Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia - Current Survey 3 The Tribunal's Authority to Order States and Individuals to Provide Evidence A Procedural Background B The Trial Chamber's Decision 1 Authority to Subpoena States 2 Authority to Subpoena Individuals 3 Limits on the Tribunal's Subpoena Power C The Appeal 1 Authority to Subpoena States 2 Authority to Subpoena Individuals 3 Limits on the Tribunal's Subpoena Power D Summary 3 The Tribunal's Authority to Order States and Individuals to Provide Evidence The issue of the Tribunal's authority vis-à-vis third parties was starkly raised in the Blaskiæ case. The case required the Tribunal to decide on the extent of its power to issue binding orders, such as subpoenas, to states and individuals, including high government officials. A Procedural Background The in dictment against Blaskiæ accused him of, inter alia , the persecution of Bosnian Muslim civilians on political, racial or religious grounds, unlawful attacks on civilians and civilian objects, wilful killing and causing serious physical and mental injury to civilians, the destruction and plunder of property, the destruction of institutions dedicated to religion or education and the inhumane treatment of Bosnian Muslim detainees.49 The indictment alleged that Blaskiæ was a high-level commander in the armed forces of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) and commanded its forces in central Bosnia. The issue of Blaskiæ's command responsibility for acts committed by his subordinates 50 lay at the core of the case. Military documents were highly relevant to establishing or disproving the chain of command, the degree of control exercised by Blaskiæ over the troops and the extent to which he was cognizant of the actions undertaken by his subordinates. In order to obtain such documents which are usually in possession of states, the Prosecutor requested the issuance of subpoenas .51 On 15 January 1997, after an ex parte hearing, Judge McDonald issued a subpoena to Croatia and its defence minister. 52 The subpoena directed Croatia to ensure compliance with the order and requested its defence minister to provide, by 14 February 1997, 13 specified categories of evidence relating to the Blaskiæ case.53 A similar subpoena was addressed the same day to Bosnia and to the Custodian of the records of the Central Archive of what was formerly the Ministry of Defence of the Croatian Community of Herceg Bosna (the "Custodian of the Central Archive").54 Both subpoenas specified that, in case of non-compliance, representatives of the persons subpoenaed were to appear before Judge McDonald. The Croatian government challenged the subpoenas issued by Judge McDonald. It argued that under its Statute, the Tribunal was only empowered to make requests for assistance. Such requests could only be directed to a state and not to a "specifically named high government official".55 With regard to the subpoena itself, Croatia contended that pursuant to its Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Tribunal did not have the authority to issue subpoenas to sovereign states.56 Although it refused to comply with a subpoena , Croatia reiterated its readiness to cooperate informally with the Tribunal. In contrast to Croatia, Bosnia indicated that it would take steps to comply with the subpoenas directed to it and representatives of Bosnia appeared before Judge McDonald at a hearing held in February 1997. However, neither Croatia nor Bosnia actually produced the documents sought by the Prosecutor. In February and March 1997, hearings were held in this regard and Judge McDonald issued several additional orders.57 In addition, on 7 March 1997, counsel for the accused filed a motion for the issuance of a subpoena to Bosnia compelling the production of exculpatory documents.58 On that same day, Judge McDonald directed the Prosecutor, Bosnia, the successor of the Custodian of the Central Archive, Croatia and its defence minister to brief on the following issues: (1) the power of a Judge or Trial Chamber of the International Tribunal to issue a subpoena duces tecum to a sovereign State; (2) the power of a Judge or Trial Chamber of the International Tribunal to make a request or issue a subpoena duces tecum to a high government official of a State; (3) the appropriate remedies to be taken if there was non-compliance of a subpoena duces tecum or request issued by a Judge or a Trial Chamber of the International Tribunal and, (4) any other issue concerning this matter.59 A hearing was scheduled and, because of the significance of the issues to be addressed, Judge McDonald ordered that the matter be heard by the full Trial Chamber II comprising herself as Presiding Judge and Judges Odio Benito and Jan. She also invited requests for leave to submit amicus curiae briefs on the above-mentioned issues. B The Trial Chamber's Decision The Trial Chamber's decision affirmed the Tribunal's authority to issue subpoenas to states and high government officials. The particular subpoenas challenged - i.e., those against Croatia and its defence minister - were reinstated.60 In order to reach its unanimous decision, the Chamber adopted a teleological approach: it considered the arguments raised by the parties and the amici curiae in a manner intended to give effect to the nature and purposes of the Tribunal. The Chamber started from the premise that, as an independent international court, the Tribunal needed all the powers necessary to fulfil its fundamental purposes and to achieve its effective functioning.61 1 Authority to Subpoena States Within this framework, the Chamber considered whether the Tribunal had the authority to subpoena states. As an initial matter, the Chamber concluded that the Tribunal had the inherent power to issue a subpoena because such power was necessary for the exercise of its functions as a criminal judicial institution with jurisdiction over individuals charged with serious offences. It was imperative that a trial chamber - charged with ruling on the guilt or innocence of such individuals and imposing the appropriate penalty - had access to all relevant evidence.62 The fact that subpoenaed documents were government documents should not automatically bar their production. In addition, the Trial Chamber considered that the Tribunal, which had concurrent jurisdiction with, and primacy over, national courts, could not have less capacity than national courts to obtain the documents necessary for the adjudication of a case. The Chamber essentially held that, because it needed evidence for a proper execution of its judicial function, the Tribunal had the authority to oblige states to submit whatever material was required to evaluate a case effectively and fairly. To hold the contrary would prevent the Tribunal from properly redressing serious violations of international humanitarian law, which was its very raison d'être .63 The Trial Chamber further found that the Tribunal's Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence gave it express authority to direct mandatory orders to states.64 For the Trial Chamber, the argument that a state could not be ordered to perform a particular act was simply incorrect. It was a logical corollary of the special nature and functions of the Tribunal that it had the ability to order states to take action falling within its given sphere of competence. An order within the Tribunal's mandate in no way offended state sovereignty.65 Moreover, in the Chamber's view, a subpoena was the correct vehicle for ordering a state to produce documentary evidence. The Trial Chamber understood a subpoena as being an order compelling the production of documents. In support of its view, the Trial Chamber referred itself to the French version of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence which used the term "assignation" as equivalent to subpoena and observed that this term did not necessarily imply that a penalty would be imposed in case of non-compliance. In the event that the term subpoena was understood as necessarily implying a penalty, the Trial Chamber believed that - with respect to its orders - penalties such as a finding that a state had failed in its duty to comply with an order or a referral of the matter to the Security Council could be imposed. 66 It concluded therefore that states were bound to comply fully with subpoenas and that their immunity had to give way to measures taken by the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter: i.e., the establishment of the Tribunal. 2 Authority to Subpoena Individuals As regards individuals, the Trial Chamber found that there was no controversy where the receiving party of the subpoena was an individual.67 It was a necessary exercise of the Tribunal's incidental powers for it to compel an individual to produce information required for an investigation or trial. The fact that a person identified as being in possession of documents was an official of a state did not, in the Trial Chamber's view, preclude the issuance of a subpoena addressed to him or her personally. Since the Tribunal was a Chapter VII enforcement mechanism as well as a criminal court, it was not required to conform to standard methods of international cooperation, whereby individual officials might not be addressed. For the Chamber, [i]t has been established that binding orders may be issued by the International Tribunal addressed to both States and individuals and there is, therefore, no reason why a person exercising State functions, who has been identified as the relevant person for the purposes of the documents required, should not similarly be under an obligation to comply with a specific order of which he or she is the subject.68 In other words, the Chamber found that its authority to issue binding orders to states included the authority to issue such orders to their officials. The Trial Chamber rejected the application of the theory of diplomatic privilege according to which officials of foreign governments in a diplomatic capacity usually enjoy immunity in domestic courts from any requirement that they proffer any evidence. It held that the rationale behind this protection - i.e. the "fear of harassment of diplomatic officials" - did not apply to the Tribunal as an international body established by the Security Council. 3 Limits on the Tribunal's Subpoena Power Finally, the Chamber looked at the issue of limits on its subpoena power. It specified that the scope of subpoenas should be limited to what was relevant, necessary, or in some cases, desirable. The receiving party had the right to challenge the scope of a subpoena. However, a claim that a subpoena was contrary to national security could not encumber the capacity of the Tribunal to carry out its mandate effectively. It would be contrary to the spirit and the language of the Statute and to the nature and purpose of the Tribunal to permit a state to invoke an absolute national security privilege. Such a position would jeopardize the Tribunal's obligation to ensure a fair and expeditious trial and to afford the accused the rights guaranteed by the Statute, of which access to evidence is a sine qua non .69 Nonetheless, the Trial Chamber was sensitive to the national security claims of a state; it would not automatically disregard arguments in this respect. The Trial Chamber took the position that the Tribunal was in a unique position to judge whether a national security claim had been legitimately invoked. In assessing the merits of a national security objection, the Tribunal might consider two fundamental interests: the interest in upholding the national security interests of a state and the interest in gaining access to evidence critical to the prosecution or defence in cases relating to serious violations of international humanitarian law.70 C The Appeal Croatia promptly filed a notice of appeal. The Appeals Chamber rejected Croatia's request to quash the subpoena. It nonetheless suspended the execution of Trial Chamber II's decision by staying the execution of the subpoena pending the pronouncement of its decision.71 The Appeals Chamber rendered its decision on the merits on 29 October 1997.72 It held that the Tribunal did not have the power to issue a subpoena against a state and did not have the authority to impose any penalty on a state in case of non-compliance. It further held that the Tribunal could not subpoena high government officials in their official capacity. 1 Authority to Subpoena States In the view of the Appeals Chamber, the Trial Chamber had incorrectly focused on a "domestic analogy" according to which the Tribunal could not have less capacity than national criminal courts to obtain documents necessary for the adjudication of a case. The Appeals Chamber noted that "the transposition onto the international community of legal institutions, constructs or approaches prevailing in national law [might] be source of great confusion and misapprehension".73 It held that international courts did not possess, vis-à-vis organs of sovereign states, the same powers that accrue to national courts in respect of these organs. Instead, the Appeals Chamber analysed the issues in light of the basic structure of the international community and the environment in which the Tribunal operated. At the outset, the Appeals Chamber specified the meaning of the term subpoena.74 In the opinion of the Appeals Chamber, the term subpoena as used in the Tribunal's Rules should be narrowly construed "as referring only and exclusively to binding orders addressed by the International Tribunal, under threat of penalty, to individuals acting in their private capacity".75 With regard to states, the Appeals Chamber held that the term subpoena was inappropriate and that only binding orders or requests could be addressed to them. Contrary to the Trial Chamber's findings, the Appeals Chamber found that the Tribunal did not possess any power to take enforcement measures against states. Such a power could not be regarded as inherent in the functions of an international court.76 Under current international law, states could only be the subject of countermeasures taken by other states or of sanctions visited upon them by the organized international community, i.e., the United Nations or other intergovernmental organizations. The Tribunal could only have authority beyond customary international law if it had been expressly granted in the Statute, which was not the case. On the other hand, binding orders or requests could be addressed to states by the Tribunal; states had an obligation to lend cooperation and judicial assistance to the Tribunal pursuant to Article 29 of the Statute and paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 827 (1993). Under customary international law, states, as a matter of principle, could not be "ordered" either by other states or by international bodies. Article 29 expressly granted an exceptional and unique power to the Tribunal to issue orders to sovereign states. The Appeals Chamber emphasized that the obligation set out in Article 29 was an obligation which was incumbent on every Member State of the United Nations vis-à-vis all other Member States, and of a type qualified as erga omnes by the ICJ.77 In case of non-compliance by a state, it was only for the Security Council to impose sanctions, if any, against the recalcitrant state.78 However, the Tribunal was endowed with the inherent power to make a judicial finding concerning a state's failure to observe the provisions of the Statute or the Rules. It also had the power to report this judicial finding to the Security Council, which could in turn request the state to remedy its breach of Article 29 of the Tribunal's Statute. 2 Authority to Subpoena Individuals The Appeals Chamber also diverged from the Trial Chamber in holding that the Tribunal did not have the power to address subpoenas to state officials acting in their official capacity. According to the Appeals Chamber, it was a well-established rule of customary international law that such officials were mere instruments of a state and their official action could only be attributed to the state. They could not be the subject of sanctions or penalties for conduct that was undertaken on behalf of a state. The Appeals Chamber found that under international law state officials enjoyed a so-called "functional immunity".79 There was no provision in the Statute which departed from this general rule. The Appeals Chamber therefore found that both under general international law and the Statute itself, Judges or Trial Chambers could not address binding orders to state officials. The Appeals Chamber also considered the issue - which was not raised by either party - whether the Tribunal had the authority to issue binding orders to individuals acting in their private capacity.80 It found that, in creating an international court with jurisdiction over individuals, the Security Council created a relationship different from the horizontal relation which was generally established in traditional inter-state judicial cooperation. It established a "vertical" relationship with individuals, at least as far as the judicial and injunctory powers of the Tribunal were concerned. 81 The spirit and purpose of the Statute conferred on the Tribunal an incidental or ancillary jurisdiction over individuals who might be of assistance in its task of dispensing criminal justice. In cases of non-compliance by individuals, the Tribunal should normally turn to the relevant national authorities to seek remedies or sanctions for non-compliance by an individual with a subpoena or order. However, in cases where resort to national remedies or sanctions was not workable, the Tribunal had the power to impose penalties for contempt.82 3 Limits on the Tribunal's Subpoena Power As regards the content of binding orders addressed to states, the Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber's view that it was for the appropriate Judge or Trial Chamber to make a preliminary assessment of whether items requested from a state appeared relevant and admissible and were identified with sufficient specificity.83 The Appeals Chamber also specified the compulsory content of such orders and the relevant safeguards.84 The Appeals Chamber also agreed with the Trial Chamber's conclusions as to the proper treatment of the national security concerns of states.85 It noted that international precedents showed that states had previously complied with judicial requests for the production of sensitive documents and that the scrutiny of documents in those cases was often undertaken by a judicial body in camera .86 Moreover, a plain reading of Article 29 of the Statute did not indicate any exception to the obligation of states to comply with requests and orders of a Trial Chamber. Considering the very nature of the innovative and sweeping obligation laid down in Article 29, and its undeniable effects on state sovereignty and national security, the Appeals Chamber concluded that this provision clearly and deliberately derogated from the customary international rules designed to protect national security of states.87 Finally, the Appeals Chamber noted that allowing national security considerations to prevent the Tribunal from obtaining documents that might prove of decisive importance to the conduct of trials would be tantamount to undermining the very essence of the Tribunal. The Appeals Chamber emphasized that the Tribunal should not be unmindful of legitimate state concerns related to national security. Like the Trial Chamber, the Appeals Chamber believed that the best way of reconciling the Tribunal's authority to obtain from states all documents directly relevant to trial proceedings and the legitimate concerns of states concerning national security would be to hold an in camera, ex parte hearing to scrutinize the validity of a state's national security claims. The Appeals Chamber also suggested several methods and procedures to guide this scrutiny, including consideration of the degree of bona fide cooperation and assistance lent by the relevant state to the Tribunal.88 Based on its view of the nature of a subpoena, the Appeals Chamber quashed the subpoena addressed to Croatia and its Defence Minister. The Appeals Chamber noted, however, that the Prosecutor was at liberty to submit to the appropriate Chamber a request for a binding order addressed to Croatia alone. Subsequent to the Appeals Chamber decision, the Trial Chamber issued binding orders requesting both Bosnia and Croatia to produce documents (including the exculpatory documents requested from Bosnia by the accused). 89 Croatia requested appellate review of the order directed to it pursuant to Rule 108 bis on the grounds that it was inconsistent with the Appeals Chamber's decision. The Appeals Chamber suspended execution of this order and referred the matter to Trial Chamber I for arguments.90 The Trial Chamber recently decided that the Prosecutor's request met the level of specificity required by the Appeal's Chamber's decision and ordered Croatia to produce the documents.91 E Summary The Tribunal now has extensive jurisprudence on its power to order states to produce documents, including a decision on the correct form for such an order, the level of specificity required and an assertion of its authority to decide on national security objections raised by states. Thus far, however, no documents have been forthcoming. It remains to be seen whether the states involved will in fact provide the Tribunal with the benefit of their full cooperation with respect to evidentiary matters and whether they will ever allow the Tribunal to examine their national security objections to the disclosure of evidence. 49 For a description of earlier proceedings in this case, see King and La Rosa, supra note 2, at 155-160. 50 See ICTY Statute, Art. 7(3). 51 The Prosecutor relied on Rule 54 of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence, which provides that "[a]t the request of either party ... a Judge ... may issue such ... subpoenas ... as may be necessary for the purposes of an investigation or for the preparation or conduct of the trial". Rules of Procedure and Evidence, UN Doc. IT/32/Rev.13 (9 and 10 July 1998). 52 Prosecutor v. Blaskic , Case No. IT-94-15-T, Subpoena Duces Tecum , reg. pg. nos. 3161-3056 (14 Jan. 1997). 53 The scope of the subpoena was extremely broad. The Prosecutor requested the production of 13 categories of documents, ranging from Blaskic's personal notes, telephone records, and minutes of meetings to military orders, records reflecting the provision or supply of military weapons, ammunition, communications equipment, medical supplies, logistical supplies and personnel by Croatia to the Bosnian Croats. Ibid. 54 Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Subpoena Duces Tecum , reg. pg. nos. 3069-3063 (15 Jan. 1997). 55 Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Reply to Subpoena Duces Tecum , reg. pg. nos. 3263-3261 (13 Feb. 1997). 56 Croatia further argued that any documents requested by the Tribunal had to be related to the proceedings and had to be properly specified. In its view, the subpoenas addressed to Croatia and its Defence Minister were overly broad because they listed a number of documents which did not exist or were not related at all to the Blaskic case. Ibid. 57 See, e.g., Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Order of a Judge to Ensure Compliance with a Subpoena, reg. pg. nos. 3285-3283 (14 Feb. 1997); Order of a Judge to Ensure Compliance with a Subpoena, reg. pg. nos. 3282-3280 (14 Feb. 1997); Order of a Judge to Ensure Compliance with a Subpoena Duces Tecum , reg. pg. nos. 3310-3307 (20 Feb. 1997); Order of a Judge to Ensure Compliance with a Subpoena Duces Tecum , reg. pg. nos. 3358-3353 (28 Feb. 1997); Order of a Judge to Ensure Compliance with a Subpoena Duces Tecum , reg. pg. nos. 3416-3414 (7 March 1997). 58 A hearing on this request was held before Trial Chamber I, which held that the motion should be referred to Trial Chamber II so that the related requests of the defence and the Prosecutor be heard by the same Judge. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-PT, Referral to a Judge of the Defence Motion for Issuance of a Subpoena Duces Tecum , reg. pg. nos. 3462-3458 (18 March 1997). 59 Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-PT, Order Regarding Subpoena Duces Tecum , reg. pg. nos. 3413-3411 (7 March 1997). Following its request for the issuance of a subpoena addressed to Bosnia, the defence was also invited to participate in the proceedings. 60 Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-PT, Decision on the Objection of the Republic of Croatia to the Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum , reg. pg. nos. 6724-6641 (18 July 1997) ( Trial Chamber Subpoena Decision ). After the hearing, but before rendering its decision, the Chamber authorized Croatia and the Prosecutor to submit additional briefs on the following issues: (1) The relevance of denominating a requesting document of the Tribunal addressed to a state as a subpoena rather than an order compelling the production of documents; (2) The necessity of issuing a subpoena to a state for the production of documents that were under the control of a government official of that state; (3) The effect on a state of the determination by the Tribunal that a government official of that state was in contempt; and (4) The relevant legislation and case law of Costa Rica, Pakistan and United States and any other relevant authorities in regard to the power of a court to hold in contempt a government official. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-PT, Order Regarding Subpoena Duces Tecum , reg. pg. nos. 4867-4866 (1 May 1997). 61 Trial Chamber Subpoena Decision , at para. 152. 62 Ibid, at para. 30. 63 Ibid, at para. 40. 64 Ibid, at para. 42. In support of this, the Trial Chamber referred to Articles 1, 18, 19 and 29 of the ICTY Statute and to Rule 54 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 65 Ibid, at para. 51. 66 Ibid, at para. 62. 67 Ibid, at para. 65. In support of this conclusion, the Trial Chamber relied on Article 18(2) of the ICTY Statute as well as on Rules 98 and 105 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. It also considered the extent to which the national implementing legislation of various states interpreted the Tribunal's Statute as encompassing such a power. 68 Ibid, at para. 69. 69 Ibid, at para. 132. 70 Ibid, at para. 149. 71 Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-AR108 bis, Decision on the Admissibility of the Request for Review by the Republic of Croatia of an Interlocutory Decision of a Trial Chamber (Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum ) and Scheduling Order, reg. pg. nos. 15-8 (29 July 1997). The Appeals Chamber noted that Croatia lacked standing to file such notice since it was not a party to the proceedings against Blaskic. However, recalling that on 24 July 1997, Rule 108  bis was adopted which enabled states to appeal interlocutory decisions of Trial Chambers under certain circumstances, the Appeals Chamber deemed it appropriate to consider whether Croatia's application fell under the scope of this Rule. Under the new Rule 108 bis, Croatia had the right to appeal because it was clearly directly affected by the Trial Chamber's Decision. In addition, the question whether the Tribunal had the power to subpoena states and their high officials was clearly an issue of general importance relating to the Tribunal's competence. Since the Decision under consideration was rendered after the adoption of Rule 108  bis, the Appeals Chamber verified that the operation of this Rule would not prejudice the rights of the accused. It found that there was no prejudice provided the appeal was heard expeditiously and did not unduly delay the trial proceedings. Accordingly, the Chamber proceeded to hear Croatia's appeal. 72 Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-AR108 bis, Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, reg. pg. nos. 1908-1851 (29 Oct. 1997) ( Appeals Chamber Subpoena Decision ). 73 Ibid, at para. 40. 74 Ibid, at paras 20-21. 75 Ibid, at para. 21. 76 Ibid, at para. 25. 77 Ibid, at para. 26 (citing Barcelona Traction, Power Light Co. , ICJ Reports (1970)). 78 Appeals Chamber Subpoena Decision, at para. 33-37. 79 Ibid, at para. 38. 80 Ibid, at paras 46-48. 81 Ibid, at para. 47. 82 Ibid, at paras 57-60. 83 Ibid, at para. 33. 84 Ibid. The order had to: identify specific documents and not broad categories; set out succinctly the reasons why such documents were deemed relevant to the trial; not be unduly onerous; and give the requested state sufficient time for compliance. 85 Ibid, at paras 61-69. 86 Ibid, at paras 61-62. 87 Ibid, at paras 63-64. The Chamber noted that rules of customary international law prohibited states from interfering with or intruding into the domestic jurisdiction, including national security matters, of other states. This prohibition is reflected in Article 2, para. 7 of the United Nations Charter, which provides that "[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State ...". The Appeals Chamber observed that as the Statute of the Tribunal was adopted pursuant to Chapter VII as an enforcement measure, it fell within the exception to the impenetrability of the realm of domestic jurisdiction also provided for in Article 2 of the Charter. 88 The majority of the Appeals Chamber indicated that the relevant documents could be submitted to the scrutiny of one Judge. Judge Karibi-Whyte appended a separate opinion on this question since, in his view, such scrutiny should be undertaken by the whole Trial Chamber: Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-AR 108 bis, Separate Opinion of Judge Adolphus G. Karibi-Whyte, reg. pg. nos. 1850-1844 (29 Oct. 1997). 89 Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Decision on the Prosecutor's Request for the Issuance of a Binding Order to Bosnia and Herzegovina for the Production of Documents, reg. pg. nos. 4/7464 bis-1/7464bis (17 Dec. 1997); Order on the Motion of the Prosecutor for the Issuance of a Binding Order on the Republic of Croatia for the Production of Documents, reg. pg. nos. not available (30 Jan. 1998); Decision on the Prosecutor's Request for the Issuance of a Binding Order to Bosnia and Herzegovina for the Production of Documents, reg. pg. nos. 5/7872 bis-1/7872bis (27 Feb. 1998); Order to Bosnia and Herzegovina for the Production of Documents, reg. pg. nos. 3/8083 bis-1/8083bis (29 April 1998). 90 Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-AR 108 bis, Decision on the Notice of State Request for Review of Order on the Motion of the Prosecutor for the Issuance of a Binding Order on the Republic of Croatia for the Production of Documents and Request for Stay of Trial Chamber's Order of 30 January 1998, reg. pg. nos. 2114-2109 (26 Feb. 1998). 91 Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Order to the Republic of Croatia for the Production of Documents, reg. pg. nos. 6/8469 bis-1/849bis (22 July 1998).
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