The Dayton Peace Agreement: Human Rights Guarantees and Their Implementation

V. Conclusion

In considering how to view the human rights situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the aftermath of the Peace Agreement, the best approach may be one of cautious optimism. Several important advances stand out in the Peace Agreement. First, and perhaps most encouraging, the Peace Agreement makes the protection of human rights one of its primary focuses. Second, it provides for the use of force to implement human rights guarantees in certain circumstances. Finally, the Peace Agreement, when combined with Security Council resolutions allows (albeit to a limited extent) for the sanctioning of one non-performing party in a novel way-one which cannot be circumvented by a recalcitrant permanent Member State of the Security Council.

One must, however, temper one's optimism with caution. One reason for caution includes the incident discussed above involving the detention of sixteen men, where neither IFOR nor the High Representative, at least initially, evinced an intention to act to remedy the situation. Another reason for caution is the fact that certain listed International Agreements have been in place in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina throughout the period of the war; an agreement like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights appears to have done little to safeguard the human rights guarantees contained in it.⁷⁰ Also, with some of the institutions intended to implement the human rights guaranteed under the Peace Agreement, obtaining a remedy is likely to be a long process. Indeed, in the short run, there is likely to be little benefit from the Commission on Human Rights or the Constitutional Court.

A further reason for caution is the ephemeral nature of the system under Security Council resolution 1022 for the reinstatement of sanctions against FRY and the Bosnian Serb authorities, which expires (barring an exceptional delay) 14 June 1996. This fact, when coupled with the fact that IFOR is expected to be in the region for a period of approximately one year only,⁷¹ means that those individuals overseeing the enforcement mechanisms must show a willingness to act decisively and without delay. Otherwise, the Peace Agreement may become infamous for its irony: it may go down in history as an agreement with lavish human rights guarantees which had little or no effect on improving the human rights situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

70 In 1992, the Human Rights Committee indicated its view that, despite the break up of Yugoslavia, successor States were still obligated to meet the obligations of Yugoslavia under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In its "Decision on State Succession to the Obligations of the Former Yugoslavia Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights", (see the records of the discussion of this topic on 19 October 1992, reproduced in 15 European Human Rights Reports 233) the Chairman of the Human Rights Committee noted, at paragraph 4, that despite the legal problems involved in the succession of States "there was no reason to presume that successor States [of the former Yugoslavia] would not continue to apply human rights treaties." The Human Rights Committee invited representatives of the Republic of Croatia, the FRY and Bosnia and Herzegovina to appear before it.

71 See Security Council resolution 1031, (15 December 1995) at paragraph 13. Also the United States government, the main contributor of IFOR troops, has indicated its intention to limit its participation to a one year period.

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