A New Gear in the CFSP Machinery: Integration of the Petersberg Tasks in the Treaty on European Union

5 Significance of an EU Crisis Management Capability

Various profiles emerge in an assessment of the impact that the integration of the Petersberg operations into the TEU will have on the CFSP and on the EU role in the international community.

Firstly, as far as CFSP functioning is concerned, Article J.7.2 does not represent a radical innovation. Under Article J.4.2 of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU was already able to request the WEU to implement its decisions on crisis management.⁵⁰ However, for the first time a specific policy has been codified within the second pillar. This codification did not by any means assimilate the policy of crisis management into an exclusive EU competence, but determined the EU's commitment at the highest possible level. From a practical point of view, it stimulated the creation or the adjustment of the complex mechanisms necessary for its implementation. The reformed CFSP set of acts, procedures and organs, together with the progressive development of the operational role of the WEU, constitute the institutional framework for the conduct of Petersberg operations. Particularly with regard to the WEU, the Amsterdam Treaty has generated, even prior to its entry into force, the effect of accelerating the process of setting up an adequate European mechanism for crisis management. Various difficulties still seem to weaken this machinery, for example the complexity of the institutional interplay between and within the EU and WEU, thereby raising some perplexities regarding effectiveness and timing. Nevertheless, at this stage any future inaction by the EU can no longer be attributed to an inadequate institutional and operational machinery, but exclusively to the lack of political will of the European states.⁵¹

Secondly, with regard to the EU's standing in the international community, the integration of the Petersberg tasks into the TEU signifies some important developments. Article J.4.2 strongly enhances EU visibility in crisis management with respect to the European security organizations and, particularly, the United Nations. In this regard, the question arises whether the EU has become a `regional agency' under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. In the light of the Amsterdam Treaty there can no longer be any doubts. Through its activities of peace-keeping and peacemaking, the EU is engaged in the maintenance of international peace and security. Its commitment to the principles of the United Nations Charter is stated twice in the CFSP objectives (Article J.1.1). Even if one refers to the now largely superseded debate<sup>52</sup> on the definition of `regional arrangements or agencies' under UN Charter Chapter VIII⁵³ and shares the more restrictive doctrinal interpretations, it cannot be denied that the EU now pertains to this category.

Thirdly, the EU's assumption of responsibility for conflict management could constitute an important contribution, and thus make a significant impact, in the area. The fact that the WEU has a credible military capacity for intervention in crisis management will place the EU in a unique position in the international community and in relation to other security organizations. The EU will have a twofold comparative advantage: on the one hand, it will dispose of an across the board civilian-military intervention capacity and, on the other hand, it will be possible to guarantee a continuum in crisis management - from early warning and humanitarian intervention through post-conflict reconstruction and extending to economic development aid.

In crisis management operations, the availability of qualified civilian resources is becoming as important as the presence of effective military capacity. Peace, democracy- and capacity-building programmes, such as election monitoring and human rights assistance, are considered crucial for the success of any post-conflict settlement. In this regard the EU, particularly through the Commission, has gained experience and may have the means to mobilize the human and financial resources required in order to effectively confront complex crises. Assuming responsibility for the military aspects of conflict management as well will make it possible for the EU to gather the various forms of international intervention under a single umbrella, a development which will prove immensely beneficial in terms of unity, continuity of action and effectiveness.

50 According to a certain opinion the EU actually resorted to Art. J.4.2 in the case of Mostar, see Willaert and Marqués-Ruiz, `Vers une politique étrangère et de sécurité commune: état des lieux', Revue du Marché unique européen (1995) 35, at 67. See also Pagani, supra note 6, at 251.

51 See e.g. the Declaration of the WEU Secretary General at the WEU Parliamentary Assembly, 18 May 1998, in Atlantic News (No. 3011, 20 May 1998) 3.

52 See Gioia, `The United Nations and Regional Organizations in the Maintenance of Peace and Security', in Bothe, Ronzitti, and Rosas (eds), supra note 21, at 204.

53 See Hummer and Schweitzer, `Article 52', in B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations. A Commentary (1994) 679, at 691.

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