The Implications of the Peace Agreement for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

II. Co-operation with the Tribunal by the Parties

A. The General Framework Agreement

The General Framework Agreement ("GFA"), signed by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina ("RBH"), the Republic of Croatia and FRY, affirms the duty to co-operate with the Tribunal in three ways. First, Article IX provides that:

The Parties shall cooperate fully with all entities involved in implementation of this peace settlement, as described in the Annexes to this Agreement, or which are otherwise authorized by the United Nations Security Council, pursuant to the obligation of all Parties to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law.

The Tribunal clearly falls within the compass of this provision, despite the glaring failure to mention it by name.¹⁶

Second, the Parties agree to `fully respect and promote fulfilment of the commitments made' in the Annexes to the Agreement, which contain provisions which do specifically mention co-operation with the Tribunal. Third, FRY undertakes to ensure compliance with the Peace Agreement by RS,¹⁷ which is a signatory to the Annexes. Therefore, by signing the GFA, FRY acting on its own behalf and on behalf of RS has recognized, and undertaken to co-operate with, the Tribunal. This duty of co-operation is further elaborated in the Annexes.

B. The Annexes to the Agreement

A number of articles in the Annexes explicitly refer to the Tribunal, while others implicate the Tribunal without mentioning it by name. Those which mention the Tribunal cover subjects falling into five broad categories: 1. General Commitment to Co-operate; 2. Freedom of Movement and Unrestricted Access; 3. Repatriation of Prisoners of War; 4. Exclusion from Public Office; and 5. Amnesty.

1. General Commitment to Co-operate

Several articles reaffirm, in general terms, the duty of the Parties to co-operate with the Tribunal. An important example is in Annex 1-A, signed by RBH, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina ("FBH") and RS and "endorsed" by FRY and the Republic of Croatia:

The Parties shall cooperate fully with all entities involved in implementation of this peace settlement, as described in the General Framework Agreement, or which are otherwise authorized by the United Nations Security Council, including the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.¹⁸

Articles obliging the Parties to provide unrestricted access, discussed below, also mention co-operation with the Tribunal. Article II(8) of Annex 4 notes, in particular, the duty to `comply with orders issued pursuant to Article 29 of the Statute of the Tribunal'. An arrest warrant is the most obvious example of an order which a Party is required to comply with under Article 29, but this article also requires Parties to comply with requests for assistance, for example a formal request to a national court to defer to the Tribunal's competence pursuant to Article 9(2) of the Statute and Rule 10 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence ("the Rules"). This latter type of request could become important if RS or FRY were to decide to prosecute persons accused by the Tribunal in their own courts.¹⁹ If a Party fails to comply with a request for deferral within sixty days, the Tribunal may, under Rule 11 of the Rules, report the matter to the Security Council. If RS or FRY failed to comply, they would also have failed to fulfil their obligations under the Agreement, and might be independently reported to the Council by the High Representative for this breach.²⁰

2. Freedom of Movement and Unrestricted Access

Annex 4 and Annex 6 both guarantee unrestricted access to the Tribunal.²¹ In addition, under Article II(4) of Annex 1-A, the Parties undertake to facilitate `unimpeded access and movement' to `any international personnel including investigators ... or other personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina pursuant to the General Framework Agreement'. Since Annex 1-A concerns the military aspects of the Agreement, the IFOR, which was established pursuant to that Annex may employ `the use of necessary force, to ensure compliance' by the Parties.²² Thus, upon request by the Tribunal, the IFOR could secure sites by force to ensure access to the Tribunal's investigators.²³

Access to sites is important to the Tribunal in the investigation of possible mass graves.²⁴ The majority of such sites are in the territory of RS.²⁵ RS is a party to Annexes 1-A and 6, and has approved, in a separate declaration, Annex 4. Its compliance with Annex 1-A is additionally underwritten by FRY.

The discovery of mass graves may help to demonstrate a systematic campaign of genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina,²⁶ although oral testimony attesting to mass killings may be sufficiently probative in itself. The importance of access to suspected mass grave sites was recently affirmed by the Security Council in resolution 1034 (1995) of 21 December 1995. This strongly-worded resolution indicates the Council's firm intention to remain seized of the matter and to dictate the terms of the Parties' compliance with the Agreement. The resolution is worth quoting at length:

The Security Council ...

7. Takes note that the International Tribunal ... issued on 16 November 1995 indictments against the Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic for their direct and individual responsibilities for the atrocities committed against the Bosnian Muslim population of Srebrenica in July 1995;

8. Reaffirms its demand that the Bosnian Serb party give immediate and unrestricted access to the areas in question, including for the purpose of the investigation of the atrocities, to representatives of the relevant United Nations and other international organizations and institutions ...

9. Underlines in particular the urgent necessity for all the parties to enable the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal to gather effectively and swiftly the evidence necessary for the Tribunal to perform its task;

10. Stresses the obligations of all the parties to cooperate with and provide unrestricted access to the relevant United Nations and other international organizations and institutions so as to facilitate their investigations and takes note of their commitment under the Peace Agreement in this regard;

11. Reiterates its demand that all parties, and in particular the Bosnian Serb party, refrain from any action intended to destroy, alter, conceal or damage any evidence of violations of international humanitarian law and that they preserve such evidence;

12. Reiterates further its demand that all States, in particular those in the region of the former Yugoslavia, and all parties to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, comply fully and in good faith with the obligations contained in paragraph 4 of resolution 827 (1993) to co-operate fully with the International Tribunal and calls on them to create the conditions essential for the Tribunal to perform the task for which it has been created ...

It may be inferred from this resolution that failure by RS to provide "unrestricted access to the areas in question" would constitute a serious breach of both RS's and FRY's obligations under the Peace Agreement, and would be a ground for the reimposition of sanctions under resolution 1022, provided that the Security Council were first seized of such non-compliance by the High Representative or the IFOR Commander. As discussed below, the Council's perception of the gravity of the breach might influence the views of these officials.

3. Repatriation of Prisoners of War

Article IX(1)(g) of Annex 1-A provides:

... each Party shall comply with any order or request of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia for the arrest, detention, surrender of or access to persons who would otherwise be released and transferred under this Article, but who are accused of violations within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Each Party must detain persons reasonably suspected of such violations for a period of time sufficient to permit appropriate consultation with Tribunal authorities.

This paragraph has to be read in conjunction with paragraph (c) of the same article, which provides for the release and transfer of all prisoners held by the Parties within thirty days of the transfer of authority from the UNPROFOR Commander to the IFOR Commander. Exchange of prisoners has now officially taken place, although many may remain in custody, without resulting in the surrender of accused to the Tribunal under Article IX(1)(g), a provision which was not, in any event, designed to result in leaders being surrendered to The Hague.

4. Exclusion from Public Office

The Peace Agreement contains a number of "office-barring" clauses, most notably in Annex 4, "Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina". Article IX(1) of this Annex reads:

No person who is serving a sentence imposed by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and no person who is under indictment by the Tribunal and who has failed to comply with an order to appear before the Tribunal, may stand as a candidate or hold any appointive, elective, or other public office in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.²⁷

The natural interpretation of this provision is that it is a corollary of a Constitution which is `determined to ensure full respect for international humanitarian law' and is `guided by the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations'.²⁸ It does not imply that exclusion from public office is an alternative to being tried by the Tribunal; rather it would be a further "sanction" to ensure the appearance of the accused before the Tribunal. Arguably, a private citizen is also easier to arrest than a public official, and the latter might try to claim sovereign immunity, notwithstanding the fact that Article 7(2) of the Tribunal's Statute provides that, `[t]he official position of any accused person ... shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility ...'. In any event, the main purpose of the provision is to reflect the value judgement that a person convicted by the Tribunal, or indicted and failing to appear before it to defend himself, is not fit for public office.

The phrase, `and who has failed to comply with an order to appear before the Tribunal', in Article IX(1) of Annex 4 is unfortunate, since the Tribunal does not have a practice of ordering persons to appear before it, but of issuing arrest warrants addressed to States.<sup>29</sup> Such an order could, of course, be issued as a summons under Rule 54 of the Rules if `necessary for the purposes of an investigation or for the preparation or conduct of the trial'. Equally, it could be argued that an arrest warrant which has been brought to the attention of the accused operates as a form of summons.

5. Amnesty

Article VI of Annex 7, which addresses the sensitive issue of amnesty, reads:

Any returning refugee or displaced person charged with a crime, other than a serious violation of international humanitarian law as defined in the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia since January 1, 1991 or a common crime unrelated to the conflict, shall upon return enjoy an amnesty. In no case shall charges for crimes be imposed for political or other inappropriate reasons or to circumvent the application of the amnesty.

By definition, this Article does not interfere with or impinge in any way upon the work of the Tribunal. It should be seen as having the purpose of satisfying Article 6(5)³⁰ of Additional Protocol II,³¹ and thereby confirming that Additional Protocol II contemplates amnesty only for having participated in the fighting, and not for having committed violations of international humanitarian law while so participating.

The absence of any amnesty for those accused by the Tribunal underscores the point that the Peace Agreement must comply with previous Security Council resolutions relating to the former Yugoslavia, in particular those establishing the Tribunal. An amnesty for those accused of genocide³² might, in any event, be contrary to jus cogens and therefore void.³³

Many articles could also be invoked in the Tribunal's favour which do not specifically mention it by name, notably articles which remind the parties of their obligations under international humanitarian law,³⁴ or which refer to co-operation with international organizations or personnel. An example of the latter is Article III(2) of Annex 7, which could be relied upon to provide the Tribunal's investigators with access to refugees and displaced persons for the purposes of taking statements regarding the circumstances of their displacement - an activity "vital to the discharge of their mandate".

A number of clauses mention co-operation with non-governmental organizations ("NGOs").³⁵ In the early stages of an investigation, the Tribunal often receives valuable information from NGOs.³⁶ It is also significant that whereas before the Peace Agreement, the Parties were not strictly required to co-operate with NGOs, as they were required by Security Council resolutions to co-operate with the Tribunal, the relevant clauses now impose such a requirement.

C. Sanctions for Non-Compliance

As stated, Security Council resolution 1022 (1995) provides for enforcement of the Peace Agreement by conferring on the High Representative and the IFOR Commander the power to report to the Council significant non-compliance by either RS or FRY. The Council will then reimpose sanctions against those parties, without the need of a decision, after 5 days, `unless the Council decides otherwise taking into consideration the nature of the non-compliance'. Thus sanctions will be reimposed automatically unless members of the Security Council decide to the contrary (although such a decision could of course be vetoed by one of the permanent members).

The provision for sanctions is, however, subject to an important qualification: it may terminate after six to nine months. Operative paragraph 4 of the resolution stipulates that the Council will terminate sanctions "on the tenth day following the occurrence of the first free and fair elections provided for in annex 3 of the Peace Agreement ...", which are due to take place, under annex 3, six months after the Agreement enters into force or, if the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe deems a delay necessary, "no later than nine months after entry into force" (Article II(4)). This raises the issue: what if it proves impossible to organize free and fair elections in that time, given the conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, notably the many hundreds of thousands of refugees? Presumably the termination of sanctions under resolution 1022 would then have to await such elections, even if they were not to be held for a year or more. It should be added that, if elections are held in time, termination would not be automatic; operative paragraph 5 of the resolution refers to termination "by a subsequent Council decision in accordance with paragraph 4 above", clearly indicating that the Council must take a decision to terminate sanctions. A permanent member could veto this decision if there were continuing non-compliance by the FRY or RS. Indeed, the prospect of using the veto in these circumstances may have been hinted at by the United States Representative during the debates on resolution 1022:

.... compliance by the Bosnian Serbs cannot be assumed. After the siege of Sarajevo, the market-place shelling, the years of "ethnic cleansing" and the unforgivable savagery at Srebrenica, the world has had enough of Bosnian Serb arrogance and brutality. Their compliance with this agreement must be demanded by the Government in Belgrade; it must be demanded by this Council; and it must be demanded by every civilized person on earth.³⁷

If the two conditions demanded by paragraph 4 were met, namely free and fair elections and withdrawal from the zones of separation, but the Bosnian Serbs were recalcitrant in other areas, for example refusing to co-operate with the Tribunal, sanctions might still not be terminated. To terminate sanctions in the face of bare-faced non-compliance with "an essential aspect of implementing the Peace Agreement" would appear to be inconsistent with the entire spirit of resolution 1022 (1995).

The sanctions suspended under resolution 1022 are contained in a number of resolutions against FRY and, to a lesser extent, RS (notably resolution 942(1994)). Interestingly, it appears that sanctions would be reimposed on both Parties if either of them failed to comply. While it is logical for sanctions to be reimposed on FRY for RS's non-compliance, since FRY is the guarantor of RS's compliance, it is curious that sanctions may be reimposed upon RS for FRY's non-compliance. The close identification of FRY and RS suggests a perception that they are, in fact, one entity. This perception is reinforced by the Agreement of 29 August 1995,³⁸ and the constitutional provision which would allow RS to establish a "special parallel relationship" with FRY.³⁹ The de facto establishment of a "Greater Serbia" has potential implications for the Tribunal, both in respect of the characterisation of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina as international, based on the notion that Bosnian Serb forces are agents of FRY, for the purposes of the application of international humanitarian law, and in respect of the existence of an expansionist project in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the part of FRY.

An important feature of resolution 1022 (1995) is that it requires the Security Council to be seized by the High Representative or the IFOR Commander of non-compliance by FRY or RS with regard to a matter within the scope of their respective mandates. Thus these officials have a vital rôle to play in monitoring compliance by these Parties.⁴⁰ The High Representative's mandate is to monitor compliance with the civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement,⁴¹ which include such issues as humanitarian aid, rehabilitation of infrastructure and economic reconstruction, the establishment of political and constitutional institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, promotion of respect for human rights and the return of displaced persons and refugees, election arrangements, and, notably, co-operation with the Tribunal. The IFOR Commander is responsible for enforcing compliance with the military aspects of the Peace Agreement (Annex 1-A), which includes provisions regarding co-operation with the Tribunal, free movement of investigators, including access to sites, and access to prisoners held by the Parties.

Resolution 1031 (1995) confirms that the IFOR Commander and the High Representative have `final authority to interpret'<sup>42</sup> the military and civilian aspects of the Agreement, respectively. This would seem to imply that the Security Council is not competent to determine, proprio motu, non-compliance by a Party, although the words, `in theatre', could be construed to mean that the Council, being `out of theatre', is not subject to this `final authority'. Resolution 1031 (1995) would then represent a partial delegation of power by the Security Council to the IFOR Commander and High Representative, the Council however retaining a residual power to determine, at least, a Party's non-cooperation with the Tribunal. It is possible to imagine tension arising where there is substantial non-cooperation with the Tribunal by RS or FRY, but neither the High Representative nor the IFOR Commander consider it a significant breach of the Parties' obligations under the Peace Agreement. The Security Council would, on the above theory, not be barred from adopting new resolutions to condemn and, if necessary, to apply sanctions against RS and FRY for non-cooperation. Since it has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, its resolutions might also mould the views of the IFOR Commander and the High Representative as to the interpretation of the Agreement and of what constitutes significant non-compliance.

It is salient to note that the Tribunal's Rules⁴³ provide for direct notification to the Security Council where a State fails to co-operate: a useful safeguard against inaction by the High Representative or the IFOR Commander. A finding by a Trial Chamber that failure to execute an arrest warrant is due to the failure of a State to co-operate may implicitly involve finding that a Party has failed to meet its obligations under the Peace Agreement.⁴⁴ This judicial determination would be independent of, and not subject to, the High Representative's `final authority to interpret' the Agreement. Thus a system of `checks and balances' may emerge in which the High Representative's `final authority' to interpret civilian implementation of the Agreement is balanced in certain cases by the monitoring activities of other organs enjoying concurrent jurisdiction.⁴⁵

16 This is a blatant omission. Article X of Annex 1-A is virtually identical save it includes the phrase, "including the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia'.

17 See the Preamble, `Noting the agreement of August 29, 1995, which authorized the delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to sign, on behalf of the Republika Srpska, the parts of the peace plan concerning it, with the obligation to implement the agreement that is reached strictly ...'. In side-letters, FRY has also pledged to ensure RS's compliance with Annex 1-A, and Croatia has undertaken to ensure compliance by "personnel or organisations in Bosnia and Herzegovina which are under its control or with which it has influence", i.e. Bosnian Croats. See letter of Mate Granic to the Acting Secretary General of NATO, dated 21 November 1995.

18 Article X of Annex 1-A (emphasis added). Another example is Article IV of Annex 9.

19 A recent article suggests that the Bosnian Serbs might try Radovan Karadzic themselves. See the New York Times, 4 January 1996, "Top Leader of the Bosnian Serbs now under attack from within": ` .... there are increasing calls within Serb-held parts of Bosnia for him (Karadzic) to be removed from power and tried as a war criminal, if not in The Hague, then in Bosnia. ... "Our main goal now is to take these war criminals, like Karadzic, and put them on trial. The Bosnian Serbs must punish those who carried out these crimes, otherwise, in the eyes of the world, we will bear the guilt for the atrocities they committed in our name."' (Emphasis added).

20 If acquitted by the national court, the Tribunal could still request the arrest of the accused if `(a) the act for which he or she was tried was characterized as an ordinary crime; or (b) the national court proceedings were not impartial or independent, were designed to shield the accused from international criminal responsibility, or the case was not diligently prosecuted.' (Article 10(2) of the Statute).

21 See Article II(8) of Annex 4 and Article XIII(4) of Annex 6: `All competent authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina shall cooperate with and provide unrestricted access to ... the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ...'.

22 Article I(2)(b) of Annex 1-A.

23 IFOR has been equivocal about its willingness to perform this task. The attitude of the Clinton Administration has, on the other hand, been more robust. See, the remarks of US Defence Secretary Perry: `If the War Crimes Tribunal (sic) wants to go to Srebrenica and dig up some graves, we'll provide the security ... I don't consider that mission creep', reported in the New York Times, 13 January 1996, "U.S. Sees Bosnia Role Widening to Protect War Crimes Inquiries".

24 Note that Article IX(2) of Annex 1-A also mentions mass graves. This article, however, only allows access to such sites for the `limited purpose' of recovering the dead by registration personnel of a party, and not by the Tribunal, and it is also qualified by the strange wording, `... where places of burial, whether individual or mass, are known as a matter of record, and graves are actually found to exist ...', which appears to be intended to exclude suspected sites which have not been confirmed.

25 See the Report of the Commission of Experts, Annex X, Mass Graves, passim. See also The Times, 13 January 1996, p.10/1: `War Crimes team told of 8,000 bodies in mineshafts'; and Le Monde, 26 January, 1996, p.2, "Les principaux charniers repérés".

26 The indictment in Karadzic and Mladic (IT-95-18-I), charges the accused with, inter alia, genocide, for their involvement in the events following the fall of Srebrenica to Serb forces. The confirming Judge in that case noted the evidence of `thousands of men executed and buried in mass graves'.

27 See also Article VIII(4), Establishment of a Joint Military Commission, of Annex 1-A, and Article II(1) of Annex 8, "Commission to Preserve National Monuments".

28 Preamble to "Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina", Annex 4.

29 This does not apply to Article VIII(4) of Annex 1-A, which does not require that the person be ordered to appear before the Tribunal, but would apply to Article II(1) of Annex 8, which does.

30 "At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict ... ". See Paragraph 4618 of the Commentary on the Additional Protocols: "the object of this sub-paragraph is to encourage gestures of reconciliation which can contribute to reestablishing normal relations in the life of a nation which has been divided".

31 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977)).

32 To date, the Tribunal has charged five accused with genocide: Zeljko Meakic (IT-95-4-I), Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic (IT-95-5-I and IT-95-18-I), Dusko Sikirica (IT-95-8-I) and Goran Jelisic (IT-95-10-I).

33 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See the International Court of Justice's Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (1951), in which it stated that genocide was `contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations'; see also the Separate Opinion of Judge Lauterpacht in the Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (Order of 13 September 1993): `... the prohibition of genocide has long been regarded as one of the few undoubted examples of jus cogens' (paragraph 100).

34 See, e.g., the Preamble to Annex 4: `Determined to ensure full respect for international humanitarian law'.

35 See, again, Article III(2) of Annex 7, and Article XIII(3) of Annex 6, `The Parties shall allow full and effective access to non-governmental organizations for purposes of investigating and monitoring human rights conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and shall refrain from hindering or impeding them in the exercise of these functions'.

36 See the Tribunal's Second Annual Report (A/50/365; S/1995/728), paragraphs 154-156.

37 S/PV.3595, p.15.

38 See footnote 17.

39 Article III(2)(a) of Annex 4.

40 The present holder of the office of the High Representative, Mr. Carl Bildt, has sought to play down his capacity to ensure compliance by the Parties. Replying to an editorial of 17 December 1995 in the New York Times, Mr. Bildt wrote, "You seem to overestimate the powers of the High Representative. His powers are not to execute or enforce but to monitor and coordinate. In contrast to the military implementation with its distinct chain of command and single-key approach, the civilian implementation structures have numerous chains of command and multiple keys"(New York Times, 21 December 1995). This passive interpretation of his rôle deliberately overlooks the High Representative's power to re-activate sanctions against FRY and RS under resolution 1022 (1995).

The Commander of the IFOR, Admiral Leighton Smith, has also appeared at times to labour under a misconception of his responsibilities. In reply to a question whether the arrest, in February this year, of Bosnian Serbs by the Bosnian Government, on suspicion of having committed war crimes, violated the Peace Agreement, Admiral Leighton Smith replied, "The issue rests now, with the international tribunal", thus abdicating to the Tribunal his "final authority in theatre" to interpret the Peace Agreement (see CNN Transcript # 90-3, 7 February 1996). Smith of course had it in his power to state that there was no violation of the right to liberty of movement, guaranteed in the Agreement (for example, by Article I(13) of Annex 6), in effecting bona fide arrests of those suspected of committing war crimes or crimes against humanity.

Interestingly, new "rules for the road" announced by U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke in the wake of this affair also led to far greater powers being conferred upon the Tribunal than envisaged at Dayton. After the two detainees referred to were transferred to the Tribunal on 12 February 1996, Holbrooke declared an agreement pursuant to which the Bosnian government would send a list of suspects to the Tribunal and only those certified by the Tribunal as suspects could be arrested at will on the territory of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This agreement in effect treats the Tribunal as a `detaining authority', or even a `prosecuting authority', in Bosnia and Herzegovina for those suspected of committing violations of international humanitarian law. While these measures were no doubt expedient as a means to forestall retaliatory arrests by the Bosnian Serbs, one has to question the constitutionality and legitimacy of this abdication by Bosnia and Herzegovina of the right to arrest those it suspects of having committed grave crimes on its territory. It is also highly questionable to what extent the Tribunal, with its limited facilities, may appropriately act as an overall `prosecuting authority' for Bosnia and Herzegovina, with regard to war crimes and crimes against humanity. The principle of an international tribunal has always been conceived as operating alongside national courts. For these reasons, Holbrooke's `rules of the road' represent more of a realpolitik stop-gap, born of `shuttle diplomacy, than a long-term solution.

41 Article II(1) of Annex 10.'

42 See footnote 9.

43 See Rules 11, 13, 59(B), and 61(E) of the Rules.

44 See Rule 61(E) of the Rules.

45 Another such "check" is the IPTF Commissioner's duty to report directly to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Article II(4) of Annex 11).

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