Russia and the `Legality' of Strasbourg Law V. No matter how politically rational the decision to admit Russia to the Council of Europe, it must be recognized that Russia's accession will result in two important and probably negative consequences for the `legality' of the Strasbourg human rights law system. First, the participation of Russia increases the possibility that European human rights law will both be disobeyed and be seen to be flouted. This has, of course, occurred before, notably by the Colonels' regime in Greece between 1967 and 1974. That situation led to the condemnation of Greece by the European Commission of Human Rights and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, as well as to the denunciation of the Convention by Greece in December 1969.33 Moreover, doubt has been expressed about the actual efficacy of the system, even with regard to the traditional liberal democracies.34 However, three aspects of Russia's accession are particularly troubling for the future of compliance with Strasbourg law. First, at the present time, as the Eminent Lawyers Report makes clear, Russia falls short of the usual European standard of the rule of law and the protection of human rights. Second, given Russia's lack of experience in protecting human rights at the level of municipal law, it is likely that a great many violations of European human rights law will be committed there, and that they will not be remedied domestically. Third, the same political importance of Russia that has prompted the Council of Europe to accept its admittance will make it especially difficult for Strasbourg to force the Russian government to comply with adverse findings. The other significant consequence for the system of European human rights law posed by Russia's accession is likely to be a new challenge to what, along with Hart, we can call Strasbourg's `internal point-of-view'. Given the difficulties of Russia effectively complying with European human rights law in its municipal legal order and of Strasbourg imposing its decisions upon the Russian government, there will be a strong temptation for the Strasbourg institutions to fashion a two-tier legal order, which would allow lower than normal expectations for Russia. This will have the likely benefit of enabling Russia's continued participation in the system, but it will threaten the perception of Hart's `officials, lawyers or private persons' that Strasbourg law `in one situation after another [is a guide] to the conduct of social life, as the basis for claims, demands, admissions, criticism or punishment, viz., in all the familiar transactions of life according to rules'.35 These probable challenges resulting from Russia's accession come at an awkward moment for Strasbourg. Not only is the ambit of European human rights law being widened to reach out to the former Soviet bloc, but the potency of Strasbourg law is being deepened by ever bolder Court judgments against national governments.36 This deepening, a welcome advance on international legal control, is proceeding just when the basic tenets of European unity are under increasing assault by nationalistic sentiments across Europe. This is true not least in the United Kingdom where both European human rights law and European economic law are perceived more and more, not as solutions to European-wide problems, but as foreign threats to national political and economic objectives. Hence, there is a danger that the failure of Russia to comply with European human rights law domestically and to obey the decisions of the Strasbourg institutions and the creation of a two-tier human rights system to accommodate Russia will give the governments of the existing member states all the more latitude in weakening their own commitment to the Strasbourg system. This all serves as a reminder that the `breakthrough' of Strasbourg law to genuine legal obligation may not be forever. 33 . Janis, Kay and Bradley, supra note 7, at 51-64. 34 . Churchill and Young, `Compliance with Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights and Decisions of the Committee of Ministers: The Experience of the United Kingdom, 1975-1987', 62 British Yearbook of International Law (1992) 283. 35 . Hart, supra note 10, at 90. 36 . Janis, Kay and Bradley, supra note 7, at 113-118.
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