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Book ReviewsHirsch, Moshe. The Responsibility of International Organizations
toward Third Parties: Some Basic Principles. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff,
1995. Pp xvi, 220. The emergence of international organizations has presented international
lawyers with some complex puzzles. As the collapse of the International Tin
Council in the 1980s demonstrated, the question of the international legal
responsibility of international organizations has particularly required further
study. Moshe Hirsh's study The Responsibility of International Organizations
toward Third Parties: Some Basic Principles is a brave attempt to deal with
a complex legal problem. Although the book has great merit, it is not an
unqualified success. Ostensibly dealing with the question of the responsibility
of international organizations, the study is in actual fact much more an
examination of the responsibility of their members. As such, it hardly lives up
to the promise of its title. Still, Hirsch's chapter on the lex lata regarding the
responsibility of member states is a gem. Lucidly and elegantly, Hirsch
provides an in-depth analysis of treaties and other sources, case law, state
practice, and doctrine, and carefully concludes that contemporary international
law `points to responsibility of the members of international organizations.'
(p. 148). How this responsibility operates, however, remains an open question. Is
it concurrent with the responsibility of the organization itself? Is the
responsibility indirectly incurred, or rather secondarily? In his fifth
chapter, Hirsch attempts to answer these questions, sketching various possible
alternative regimes and distinguishing between voluntary and non-voluntary
third parties (the latter are (presumably victims of torts committed by
organizations). Voluntary third parties, Hirsch proposes, should be subject to
a regime of indirect responsibility. If the organization incurs responsibility,
it is under a legal duty to make its members comply. In the absence thereof,
the injured third party may enforce members' obligations toward the
organization. With respect to non-voluntary third parties, however, a regime of
secondary responsibility is proposed. If the organization fails to provide
remedies, non-voluntary third parties may eventually proceed against the
members. Hirsch bases his proposals on the balancing of interests of the
organization with those of third parties. However, this dichotomy is not
without its problems. Although international law can be said to be largely the
result of structural tension between the interests of sovereign states and
those of the international community at large, it is doubtful whether this
model can simply be transposed to questions concerning the legal position of
international organizations. Hirsch neglects the fact that the emergence of
international organizations added not just a new (type of) subject to
international law, but rather added a whole new dimension. Consequently, the
simple `state versus community' dichotomy (transposed to an `international
organization versus third state' dichotomy) is by no means a sufficient tool
for the analysis of problems of international organizations. A balancing of
factors, as advocated by Hirsch, should have included the interests of the
international community as well as those of the member states of
organizations. As a result, his defense of the interests of international organizations
leads at times to puzzling statements. While there may be some truth in
Hirsch's proposition that international organizations generally contribute to
human welfare, this can hardly be a reason to deny remedies to injured third
parties. Yet, this is precisely what would happen in certain (extreme) cases.
Third parties could fall victim to a need to enable international organizations
to prosper. Furthermore, Hirsch fails to clarify why, in cases where residuary
responsibility of the member states is envisaged, this responsibility also
extends to those member states which were outvoted when the organization
prepared or committed its wrongful act. In theory, this could perhaps be
justified by arguing that membership necessarily entails residuary
responsibility. Unfortunately, however, Hirsch barely addresses the issue. Apart from not quite living up to its title and the use of a less than
fully convincing theoretical framework, Hirsch's study suffers from some
additional defects. The international legal personality of international
organizations is, for instance, simply `presumed' (p. 10, n. 50). Whether
organizations need to have a distinct will is a question that remains
unaddressed. And most curiously, the chapter ostensibly devoted to breaches of
international law by organizations (Ch. 2) does nothing of the kind; Hirsch
analyses the possible sources of international obligations of international
organizations, but does not examine `breach' itself. The pertinent rules on the
breach of the treaty are not even mentioned. Surprisingly, although Hirsch's study is vulnerable to criticism both on
theoretical and methodological grounds, it is a quite valuable study. In spite
of the flaws noted above, the subsequent analysis is convincing on most counts,
and, as mentioned, the chapter on lex lata with respect to
responsibility of member states for acts attributable to international
organizations is a gem. Moreover, the proposals Hirsch makes de lege
ferenda appear quite reasonable as far as the results are concerned. Moshe Hirsch's study does not solve all the riddles relating to the
responsibility of international organizations. It does, however, provide
fertile soil for further debate and study, and presents some useful suggestions
regarding urgent practical problems. These facts alone suffice to make it an
important contribution to the international legal literature. Jan Klabbers Europa Instituut University of Amsterdam
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