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Book ReviewsKontou, Nancy. The Termination and Revision of Treaties in the Light
of New Customary International Law. New York: Oxford University Press,
1994. Pp. xvii, 166. Index. $55. The problem addressed by this book is the situation created by the
coming into effect of a rule of customary law that runs contrary to an existing
treaty provision. It takes a rather strong position in favour of the idea that
a state bound by a treaty which is contra to newer custom has the right to
insist on its cancellation or renegotiation. This seems to follow from a rather
straightforward, binary view of custom, namely that there either is or is not a
new custom. Americans are inclined to be sceptical of assertions about custom,
noting that they can be highly partisan, self-seeking and disingenuous. In a
world without judicial institutions possessing broad jurisdiction, definitive
resolution of questions about custom is rare. One fears that an assertion of a
new custom may be one more in a set of reasons for avoiding a nation's treaty
obligations. In fact, the supersession of treaties by custom is not a common event
since in the context of modern international law the advent of new treaty rules
codifying, modifying or cancelling prior customary law is by far the more
usual. A large fraction of the examples considered in this book come from a
single event - the supersession of various agreements by newer customary
international law of the sea. The special quality of this new custom lies in
the fact that it is primarily the product of widespread agreement among states
upon the provisions of the Law of the Sea Treaty signed in 1982, together with
its failure to achieve enough ratifications to cause it to come into effect
before 1994. It is a somewhat uneasy state of affairs when a treaty that has
failed qua treaty has such a major effect, coming through the back door
as custom. For one thing, this shift from treaty to customary law alters the
internal balance of power among branches of the government in the United States
and perhaps in other countries as well. A treaty under the US Constitution
requires the agreement of two thirds of the Senate, and even a
presidential/executive agreement needs a vote of both houses of Congress. Yet a
President can alone determine that a new customary rule has formed and that the
United States should adhere to it. This is what happened in 1993 when President
Reagan proclaimed a 200 miles exclusive economic zone. The judiciary also has
some power to declare customary law as part of the law of the land. As between
states, the existence of this new custom has been hotly controverted. The
United States has with considerable success taken the position that the parts
of the Law of the Sea Treaty that it likes have become custom, whereas the
parts that it does not like, chiefly those relating to the Deep Sea Bed Mining
Authority, have not. It has thus been able to avoid directly confronting the
question whether it should accept the whole package. That has also weakened the
position of states that thought they could insist on the deep sea bed
provisions because states with other priorities would accept it in order to get
the clauses they wanted. Dr. Kontou writes clearly and rather elegantly. There is so much bad
prose assaulting the reader of international law publications that it is a
pleasure to read straightforward declarative sentences without entangling
clauses. In the best tradition of British international law it is lucid and
understandable - and mercifully condensed. It also has some of the limitations
of the British tradition. The view it takes of custom is rather old-fashioned.
One finds no reference to the works of such authors as David Kennedy and Martii
Koskenniemi who have tested the rhetoric of customary law and found it
inadequate to explain why and when a customary rule is binding. An infusion of
that scepticism would have made the book more realistic, though probably less
readable. Detlev F. Vagts Harvard Law School
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