| |
|
 |
|
 |
|
 |
|
 |
|
  |
|
 |
|
  |
|
 |
|
 |
|
 |
|
 |
|
 |
|
 |
|
 |
|
 |
The role of NATO in the Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina
by Niccoló Figà-Talamanca1
Full text available: PDF format *
I. General
The Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement, signed in Paris on 14 December 1995 as Annex 1-A to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina2, invites the United Nations Security Council 'to adopt a resolution by which it will authorise Member States or regional organisations and arrangements to establish a multinational military Implementation Force (hereinafter "IFOR").'3 The multinational force would 'assist in [the] implementation of the territorial and other military related provisions4 of the agreement',5 and notably undertake 'such enforcement action by the IFOR as may be necessary to ensure implementation'.6
The 'regional organisation or arrangement' entrusted with the establishment of IFOR is immediately identified in Article I of Annex I-A7 as NATO, even though it is made clear that IFOR would be `composed of ground, air and maritime units from NATO and non-NATO nations'.8 The willingness of NATO to play such a fundamental part in the implementation of the Peace Agreement shows that the member States have been able to adapt their political understanding of the role of the Alliance in the international order to the new security priorities of the post-cold war era. The IFOR experience not only will provide practical experience of co-operation between the Alliance and the armed forces of other States, (notably those taking part in the Partnership for Peace program), but it has provided the Alliance with a model for future multinational deployments on a medium to large scale. However, the new role for NATO envisaged by the member States and reflected in the Peace Agreement raises many legal questions.
This paper is an attempt to raise issues for discussion on the legal implications of the role of NATO in the Peace Agreement. The argument which it will support is that NATO qua NATO was not, subsequent to the Peace Agreement, authorised by the Security Council to undertake or organise peace-enforcement -or even peace-keeping- actions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Rather, NATO is merely providing Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence (C3I) infrastructure and co-ordination between United Nations Member States contributing to IFOR without thereby affecting the legal status of their contribution, nor the status of NATO itself as a self-defence agreement. The authority under which the implementation is supervised and, if necessary, enforced, is the United Nations, and in particular the Security Council.9 While this distinction may seem merely academic, it may have important implications for State responsibility and the legal status of troops contributed to IFOR, for instance in respect of States obligations to co-operate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.10 Other possible important implications of this distinction which will not be discussed here are in respect of the applicable jus in bello should armed clashes occur between IFOR troops and local military or paramilitary groups, and in respect of possible disputes in the control and direction of the forces contributed by States.
* The free viewer (Acrobat Reader) for PDF file is
available at the
Adobe Systems.
1 University of
Nottingham.
2 Hereinafter
referred to as 'Annex 1-A' and `Peace Agreement' respectively. Collectively
UN Doc. S/1995/999/annex.
3 Article
I,1(a) of Annex 1-A.
4 In particular
Annex 1-A itself and Annex 2, relating to the `Military Aspects of the Peace
Settlement' and to the `Inter-Entity Boundary Line and Related
Issues'.
5 Article I,1
of Annex 1-A.
6 Article I,3
of Annex 1-A.
7 Article
I,1(b) of Annex 1-A, which reads, in the relevant part: '[i]t is understood and
agreed that NATO may establish such a force, which will operate under the
authority and subject to the direction and political control of the North
Atlantic Council ("NAC") through the NATO chain of command.'
8 Article
I,1(a) of Annex 1-A.
9 cf. also
M.Holly MacDougall, 'United Nations Operations: Who Should Be In Charge' in 33
Revue de Droit Militaire Et De Droit De La Guerre, (1994), 21
ff.
10
Established under Security Council resolution 827, UN Doc. S/RES/827,
hereinafter SCR 827
© 1990-2004 European Journal of International Law
All comments and suggestions should be sent to webmaster
This site is part
of the Academy of European Law online, a joint partnership of the Jean Monnet Center at NYU School of Law and the Academy of European
Law at the European University
Institute.
This file was last modified:
Tuesday, October 14, 2003 12:24PM