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Recapturing a Lost Opportunity: Article III:2 GATT 1994 Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages 1996II. BackgroundIn Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, the Panel and the
Appellate Body agreed with the US, the EC, and Canada that the Japanese Liquor
Tax Law violated Japan's obligations under Article III:2 GATT 1994 by taxing
shochu at a lower rate than other liquors. Article III:2 prohibits imported
products from being subject to internal taxes in excess of taxes levied on
"like" domestic products.6 Imported products
that are "directly competitive" with domestic products cannot be taxed
dissimilarly, as stated in the interpretive note to Article III:2, Ad Article
III:2.7 The US, the EC, and Canada requested
that the Panel find that the other liquors are either "like" shochu or,
alternatively, "directly competitive" with shochu. The tax rates would then
have to be the same or at least similar for shochu and the other liquors. The
Panel and the Appellate Body found that shochu and the other liquors are either
"like" or "directly competitive," and therefore the different rates of taxation
in the Japanese Liquor Tax Law violated Article III:2. However, the reasoning
used to arrive at this outcome was acceptable only to the EC and Canada, and
not to the US or Japan.8 The test the Panel and the Appellate Body used to find the violation of
Article III:2 relied exclusively on descriptive criteria to classify the
alcoholic beverages as "like" or "directly competitive."9 Whether the products are "like" or "directly
competitive" is assessed on a case-by-case basis using a panel's "best
judgment."10 For potentially "like"
products, a panel looks to the physical characteristics, end-uses, and tariff
classifications of the products. After determining that products are "like," a
panel decides if the tax on imports is "in excess" of the tax on domestic
goods. If the tax is "in excess," then the measure is presumed to be protective
and violates Article III:2. Products are considered "directly competitive" if
they have similar consumer end-uses, as illustrated, for example, by the
cross-price elasticity of demand. Once the products are found to be "directly
competitive," then a panel determines if the products are similarly taxed, and,
finally, if the fiscal measure has a protective effect. Essentially, if there
is a greater than de minimus tax difference between the products, then the
measure is presumed to be discriminatory. Even though the United States agreed with the outcome of the dispute, it
appealed the Panel's test for determining a violation under Article III:2 and
again offered the aim-and-effect test as an alternative.11 The US based its argument on the language of
Article III:2 and Article III:1. Article III:1 lays out the general obligation
of the Contracting Parties not to apply internal measures to imported or
domestic products "so as to afford protection to domestic production."12 The US argued that the specific obligations of
Article III:2 must be read in light of Article III:1, which forms part of the
context of Article III:2. A panel should determine the likeness and
competitiveness of products by evaluating whether the defendant government
categorized the products "so as to afford protection" to the local product.
"Applied...so as to afford protection" should be interpreted to mean that the
measure was both intended to and has the effect of protecting domestic
production. If a measure does not have both the aim and the effect of
protection, then the products are not "like" or "directly competitive" for the
purposes of Article III:2. The Appellate Body, like the Panel, rejected the
aim-and-effect test to the long-term detriment of the fiscal sovereignty of the
Contracting Parties.
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