After Amsterdam: A Report on the Common Foreign and Security Policy

1 The Stakes in the IGC

A The Problems

1 The New Geopolitical Context

The process of disintegration of the communist regimes in Europe beginning in 1989 has brought about a radical shift in the geopolitical balance on the European continent. To be sure, it has greatly reduced the threat of large-scale conflict - at least for the time being. Yet, at the same time, it has fostered the re-emergence of ethnic-based territorial disputes, resulting in the threat and appearance of local conflicts. Thus, the disappearance of the Soviet menace has, paradoxically, fundamentally improved European security, while rendering the continent more unstable.

Further, with the partial retreat of the United States, this instability has become more difficult for the European countries to manage. The disappearance of the Soviet threat has also reduced American interest in European problems. For instance, as a result of the disarmament agreements signed during the Gorbachev period, American troops stationed in Western Europe have been reduced to 100,000 men.

2 Insufficient Cooperation in the Area of Foreign Policy

In such a context, it would seem logical that the Member States of the European Union should strengthen their cooperation in the field of foreign policy. However, it was reinforced only to a small degree at the time of the American retreat. Doubtless, foreign policy is an area of great symbolic value for the Member States, with each nation trying very hard to maintain an outward appearance of sovereignty. Hence, the improvements incorporated in the Maastricht Treaty in this area were more apparent than real.

By the same token, it can be argued that the importance of the problem of foreign policy is most likely overestimated. The external policy of the European Union may be divided into three sectors: external economic policy, defence policy and foreign policy in the narrow sense of the word. This last sector is the smallest as most foreign policy decisions interconnect with international economic cooperation or defence.

3 The Rapid Decline of the European Armaments Industry

Since 1989 the armaments industry has suffered a considerable worldwide reduction in demand (except in Asia, where economic growth has allowed regular increases in military budgets). Quite notably different reactions to this new situation may be observed. American enterprises implemented drastic reforms (with destabilizing effects on the Californian economy for some time) and reoriented towards an export market. The European response was slower, with the result that companies there are now facing the competitive disadvantage of higher costs and are losing substantial parts of their traditional world market share.

This evolution also has important strategic implications. Conflicts reappearing in Europe are being fought with light weapons which have a high technological capacity. The inertia of the European armaments industry has thus caused it to fall increasingly behind in the world market. In addition, the closed nature of the national markets within Europe has exacerbated the problem of insufficient competitiveness. In turn, these difficulties in the defence industry affect the defence capacity of the Member States.

4 The Weakness of European Defence Capacity

At the same time, there is little coordination among existing defence instruments. Very few integrated units are in place (with the exception of the Eurocorps currently being set up). Integration of command is weak, as is the information structure. Each country is likely to rely on its own materials and resources.

B The Responses of the European Union To Date

As noted, the importance of the EU's foreign policy is often exaggerated. In the narrow sense, foreign policy corresponds to diplomatic decisions that are not of an economic nature (which come within the field of the European Community) and are not defence issues (which for the moment is dealt with in other organizations). Nevertheless, it continues to carry an intense symbolic value, especially for the large Member States which are anchored in their own diplomatic tradition dating back several centuries.³

1 The Institutionalization of Political Cooperation

a) The Beginnings of Political Cooperation

The rapprochement of Member State foreign policies has always been an extremely complicated exercise. Starting from 1970, it was dealt with in the framework of European Political Cooperation (EPC), which was based on traditional diplomatic mechanisms operating outside the Community institutions. These mechanisms were formally confirmed by the Single European Act of 1986.

However, this official `consecration' only barely improved the results of political cooperation. The Member States multiplied their common diplomatic declarations during the 1970s and 1980s, without however producing any notable concrete results. The influence of the European Community in the important conflicts of that period (armaments negotiations with the Soviet Union, the Middle East peace process, American military action in Central America, the survival of the apartheid regime in South Africa) was extremely weak, even when its fundamental interests were at stake.

b) The Maastricht Treaty: The Common Foreign and Security Policy

In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty established a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This is the `second pillar' of the general framework of the European Union. Its provisions envisage a reinforcement and expansion of political cooperation. In this perspective, the objectives of the policy and the instruments it made available have been described with great enthusiasm.

Unfortunately, the decision-making mechanism remained essentially unchanged. On the one hand, the Treaty provides that a qualified majority can be used, on the condition that it is unanimously agreed beforehand. There is also a declaration annexed to the Maastricht Treaty stating that the Member States will try to avoid blocking decisions supported by a qualified majority by demanding a unanimous vote.

Within this framework, the European Union has been able to obtain some, albeit limited, results. These include the launch of the Stability Pact for Europe and support for the Non-proliferation Treaty. In general, however, the results have been disappointing. Indeed, the system's failure is much more obvious than its success.

Firstly, the European Union has not as yet been able to delineate an appropriate answer to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. Admittedly, a solution to these conflicts is far from self-evident. However, given the degree of interest of the Member States in this issue, their inability to act certainly does not bode well. Secondly, coordination between actions in the framework of the first pillar (European Community) and in the framework of the second pillar (CFSP) has been problematic. At times the separation between these two frameworks and the types of procedures pertaining to each has proved very difficult to maintain. Thirdly, it has been the first pillar, and not the CFSP, that has enabled the EU to accomplish its most important diplomatic successes. We need only refer here to the conclusion of the commercial negotiations of the Uruguay Round, the support to the economic restructuring of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the renegotiations of certain elements of the Lomé Convention and the political and economic rapprochement with the Mediterranean countries.

The crisis in Chechnya showed the difference between these two types of procedure very clearly. In the framework of intergovernmental cooperation, the Member States have continued to produce statements and positions without exerting any real influence. The threat to end the first-pillar negotiations for a Partnership Agreement has proved to be much more effective.

2 A Cautious Rapprochement between the European Union and the Western European Union

The Maastricht Treaty sought to bring about a rapprochement between the European Union and the Western European Union, with the long-term aim of establishing a role for the WEU as an EU instrument for the implementation of the CFSP. This rapprochement, however, has remained extremely cautious. In the provisions of the Treaty itself, there is no reference to defence issues. A declaration of WEU member countries annexed to the Maastricht Treaty states that they `agree to strengthen the role of WEU, in the longer term perspective of a common defence policy'. The restrictions in this phrase are more striking than its substance.

In reality, more factual progress has been obtained in the framework of specific cooperation between certain Member States (Eurocorps, regrouping of navy forces) than in the framework of the European Union. The only intervention made by the WEU in the framework of the CFSP was the sending of troops in 1994 to maintain public order in the city of Mostar.⁴

C The IGC Debate

What is foreign policy about? The question is not so simple, as the IGC negotiators discovered. It had not been discussed at length during the Maastricht negotiations, but the failures of the former Yugoslavia necessitated some reflection. While many preliminary comments were published,⁵ this introspection unfortunately remained somewhat limited. Many of these writings were not widely read.

1 The Development of a Diplomatic Instrument

a) A Capacity for Information and Analysis

All observers recognize the need for a structure that combines capacities for information and analysis. Yet there is no agreement on the management of such a structure. Some would prefer it to be under the umbrella of the Commission, others argue that it should be the responsibility of the secretariat of the Council of Ministers, and yet others would like to see the appointment of a special representative to undertake this role. In addition, various mixed solutions have been proposed.

The most rational solution would be to consign this mission to the Commission. It must be underlined, however, that this would imply a reinforcement of the Commission's responsibility towards the other institutions of the European Community. If not, the actual lack of Commission legitimacy would obstruct such a reform. In addition, mechanisms for cooperation would need to be developed with the national ministries of foreign affairs. The intervention of the Commission would allow a maximal coherence to be maintained between diplomatic action and the management of external economic policy (which is a fundamental element of long-term security policy).

One must nevertheless acknowledge that the granting of new powers to the Commission would increase an already sizeable problem of accountability. Considering its present powers, it is necessary that the Commission be more effectively controlled. Mechanisms must be developed. Federally minded Member States (and the Commission) strongly underestimated this problem in the preparation of the IGC. Yet, one cannot always seek a strengthening of the powers of the Commission without considering the question of a strengthening of its accountability.

However, for the present, many Member States unfortunately oppose the idea of entrusting this new task to the Commission. A compromise solution might be to set up a mixed entity comprising people from the Commission and the secretariat of the Council of Ministers. This would allow at least minimal coordination for the different aspects of the external policy of the European Union. Every other solution would inevitably add a new layer of bureaucracy, which would in turn further complicate coordination between the institutions, making it even less comprehensible for the public.

b) A Capacity to Decide

The highly symbolic value attached to foreign policy decisions has led to proposals for complex decision-making methods in recent years: reinforced qualified majority, consensus minus one, selective veto. Two general orientations, however, seem clear. On the one hand, it would seem evident that the possibility of qualified majority voting should be developed. Otherwise, the existing paralysis of the European Union, and thus crisis, will continue. On the other hand, this reform cannot be used as an alibi in order to reintroduce the right to veto, unless this concerns the deployment of armed forces.

c) A Capacity to Implement

For the moment, the implementation of every foreign policy decision creates problems. As in the analysis area, it is necessary to establish mechanisms for cooperation between the services of the Commission and national administrations. The delegations of the Commission in third countries could be used as coordination centres. However, for the management of urgent crises, requiring humanitarian or armed interventions, the Commission is badly equipped. This type of intervention should be coordinated by the WEU.

2 The Development of a Military Instrument

a) Improved Cooperation for Armaments

In its attempt to maintain the technological capacity of the European industry and improve the efficiency of armaments, while at the same time reducing their cost, coordination in the area of armaments production should be strongly reinforced. The creation of an armaments agency in the framework of the WEU is thus a necessity.

b) Improved Cooperation for Defence

Cooperation between the European states with regard to their defence organization also constitutes a necessity. This cooperation, together with an effective integration of defence, would produce even better results, enabling a substantial improvement in the efficiency of military instruments while at the same time reducing costs. This is especially justified in those sectors - including military intelligence (particularly the use of satellites), strategic transport and units under integrated command - where the operational capacities of the armies of the European states are still largely dependent on American support.

3 In the abundant literature, see for the beginnings, D. Allen, R. Rummel and W. Wessels (eds), European political cooperation (1982); P. De Schoutheete, La coopération politique européenne (1986). The results of European political cooperation are analysed in A. Pijpers et al., European Political Cooperation in the 1980s: A Common Foreign Policy for Western Europe? (1988); S. Nuttal, European Political Cooperation (1992); E. Regelsberger, P. De Schoutheete and W. Wessels (eds), Foreign Policy of the European Union (1997).

4 OJ 1994 L 134.

5 For an analysis of possible reforms, see Willaert and Marques-Ruiz, `Vers une politique étrangère et de sécurité commune: état des lieux', RMUE (1995) 35; W. Van Eekelen, `The Security Agenda for 1996: Background and Proposals', CEPS Papers, no. 64 (1995); A. Dashwood (ed.), Reviewing Maastricht - Issues for the 1996 IGC (1996), at 211-275; J. Winter, D. Curtin, A. Kellermann and B. De Witte (eds), Reforming the Treaty on European Union - The Legal Debate (1996), at 323-376; Rummel, `The Intergovernmental Conference 1996: How to Reform CFSP?', in E. Regelsberger et al., supra note 2, 363.

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