationsTapered roller bearings from Japan, OJ (1993) C 179/5 (Notice); OJ (1993) L 244/1 (repeal with retroactive effect) With this Notice the Commission made it publicly known that the request
for review had been withdrawn. This rather bizarre case was the result of a complaint lodged by the EC
industry in December 1988 and was essentially a mixed Article 14/15 review. In
March 1993 the EEC industry withdrew its request for a review. The Commission
consequently decided to terminate the proceedings. For no discernible reason,
the review proceeding had already taken four and a half years, so the
Commission decided to have the duties expire retroactively as of 29 June
1990. The products allegedly being dumped are watch movements, battery or
accumulator powered, with mechanical display only, or with a device to which a
mechanical display can be incorporated, complete and assembled.6 This complaint was launched by Furfural Espagnol S.A., the only
Community producer of furfuraldehyde. The Spanish producer based its dumping
allegation by comparing export prices of the Chinese producers with export
prices of Argentinean producers. On the normal value side, captive use sales and sales to associated
companies were not considered to be made in the ordinary course of trade
because the buyers were not free in their choice of suppliers and the prices of
these sales were influenced by the relationship between buyer and seller. As
these sales comprised, for each of the companies concerned, no more than 15% of
sales, remaining sales on which normal value was based were considered
representative. On the export side, export prices were reconstructed. Cost
deductions included certain sales costs which were incurred by companies
associated to US producers, situated in a third country (Switzerland), which
normally would be borne by an importer in the Community. The profit margin of
5% was also deducted. Dumping margins varied between 62% and 91%. The
Commission decided to impose anti-dumping duties in the form of minimum import
prices `given the determination of the US producers to defend their increased
market shares and the possibilities for them to absorb to a large extent high
anti-dumping duties, and given the vulnerability of the Community
industry'. This was an anti-absorption proceeding. As the Commission found that
absorption took the form of lowering export prices, it calculated the extent of
absorption of the anti-dumping duty by comparing the prices of woven polyolefin
sacks from China during the period 1 January to 31 December 1988, with the
prices during the period following imposition of the anti-dumping duties i.e.
the period from 1 August 1990 to 30 April 1991. The level of absorption was
found to be 97.6% when expressed as a percentage of the amount of duty paid on
the reduced export price. As a result, the duty of 43.4% was increased to
85.7% The decision to repeal the anti-dumping duties in force and to terminate
the review followed a communication from the two major Community producers,
comprising 97% of the EEC's output of the product, to the Commission advising
them of their intention to cease production of compact disc players in the
Community. The producers advised the Commission that the discontinuation of
production within the Community would be completed by the end of 1993, and that
consequently in their opinion there was no longer any justification for the
continued existence of protective measures. Furthermore, the complainant
Compact, representing all producers in the EEC industry, formally withdrew its
complaints on 6 April 1993 and requested the Commission to propose to the
Council to repeal the anti-dumping measures in force. In these circumstances
the Commission considered that protective measures were no longer necessary and
the Council agreed. For Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia the case could simply be terminated
since no duties were yet in force. This was an Article 14 review limited to a reconsideration of the injury
situation. The Commission found that the prices of imports were, in US dollar
terms, in line with the prices set in the undertakings accepted by the
Commission, while in Ecu terms they were lower by up to 20% over the period
examined. In other words, the Commission made it clear that there had not been
any violations of the undertakings previously accepted. Nevertheless injury had
occurred, and it was deemed necessary to revise the undertaking prices and the
residual duties imposed accordingly. See above. South Africa was used as the reference country. Normal value was based on domestic selling prices. Salient features with
regard to the normal value determination were that the Commission on its own
initiative (it seems) adjusted the South African selling prices downwards to
reflect the fact that access to raw materials in South Africa is more difficult
in South Africa than in China. It was considered that downward adjustment would
take care of the Chinese natural advantage. On the other hand, the Commission
rejected the claim of two Chinese exporters who had argued that account should
be taken of the less refined quality of the Chinese product. The Commission was
of the view that end users in the EC do not distinguish the products from the
two countries from a quality point of view. Due to insufficient cooperation from Chinese exporters, export prices
were based on the best information available, i.e. Eurostat data. Needless to
say, this practice tends to decrease the export price because importers are
inclined to understate their prices for customs purposes. On this basis a 13.2%
dumping margin was found. Nevertheless, the export prices proved to be
immaterial after all - apart for the dumping finding - because the Commission
established a minimum (floor) price based on the normal value. A minimum floor
price was set to prevent price decreases by the Chinese exporters that could,
in the Commission's view, not be redressed by a specific duty. The floor price
was established at 93.4 Ecu per tonne. The proceeding against Taiwan was terminated on the basis of negligible
dumping. With regard to the like product definition, a request made by Chinese
producers to separate mountain bikes from other bikes was rejected by the
Commission. An interesting issue arose with respect to the standing of the EEC
industry. The Commission initially only sent questionnaires to the Community
producers listed as complainants in the anti-dumping complaint, in conformity
with its standard practice. However, the Commission found that the Community
industry which had replied to the questionnaires represented only an estimated
40% of total Community production of bicycles. The Commission then sent out
further questionnaires to widen the basis of the injury investigation. The
Community producers which fully cooperated in the investigation accounted for
54.3% of total Community production. Producers representing a further 10% of
Community output supplied some basic information on their production, and
expressed support for the complaint. Apparently, therefore 54.3% was deemed to
be sufficient. The Commission again applied the one-country-one-duty rule for
China and refused to grant individual treatment to producers. Although there
were only 14 Chinese producers, the Commission nevertheless decided to resort
to sampling in view of the large number of models and exporters. For this
purpose the Commission took the models manufactured by a representative
selection of manufacturers. This selection included two state-owned
organizations, two joint venture companies and one company which sold via a
company in Hong Kong. In order to increase the representativity of its sample
for its definitive conclusion, the Commission included in the sample the fully
foreign-owned company which was the most important in terms of volume of
exports. The six companies included in the sample represented 88% of all
exports to the Community by the companies which replied to the questionnaire.
With respect to the dumping margin calculation the Commission based normal
value on prices in Taiwan. On the export side, the Commission was faced with the situation that one
Chinese exporter sold to the Community via a related company in Hong Kong. The
Commission applied Article 2(8)(b) of the Regulation and made an allowance for
an estimated margin of 5% to take account of the fact that the sales were made
via Hong Kong. This 5% presumably covered both costs and profit of the Hong
Kong entity. One may question whether this methodology is correct in view of
previous cases where the Commission has generally held that such companies
located closely to the exporting country are to be treated as part of the
exporting network, and not as part of the importing network. The practical
consequences of the distinction is that if a company is treated as part of the
exporting network, only its direct selling costs are deducted. The Commission
further found that the companies which replied to the Commission's
questionnaire constituted only 73% of proto-exports from China to the EEC. The
Commission deemed it appropriate for the remaining 27% to use best information
available and in casu considered that the dumping margins of the models
of the company in the sample with the highest margins should be used to
calculate the dumping margin for this 27%. The weighted average dumping margin
for China was 30.6% and an anti-dumping duty of the same percentage was
imposed. One exporter requested that the Commission take account, in accordance
with Article 13 of the GATT Anti-Dumping Code, of the fact that China is a
developing country. The Commission replied quite appropriately that it should
be borne in mind that China is not a signatory to the GATT Anti-Dumping Code
and refused to apply constructive remedies. The Commission again refused to apply individual treatment and applied
the one-country-one-duty rule. Normal value was based on constructed value in
Korea. Export prices were constructed on the basis of Article 2(8)(b), and on
the basis of the price at which the product concerned was resold by the Hong
Kong company to independent Community producers, with a deduction of a
reasonable profit margin (note the discrepancy in treatment between the
previous case and this case). A duty of 19.4% was imposed. This concerned a partial Article 14 review because two Japanese
companies had merged. One of the two merged companies previously was not
dumping. The other merged company previously did not export. As a result of the
review, the new company arising from the merger had been excluded by the
Council from the anti-dumping duties. This concerned a sunset review of anti-dumping measures. However it
concerned only Singapore, because the situation of Japanese imports had been
reviewed earlier. As a result of the sunset review, the Council excluded
Singapore from the anti-dumping measures. The reason was that imports from
Singapore account for only 0.6% of the EC market and were considered not to
have contributed to the injury of the EC industry. The striking feature of the case was that the Commission decided to make
the anti-dumping duty expire with three years' retroactive effect. This
followed representations of the Singapore producers, which had pointed to the
unusual length of the review investigation which had been initiated in
September 1989. This Regulation has been amended to remove contradictory provisions
which had the potential to generate conflicting rules on customs
valuations. In 1991 the Commission had accepted undertakings from China and the
Soviet Union. Secondly, the USSR exporter V/O Stanko Import lost its monopoly
on exports. Exports are now carried out by a number of new exporters located in
the Russian Federation and the Ukraine. With respect to China, undertakings
were accepted from six trade organizations authorized by the Chinese Chamber of
Commerce to export the product from China. However, the Commission found that
exports were being made from China by other exporters and trade organizations
previously unknown to the Commission. The Commission also established that
exports of artificial corundum from China, the Russian Federation and the
Ukraine had taken place in substantial quantities and at prices well below the
prices specified in the undertaking. As the Commission had forgotten in 1991 to
impose residual duties, it was now deemed necessary to impose residual duties.
These were 30.8% with respect to China and 9.8% with respect to the Russian
Federation and the Ukraine. With respect to China, normal value was based on the constructed value
of Norwegian producers with an addition of a profit margin of 6%. Where South
African producers sold through related importers in the EEC, prices were
constructed and a 3% margin deemed reasonable was deducted. Dumping margins
found were as follows:
For injury purposes imports from South Africa and China were
accumulated. As the injury margins found were higher than the dumping margins,
anti-dumping duties were established by reference to the dumping margins. The termination followed findings by the Commission, which were made in
the course of its investigation, that the sole Community producer of unwrought
manganese had decided to discontinue production and was in the process of
gradually phasing out its manufacturing operations. Accordingly, since the
Community production of the product concerned by the present proceeding was
discontinued, protective measures were deemed unnecessary. For the provisional determination the Commission had based normal value
on the data of a South African producer (the analogue country). However, after
imposition of provisional duties, the Commission received further information
from a producer in Zimbabwe. The Commission considered this data to be more
reliable, despite the fact that the producer did not allow verification. The
cost of production in Zimbabwe plus a 5% profit margin was used to establish
normal value. In view of the enormous devaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar, two
normal values were established for the first and second part of the
investigation period. After the imposition of provisional duties, one Russian producer still
provided information on its export prices. The Commission did take this
information into account, in view of the extraordinary economic and social
situation in the exporting countries and because these exports accounted for
more than 80% of the Community imports of the product concerned. In order to avoid possible price manipulation the Commission proposed,
and the Council imposed, a specific duty of Ecu 0.31 per kg. The Commission based normal value on domestic sales prices of a sample
of US producers representing about 69% of sales volume in their domestic
market. The dumping margin found amounted to 46.1%. On the injury side an
interesting question arose because approximately 41% of total production in the
EEC was consumed by the EEC producers themselves. The Commission examined
whether the captive and free markets could be considered distinct for the
assessment of injury. The Commission referred to the Gimelec case7 which held that only the free market should be
considered for the purpose of establishing injury if the volumes of the product
used for intra-company consumption do not enter into direct competition with
the sales on the free market, and consequently do not suffer from the effects
of dumping. As this was the situation in the present case, the assessment of
injury was based exclusively on data referring to the free market. Injury
margins were higher than dumping margins. The Commission decided to impose an
anti-dumping duty in the form of a fixed amount of Ecus per tonne in order to
avoid the consequences of manipulation of the invoice price, and to secure the
correction of the necessary amount of the duty. This was an Article 15 sunset review. It was also a combined
anti-dumping and countervailing duty investigation. With respect to the
countervailing duty investigation, it was found that neither the Mexican
government nor the Brazilian government had granted any subsidies. With respect
to dumping, it was found that with respect to Mexico no imports had been made
for Mexico to the EEC since 1989. With respect to Brazil, the Brazilian
producers did not cooperate on the dumping side but indicated their willingness
to offer new undertakings. These were accepted. The proceeding with respect to
Mexico was terminated since there had been no indications of dumping. Following decisions of the EEC-Czech Republic and Slovak Republic Joint
Committee of 28 May 1993, acting in accordance with the interim agreement
concerning the export of certain steel products from the Czech Republic and
Slovak Republic to the Community, the Council had opened and provided for the
administration of tariff quotas in respect of certain steel products covered by
the EEC Treaty, including the products subject to this proceeding. The
Commission considered that the effect of the tariff quota system on imports of
the products would be that the injurious consequences of the dumped imports
originating in the Czech and Slovak Republics would be eliminated. It was
therefore considered appropriate to terminate the proceeding. By a notice published on 18 March 1993 the Commission had decided to
initiate a newcomer review at the request of a Turkish company Korpejs. On 25
August 1993, the Commission was informed by Korpejs that it was withdrawing its
request for a review of the Regulation in force because of profound changes in
the market place. The Commission considered it unnecessary to further
investigate the case and terminated the proceeding. These determinations were the result of a newcomer review for which
Nippon Steel Semiconductor (producer) and Intel Corporation (exporter) had
applied. On the basis of the findings of this newcomer review the Commission
accepted an undertaking offered by Intel. The Commission Decision concerned the
acceptance of the undertaking offered by Intel. The amendment by the Council
Regulation concerned the resulting technical changes to the original
measures.8 No details were revealed
regarding the dumping margin. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2861/93 of 18 October 1993 imposed a
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain magnetic disks (3.5'
microdisks) originating in Japan, Taiwan, and the People's Republic of China,
and collected definitively the provisional duty. Regarding the dumping, the Council basically confirmed the findings of
the Commission. The following final dumping margins were established:
For Taiwan and China the anti-dumping duties were based on the dumping
margins. For Japan, however, the anti-dumping duties were limited by the injury
margins. The injury margins for Japan were calculated on the basis of the
underselling method, using a 10% profit margin on turnover. This led to the
following injury margins, and anti-dumping duties, for Japan:
Electronic weighing scales from Singapore and Japan, OJ (1993) L 263/1 (definitive) For the purpose of the definitive findings, normal value was established
on the basis of the same methods as those used in the provisional determination
of dumping. Certain calculation adjustments were made on the basis of
submissions by the parties. With respect to export prices, the Council
confirmed the Commission's findings. The dumping margins for Korean producers amounted to 9.3% for Cas
Corporation, 7.2% for Han Instrumentation Technology, and 26.7% for Descom
Scales Manufacturing. The dumping margin for Teraoka Weigh-system PTE Ltd., Singapore, is
10.8%. For non-cooperating producers the Council confirmed the Commission's
position and, accordingly, set the definitive residual dumping margin for
Singapore at 31%. Regarding the injury, the Council confirmed the Commission's position
that the effects of Korean and Singaporean imports had to be analyzed
cumulatively. The Council confirmed the Commission's conclusion that the
Community industry had suffered material injury. The Council confirmed that the
material injury sustained by the Community producers has been caused by the
Korean and Singaporean imports. The Council confirmed that the imposition of measures is in the
interests of the Community industry. The level of injury exceeding the dumping margins was established.
Accordingly, the duties were set at the level of the dumping margins.
Therefore, the duties for Korea were: 9.3% for Cas Corporation, 7.2% for Han
Instrumentation Technology, and 26.7% for Descom Scales Manufacturing. The
residual duty for Korea was set at 26.7%. For Singapore the duties were 10.8%
for Teraoka, and 31% for non-cooperating producers. The amounts secured by way of provisional duty are definitively
collected at the rate definitively imposed. Amounts secured in excess of the
definitive rate of duty are released. The Thai producer, Thai Merry Company Ltd. by correspondence dated 18
August 1993 informed the Commission that it withdrew its undertaking. The
Commission therefore decided to apply provisional anti-dumping duties on the
basis of the facts established before the acceptance of the undertaking. A duty
of 14.1% was imposed. Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 3029/93 of 29 October 1993 imposed
provisional anti-dumping duties on imports of television camera systems
originating in Japan, OJ (1993) L 271/1. For all exporters normal value was, for the vast majority of models,
established on the basis of the comparable price actually paid or payable for
the product intended for consumption in the country of origin. For those models
not sold domestically, or sold at a loss, normal value was established on the
basis of the constructed value. In all cases the export prices were
reconstructed, using a 5% profit margin. For one related importer the Commission determined that it had provided
false and/or misleading information regarding SGA expenses. Accordingly, the
Commission resorted in this instance to the best information available
rule. The dumping margins that the Commission established were as follows:
The exporter Matsushita did not reply to essential parts of the
questionnaire and its dumping margin was therefore based on the best
information available rule. In this instance, the best information available
led to a 97% dumping margin. This was also the dumping margin determined for
other non-cooperating exporters. Regarding the injury, the Commission determined that the Community
industry was suffering material injury as a result of the dumped imports. The Commission determined that the imposition of anti-dumping measures
was in the interest of the Community industry. The injury margins calculated by the Commission exceeded the dumping
margins. Therefore, the duties were based on the dumping margins:
Furazolidone from China, OJ (1993) C 302/2
(initiation) This was a newcomer review requested by four Brazilian and one Turkish
producer. The dumping margin for the Turkish producer amounted to 8.4% while
the dumping margins found for the four Brazilian producers varied between 8.7%
and 12.3%. Anti-dumping duties were imposed accordingly. This mixed Article 14/15 review followed a request by the EC industry.
The investigation period ran from 1 January 1991 to 30 April 1992 (16 months).
Dumping With respect to Norway, the Commission found that Norwegian producers
formed part of two separate corporate groups and sold through related sales
companies. Normal value was based on constructed value and additional 6% profit
margin. Where exports were made to related importers, the export prices were
constructed and a 3% profit margin was deducted. With respect to Iceland, normal value was again constructed. On the
export side the sole producer in Iceland channelled its sales to the Community
through a Norwegian group. The Commission decided to apply Article 2(8)(b) and
deducted an estimated margin of 3% arising from profits realized on sales on
the sector concerned. With respect to Sweden, normal value was based on domestic sales. With respect to Venezuela, 70% of the sales on the domestic market were
sold to related companies for processing. These were held not to have been made
in the ordinary course of trade and resort was therefore had to constructed
value. With respect to Brazil, normal value was based on a monthly basis,
either by reference to domestic sales or, where necessary, by reference to the
constructed value. With respect to Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Russia, normal value was based
on the constructed value in Norway. With respect to the former Yugoslav republics of Macedonia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Slovenia, no dumping determination was made in view of
their de minimis contribution to injury (see below). Dumping margins found were the following:
With respect to those Brazilian companies which had cooperated in the
investigation and were found not to have exported during the investigation
period, the Commission considered that the best evidence available was the
weighted average dumping margin found for the companies which did export. This
is a deviation from the standard practice of the Commission which holds that if
a company does not export during an investigation period it is automatically
subjected to the highest duty imposed with respect to any cooperating producer.
On the injury side, the Commission decided to accumulate imports from all
countries with the exception of the former Yugoslav republics of Macedonia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Slovenia. It was considered appropriate to decumulate
imports from these countries and to terminate the proceeding with respect to
them because imports from these countries were minimal and furthermore were
unlikely to resume in the future. Although two companies proposed revised price
undertakings, the Commission considered this inappropriate in view of the fact
that the prices cited in previous undertakings had all been systematically
undercut. Following the imposition of provisional measures, the Chinese exporters
argued that an additional allowance should be made for the fact that in China
dead burned magnesite can be extracted and processed more easily than in
Turkey. The Commission considered this request appropriate and therefore,
taking into account the actual ore/spoil ratio found in Turkey and the level of
adjustment suggested by the Chinese exporters, reduced the costs of extraction
by 20%, as compared with those established in Turkey. The Commission again
rejected requests for individual treatment and applied the one-country-one-duty
rule. As the definitive duty took a different form from the provisional duty,
the Council considered it inappropriate to collect definitively the provisional
anti-dumping duty. The definitive anti-dumping duty was imposed in the form of
a difference between Ecu 120 per tonne and the net, free at Community frontier
price before Customs clearance, if this price is lower. This was the result of an Article 15 (sunset) review. The investigation
had shown that no injury would be suffered if the measures were to lapse. The
Community industry had informed the Commission that it was intending to
transfer its production outside the Community and withdrew its complaint.
Accordingly, the European Commission terminated the review procedure and the
anti-dumping measures lapsed. One may question the assumption that the EC industry did not know that
they were going to transfer one and a half years ago at the time of filing a
complaint. Also the current absence of an expected recurrence of injury raises
the suspicion that the EC industry has to a certain extent `abused' the dumping
law by benefitting from the extension possibility under Article 15. Therefore,
the EC industry has enjoyed an extended protection from competition for about
one year and four months. One suggestion that has been made to prevent such
abuses in the future is to only provisionally secure the amounts of duties, if
after the five-year period a review is triggered. If after the review it
appears that it had actually not been warranted (as in this case) the duties
should not be collected. A provisional anti-dumping duty had been imposed on fluorspar from China
(see above). Article 1 of the Regulation concerned specified that the dumping
duty applied to fluorspar containing more than 97% of calcium fluoride or
containing less than 97% of calcium fluoride. Thus the scope of the dumping
duty clearly excluded fluorspar , as it had a content of exactly 97%, although
this was not the intention of the Commission. This Regulation amended the
previous Regulation by clarifying that fluorspar, with a content of exactly 97%
of calcium fluoride is also included and subjected to anti-dumping duties. In the evening of 15 December, just after returning from Geneva, Mr.
Brittan unblocked the MWO case and signed the approval. The case was
immediately initiated on 18 December. The investigation period ran from 1
October 1992 until 30 September 1993. This was a sunset review request. For some bizarre reason it was
cancelled by a notice in the official journal published three days later. No
reasons for the cancellation were provided. This review was made at the request of the EEC industry. The review
request is based on allegations of an increase in the dumping margin. If no review is requested then the measures will lapse on 24 June
1994. These measures will expire on 9 January 1994. Publication is unusual
because normally publication does not take place before the actual date of
expiry. However this novelty will not have any legal impact. This review followed the request from a Romanian producer alleging
changed circumstances in the economic system in Romania. The Commission decided
to extend the review to imports of the product from former Yugoslavia. However
it decided not to extend the review to exports from Serbia and Montenegro in
view of the fact that the Community has suspended normal trade relations with
these countries, and that the trade embargo is currently in operation. The
Commission further decided to extend the review to Turkey and Venezuela `in the
interest of efficiency and sound administration'. The Commission again refused to grant individual treatment to the Hong
Kong exporter Klimax. The Commission made some slight modification in the
calculation of the export price which resulted in a decrease in the dumping
margin to 18.6%. A dumping duty of 18.6% was imposed accordingly. 1.3. Court CasesCase C-104/90, Matsushita Electric Industrial v. Council, Judgment of 13 October 1993 (Sixth Chamber), not yet reported The case was brought by Matsushita (hereinafter: MEI). MEI requested the
annulment of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 112/90 of 16 January 1990 imposing a
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain compact disc players
originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea, and collecting definitively the
provisional duty (OJ L 13/21 (1990)). During the investigation period (1 June 1986 to 31 May 1987), compact
disc players were sold by the Hi-Fi and Audio Division (HAD) on the Japanese
market to 77 related companies and 2 independent companies. Matsushita maintained that the institutions violated Article 2(3) and
(7) of the Basic Regulation by determining normal value on the basis of the
sales price charged by related distributors. According to the applicant, normal
value had to be determined in accordance with Article 2(3)(a) of the Basic
Regulation on the basis of the price paid to it by the sales companies. The
sales between MEI and those companies in fact had to be considered as made in
the ordinary course of trade. The applicant maintained that as MEI was not only a production company
but also had its own sales departments, the related sales companies constituted
independent regional distributors. For this reason, sales between MEI
and the related companies were actual transactions and Article 2(7) of the
anti-dumping regulation had to be applied. If the Community authorities were of the opinion that those sales did
not take place in the ordinary course of trade, no account should be taken of
total sales on the domestic market, and normal value should be determined in
accordance with Article 2(3)(b) on the basis of either the export price to a
third country or a constructed normal value. The Council argued that the anti-dumping regulation had not been
violated. It had not been proved that the applicant had sold significant
quantities of compact disc players to independent customers (disqualification
of use of selective normal value). The related sales companies fulfilled the
function of a commercial service of the applicant, which led the institutions
to treat MEI and those companies as forming a single economic entity.
The Council considered that the functions exercised by the applicant and the
related sales companies were all necessary to make sales to the first
independent customer. The products were considered to be sold for the first
time in the ordinary course of trade when the related sales companies sold to
independent purchasers, and it was those sales which should be used in order to
determine normal value in accordance with Article 2(3)(a). The Court did not accept the argument of MEI and held that the Council
had not infringed the above-mentioned rules. The Court considered that the
functions performed for the manufacturer by the HAD were merely complementary
to the functions performed by the distribution companies. Moreover, the Court
held that the intermediary of a distributor, whether related or not, has always
been necessary. It followed from the foregoing that `the sales function
performed by the distributors had to be regarded as an essential factor
in the first scale to an independent buyer'. As a consequence, the institutions
were entitled to conclude that the companies concerned formed a single economic entity, thus allowing normal value to be properly determined on the basis of the price paid to the distributors, since that is the price which may be regarded as actually paid or payable in the ordinary course of trade within the meaning of Article 2(3)(a)... Case C-216/91, Rima Eletrometalurgia SA v. Council, Judgment of 7 December 1993 (Fifth Chamber), not yet reported Rima, a Brazilian exporter, was one of the companies under investigation
in an anti-dumping proceeding concerning ferro-silicon from Brazil. However, no
dumping was determined and consequently the company was excluded from the scope
of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3650/87.9 At the request of several other Brazilian producers the Commission
initiated in May 1990 an Article 14 review in which the applicant was again
under investigation. This time the Commission did determine dumping, which
culminated in an anti-dumping duty of 12.2% on Rima's exports to the EC.10 Rima contested the legality of the Regulation imposing anti-dumping
duties (as far as it concerned the company) on four grounds, two of which were
important. Rima's first argument was formal: the original anti-dumping proceeding
was terminated within the meaning of Article 7(9)(b) of the Basic Anti-Dumping
Regulation. Thus the company argued that the review of anti-dumping duties,
where it concerned Rima, should have been carried out on the basis of Article
7(1), i.e., via the initiation of a wholly new proceeding. Instead the review
was based on Article 14 (a review based on changed circumstances). Further, the second investigation had been carried out without
`sufficient evidence of the existence of dumping and the injury resulting
therefrom' as demanded by Article 5(1) of the Basic Regulation. Hence the
Commission had exceeded its powers. The Council's reply was that proceeding in Article 7(9) of the
Basic Regulation concerns countries, whereas investigations concern
single producers and exporters. Consequently, it would not be possible to
conclude a proceeding in respect of one single producer/exporter. The Council
considered the second argument to be unfounded, because the initiation of a
review does not require new evidence of dumping and injury, but only evidence
of changed circumstances. The Court disagreed and, basing itself on the text of Article 14,
concluded that a review must be opened in accordance with Article 7 as well.
This Article refers to Article 5(2) which stipulates that sufficient evidence
relating to dumping and injury caused thereby must be present to warrant an
investigation. The Court found its position confirmed by Article 5(1) of the
1979 GATT Anti-Dumping Code, which makes the opening of any investigation
intended to determine dumping, injury and the necessary causal link contingent
on the existence of sufficient evidence. The Court did warn that it is not necessary that evidence is provided
against every single company. Since, however, the evidence which was brought
forward to initiate the review was intended to show the absence of
dumping, this was not considered sufficient evidence and hence Rima won its
case. Finally, it should be noted that the Council and the Commission further
contended that they had been obliged to include Rima in the review in order `to
avoid subjecting it to unequal treatment'. The Court did, understandably, not
agree with that argument. The Court stated that [w]hilst dictates of equal treatment might justify extending the review to producers and exporters who were affected by the anti-dumping duty and who had not requested that review, they could not justify the opening of a new investigation into the case of the applicant, whose products had, following the initial investigation, been excluded from application of the anti-dumping duty. The judgment is clear but leaves open the question of what to do with
producers who although not `excluded' from duties, were not really affected by
them. This could happen for example when companies subject to a high residual
duty request a review while companies with a very low duty do not ask for the
review. If companies which pay low duty become involved in the case,
independently of their own initiative, one may wonder whether such an inclusion
is justified. If an analogy is drawn with the situation of Rima, one may argue
that it is not.
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