State Instigation in International Law: A General Principle Transposed

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Abstract

It is widely believed that international law imposes no general prohibition on instigation – no general prohibition on states inducing, inciting or procuring other states to breach their international obligations. The absence of a prohibition on instigation stands in contrast to the now entrenched prohibition on the provision of assistance to another state that facilitates an internationally wrongful act. In this article, I argue that the orthodox position on instigation is incorrect. I argue that a prohibition on instigation is founded on a general principle of law, as envisaged in Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and that it would be appropriate to transpose that general principle to the international legal system. To sustain this argument, I first construct a representative set of domestic jurisdictions for comparative analysis. Second, through a brief comparative survey, I assess whether in each of these domestic jurisdictions it is wrongful, in one way or another, for an actor to instigate another to commit an act that it would be wrongful for it to do itself. And, third, I argue that the transposition of this principle from domestic law to international law is conceptually and normatively appropriate.

1 Introduction

Imagine that two states share a border with each other and with a third state. States A and B enjoy strong diplomatic ties; neither is on good terms with State C. State A is wealthy and has a strong internal legal and political order that ensures its general compliance with international law. State B is less wealthy and is less constrained, in practice, by international law. Instability in the border territories of State C provokes fears, within both State A and B, of increased refugee flows across their respective territories, first into State B and then into State A. In diplomatic discussions, the foreign minister of State A suggests to the foreign minister of State B that State B institute a

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policy whereby all refugees arriving in State B are immediately returned to State C without any process or consideration of their status – a policy that, when executed, would breach customary international law. In return, State A promises that it will later grant to State B increased access to its markets. State B carries out thousands of deportations under the policy.  

In ordinary language, we might say that State A encouraged State B to commit an internationally wrongful act. If we were steeped in criminal law, we might say that State A abetted State B’s wrong. If these two descriptions seem to underweight State A’s role, we might say that it incited, solicited, instigated or induced State B’s wrong. Perhaps, more strongly, we might say that State A procured the deportations. Although each of these terms might denote a slightly different relationship between the two parties, they will be grouped together for present purposes under the term instigation.  

Instigation is a form of complicity; it refers to conduct that influences the decision of a principal wrongdoer to commit a wrong. To be more precise, following Herbert Hart and Tony Honoré, this article will confine it to situations where the instigator provides to the principal wrongdoer a reason for action – the instigator does ‘something to render some course of action more eligible in the eyes of the second actor than it would otherwise have been’. Instigation can be distinguished from a second common form of complicity – the provision of assistance to the principal that facilitates her commission of the wrong. In many domestic legal systems, criminal modes of accomplice liability include both instigation and assistance. In international law, it is crucial to distinguish them.  

It is crucial to distinguish them because, as will be seen below, scholarship almost uniformly denies that international law recognizes a general prohibition on instigation by states; it denies, for instance, that international responsibility would arise in the hypothetical set out above. The putative absence of responsibility for instigation may be contrasted with the existence of responsibility for the provision of assistance, as embodied in the rule in Article 16 of the International Law Commission’s (ILC) Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA). In

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2 See Lumley v. Gye, (1853) 2 E & B 216, 118 ER 749, at 26, Coleridge J: ‘[T]o draw a line between advice, persuasion, enticement and procurement is practically impossible in a court of justice.’
3 In international law scholarship, the term incitement is sometimes used instead of instigation. This article prefers the term instigation given that in some jurisdictions incitement is viewed as an inchoate of-fence in criminal law.
6 Kadish, supra note 4, at 342; see also Hart and Honoré, supra note 5, at 379.
7 See, e.g., StGB § 26 and StGB § 27 (Germany); 18 USC § 2 (1994) (USA); Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, as amended by Schedule 12 to the Criminal Law Act 1977, s 8 (England and Wales).
other words, the orthodox position is that the complicity rule reflected in Article 16 of ARSIWA only covers one of the two classic modes of participation in wrongdoing.\footnote{See Section 3 in this article.}

This article argues that the orthodox position is wrong as a matter of law. Its central claim is that international law does prohibit states from instigating other states to commit internationally wrongful acts. Such a prohibition is founded on a general principle of law, as recognized as a source of international law by Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute).\footnote{1945, 33 UNTS 993 (ICJ Statute).} This article shows that in private law, in a representative set of domestic jurisdictions, it is wrongful for an actor to instigate another to commit an act that it would be wrongful for it to do itself. It then argues that it would be appropriate to transpose this general principle of municipal law into the international legal system.

To make its argument, this article is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a short history of the prohibition on state complicity in international law. Section 3 sets out the orthodox position in the scholarship – that international law recognizes no general prohibition on instigation. These two sections provide the background to the central claim of the article, which is developed in Sections 4 and 5. Section 4 discusses the function of general principles of law in the international legal system and the methodology for their establishment, constructs a representative set of jurisdictions for analysis and demonstrates that the principle at issue exists in each of them. Section 5 argues that it would be appropriate to transpose the principle to the international plane, while also considering three potential objections to the acceptance of a general prohibition on instigation in international law. Section 6 sketches the contours of the rule, and Section 7 concludes. As the ILC put it in a related context, ‘a State cannot do by another what it cannot do by itself’.\footnote{‘State Responsibility, General Commentary’ (ARSIWA Commentary) 2(2) ILC Yearbook (2001) 31, Art. 16(6); see also Gardner, ‘Complicity and Causality’, 1 Criminal Law and Philosophy (2007) 127.}

\section{Complicity in the Law of State Responsibility: A Short History}

Complicity – the idea of responsibility for participation in another’s wrong – has a somewhat strained history in the international legal system. For instance, in his Hague Lectures of 1939, Roberto Ago suggested that the structure of the system denied that any such responsibility could arise. Ago argued that it appeared ‘inconceivable in international law to have any form of complicity, participation, or incitement to a delict’.\footnote{Ago, ‘Le Délit International’, 68 Recueil des Cours (1939) 419, at 523.} Whether or not Ago’s claim was true then, it is certainly no longer the case. Recent scholarship, most comprehensively that of Helmut Aust, has shown how the idea of complicity has become embedded in international law.\footnote{H. Aust, Complicity and the Law of State Responsibility (2011).} Initially, in the decades after Ago’s denial of responsibility, we saw an increase in the articulation by
states of the responsibility of other states for complicity. In some cases, it is possible to point to the entrenchment of what might be called specific complicity rules – the prohibition of complicity in specific internationally wrongful acts. For instance, international law prohibits states from placing their territory at the disposal of another state for an act of aggression.

More recently, the issue of complicity has become more central; questions have arisen, for instance, relating to the sale of weapons, the sharing of intelligence and the provision of development aid. In this respect, two events are critical to international law’s embrace of complicity. First, the ILC included Article 16 in the final text of the Articles on State Responsibility. Article 16, which the ILC grounded on some of the specific practice noted above, is a general complicity rule; it prohibits the provision by one state to another of any aid or assistance given with knowledge of the circumstances of the latter’s internationally wrongful act. Despite its inclusion in ARSIWA, Article 16 is better seen as a primary rule within the conceptual scheme developed by the ILC. However classified, though, it is an important development in the international legal system.

Second, in the Bosnian Genocide case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) declared Article 16 to reflect customary international law. Whether or not the customary status of Article 16 was evident at the time of its inclusion in the Articles on State Responsibility, the judgment of the ICJ may be taken to be authoritative. The general complicity rule – the prohibition on the provision of aid or assistance – reflected in Article 16 of ARSIWA is increasingly affecting the way that states interact with each other. Of course, there remain a number of unaddressed issues with the rule in Article 16. In particular, two issues have drawn comment: the seeming conflict in the fault element between the text of the provision and the commentary and the implications of, and justification for, the double obligation requirement – the demand that the relevant conduct of the principal state would also be wrongful for the assisting state. These may be left aside for now. What matters is international law’s embrace of a prohibition on state aid or assistance to other states.

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15 See ibid., at 97–191.
17 GA Res. 3314 (XXIX), 14 December 1974, Art. 3(f) (Definition of Aggression).
19 ARSIWA, supra note 9, Art. 16.
21 Lowe, supra note 18, at 12.
23 See, e.g., the discussion of ARSIWA, supra note 9, Art. 16, in the context of rendition and detention. Aust, supra note 14, at 120–127. For a recent analysis, see Moynihan, supra note 18.
3 The Absence of Responsibility for Instigation

At this point, we can return to the original hypothetical. State B, in its summary deportation of thousands of refugees, breached the prohibition on non-refoulement in customary international law. State A, itself fearing the subsequent movements of those refugees, instigated the breach. The question is whether State A violated international law in doing so. At the outset, we can almost certainly exclude a number of potential avenues of responsibility. As a starting point, the execution of the deportations by State B would not be seen as joint conduct by States A and B; the conduct of organs of State B is attributable to State B, and State B alone. Likewise, there is no common organ that might give rise to the attribution of conduct to both states. In addition, we are concerned with relationships between the two states that fall short of both direction and control in terms of Article 17 of ARSIWA and coercion in terms of Article 18 of ARSIWA. Both are stringent thresholds. Under Article 17, as the ILC makes clear, the state must exercise ‘domination’ over the wrongful act and actually direct its commission; incitement is specifically excluded. Under Article 18, only ‘conduct which forces the will of the coerced State will suffice’.

Instead, what we are left with is State A’s act of instigation – State A’s provision to State B of a reason to commit an internationally wrongful act, that reason being the promise of access to its markets. During the drafting of ARSIWA, the ILC was clear that instigation, or what it referred to as incitement, did not fall within the scope of Article 16. In his seventh report as special rapporteur, Ago wrote: ‘Mere incitement of one State by another to commit an internationally wrongful act does not fulfil the conditions for characterization as “participation” in the act – at least in the legal meaning of that term, which, as we have seen, is an act having, as such, legal effect and consequences.’ Likewise, in his second report as special rapporteur, James Crawford explained that what was then Article 27 ‘distinguishes between cases of advice, encouragement or incitement, on the one hand, and cases of actual assistance’. Further, he noted that ‘[c]onduct by a State in inciting another to commit an internationally wrongful act was deliberately excluded from chapter IV. Only if it materially assists or actually directs or coerces another State to commit a wrongful act is a State implicated in that act’.

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27 ARSIWA, supra note 9, Arts 17, 18. See, in particular, ARSIWA Commentary, supra note 12, Art. 17, para. 7: ‘[T]he word “directs” does not encompass mere incitement or suggestion but rather connotes actual direction of an operative kind.’
28 ARSIWA, supra note 9, Art. 17(1).
29 Ibid., Art. 18(2).
31 Crawford, supra note 26, at 48, para. 170.
32 Ibid., at 56, para. 213.
This position was sustained in the final draft of Article 16. First, as to the text, Article 16 refers explicitly to aid and assistance. Second, the examples of practice given in the commentary refer to the provision of material aid – conduct that materially facilitates the principal wrong. Third, the general commentary to Part IV notes that the ‘incitement of wrongful conduct is generally not regarded as sufficient to give rise to responsibility on the part of the inciting State, if it is not accompanied by concrete support’. Finally, the ICJ’s analysis in the Bosnian Genocide case, which drew on the rule reflected in Article 16, focused only on the provision of concrete support.

Likewise, it would be fair to say that scholarship almost uniformly asserts that instigation is not wrongful in general international law. Thus, for instance, John Quigley argues that ‘[c]omplicity does not include moral encouragement or incitement by a State to another State to engage in an internationally wrongful act, although both acts would constitute complicity in domestic law’. Bernhard Graefrath notes that ‘incitement to commit an internationally wrongful act ... does not entail international responsibility because the instigated State remains sovereign in its decision to commit or not commit the internationally wrongful act. The State alone therefore is considered liable for the wrongful act’. Aust argues that ‘[i]nternational law knows no responsibility for incitement’. Likewise, Crawford holds that ‘mere incitement will not be considered a violation of ARSIWA Article 16’. And, finally, Christian Dominicé proposes that ‘[i]t is not contested that such incitement does not constitute a wrongful act in international law’.

This is all simply to say that the orthodox position is that, in the absence of a specific treaty rule, state instigation (and its cognate forms) is not wrongful under international law. It is to say that no responsibility arises in the hypothetical set out at the start of this article. It is said to be permissible for states to instigate other states to commit internationally wrongful acts.

4 Instigation in Domestic Law: A General Principle

A Introduction

This section argues that there exists in a representative set of domestic jurisdictions a principle that it is wrongful for an actor to instigate another to commit an act that it would be wrongful for it to do itself. To this end, it first considers the function and methodology for the ascertainment of general principles of law in the international legal system. It then constructs a diverse set of jurisdictions to structure the analysis.

33 ARSIWA Commentary, supra note 12, Art. 16, paras 7–9.
34 Ibid., Part 4, para. 9.
35 Bosnian Genocide, supra note 22, paras 420–421.
37 Graefrath, supra note 20, at 371, 373.
38 Aust, supra note 14, at 221.
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before turning to a comparative survey of whether the principle exists in those jurisdictions. It is clear that it does.

B General Principles of Law: Function and Method

The idea of general principles of law as a source of international law has a long history. Giorgio Gaja points out that even prior to the inclusion of ‘general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’ within the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, the arbitrator in the Antoine Fabiani case stated that he would apply ‘the general principles of the law of nations on the denial of justice’.41 Further, with the reproduction of the clause in Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute, general principles as a source of international law have drawn sustained attention from scholars.42

Despite (or because of) this long history, to discuss general principles of law is to enter a much wider set of debates about foundational questions of international law.43 Catherine Redgwell points out that, ‘[w]hile there is no dispute that general principles are a recognised source of international law, it is only a slight exaggeration to state that there is agreement on little else regarding their ascertainment, content and function’.44 Detailed assessment of these issues is beyond the scope of this article, but, for present purposes, it is necessary to say something, at least, about function and methodology. As to the former, two non-mutually exclusive functions are adopted.45 First, there is the common view that general principles of law may fulfil a gap-filling function.46 Often linked to the need to avoid a non liquet in international adjudication,47 the idea of a gap-filling function is quite widely supported in scholarship.48 General principles operate here as an autonomous source of international law.49 Second, general principles may operate to aid the interpretation and development of conventional and customary rules of international law.50 Here, general principles operate through the

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44 Redgwell, supra note 43, at 5.
45 For a wider discussion, see F. Raimondo, General Principles of Law in the Decisions of International Criminal Courts and Tribunals (2008).
47 Pellet, supra note 46, at 832; Redgwell, supra note 43, at 7.
49 Redgwell, supra note 43, at 11.
50 Cheng, supra note 42, at 390.
interpretation of another rule, which is itself grounded in either Article 38(1)(a) or (b) of the ICJ Statute.  

The key point for present purposes is that to adopt one of these functions for general principles is not to exclude the other. Fabián Raimondo, in a helpful survey, illustrates how judicial decisions, arbitral practice and scholarship generally accept both of them, together with a confirmative role where judges deploy a particular principle to reinforce their legal reasoning. As will be argued later, either of these two functions is able to underpin the claim of this article. In other words, a prohibition on instigation can arise as either an autonomous primary rule or through an interpretive extension of the customary rule reflected in Article 16 of ARSIWA.

The second issue is methodological – namely, how do we establish if a general principle of law exists? Here, there is a range of approaches. On one end of the spectrum, there is the idea that international courts and lawyers need not delve in detail into methodological complexities of comparative law. It is enough to gather domestic law ‘into a few families or systems of law’ and check if the principle is present. On the other end, there is the doubt, which draws on theoretical disagreement in comparative law scholarship, that it is possible to distil the essence (or core) of a rule or principle without reference to wider legal and social context. On this approach, as Jaye Ellis puts it, the ‘quest for a universally shared body of legal rules or concepts is probably futile’.

It is beyond the scope of this article to engage with theoretical disagreement in comparative law scholarship. From a starting premise that general principles of law are widely accepted as a source of international law, it adopts the following methodology. First, it constructs a representative set of legal systems for analysis, where that selection is informed by the literature on the classification of legal families and traditions. In doing so, it does not address forms of normative authority outside of the state itself or provide an account of historical influences and relationships among legal systems. The choice to proceed jurisdiction by jurisdiction is informed by the principle of the sovereign equality of states. Second, it surveys domestic law in each with a view to determining how each deals with forms of participation in a civil wrong committed

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51 For a recent discussion, see d’Aspremont, supra note 48.
52 Raimondo, supra note 45, at 44.
53 Pellet, supra note 46, at 837.
54 Ibid.
56 Ellis, supra note 55, at 971; see further Tunkin, ‘Coexistence and International Law’, 95 Recueil des Cours (1958) 1, at 26.
57 For a comprehensive discussion, see Raimondo, supra note 45, at 7–72.
59 See also ICJ Statute, supra note 11, Art. 9: ‘At every election, the electors shall bear in mind not only that the persons to be elected should individually possess the qualifications required, but also that in the body as a whole the representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world should be assured.’
by another actor. The initial site of inquiry is private law; here, the transposition of a general principle of law into international law is more broadly accepted. At times, supplementary reference is made to domestic criminal law, where instigation and its related forms are widely accepted modes of criminal responsibility. And, third, it asks whether it would be appropriate to transpose the principle from domestic law into the international legal system.

Although more wide-ranging, this methodology thus resembles that adopted in certain separate opinions in cases before the ICJ. In Certain Norwegian Loans, Judge Hersch Lauterpacht briefly considered the law of France and the USA to establish that ‘an undertaking in which the applicant party reserves for itself the exclusive right to determine the extent or the very existence of its obligation is not a legal undertaking’. In North Sea Continental Shelf, Judge Fouad Ammoun assessed the principle of equity as it manifests ‘in the great legal systems of the modern world’. And in Oil Platforms, Judge Bruno Simma undertook a comparative survey of how ‘various common law jurisdictions as well as French, Swiss and German tort law’ dealt with the issue of multiple tortfeasors.

Two further methodological points are worth noting – one wider and one specific to the present analysis. First, as to the wider point, it may be that particular legal systems recognize a specific category of either ‘principles of law’ or ‘general principles of law’ as a matter of domestic classification. Likewise, it may be that the principle under consideration in this article manifests in different ways across legal systems. Neither is per se a problem for the analysis herein. Instead, the comparative survey asks only whether the principle is instantiated in the set of domestic legal systems in one way or another, however classified domestically. As Harold Gutteridge wrote in 1949:

If any real meaning is to be given to the words ‘general’ or ‘universal’ and the like, the correct test would seem to be that an international judge before taking over a principle from private law must satisfy himself that it is recognized in substance by all the main systems of law, and that in applying it he will not be doing violence to the fundamental concepts of any of those systems.

61 See M. Bohlander and A. Reed (eds), Participation in Crime: Domestic and Comparative Perspectives (2013).
65 Friedmann, ‘The Uses of “General Principles” in the Development of International Law’, 57 American Journal of International Law (1963), at 284; see also Akehurst, ‘Equity and General Principles of Law’, 25 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (ICLQ) (1976) 801, at 814: ‘One can also say that there is a general principle of law when different systems of municipal law achieve the same result by different means.’
66 On classification, the arbitrator in Antoine Fabbian, supra note 41, at 117, defined ‘the general principles of the law of nations on the denial of justice’ as ‘the rules common to most legislations or taught by doctrines.’ See also Gaja, supra note 41, paras 1–3.
As will be seen, instigation is captured in different legal systems in different ways. In some, there is an explicit provision in the Civil Code. In others, case law has developed a form of civil accomplice liability, which includes within its ambit instigation. In others still, acceptance of a multiplicity of causes allows instigators to be brought within a general clause on civil responsibility. What matters is that the principle exists in substance across jurisdictions.

Second, as to the specific comparative survey undertaken below, within private law the focus is on principles relating to participation in tortious or delictual wrongdoing. It was noted above that one element of the existing rule reflected in Article 16 of ARSIWA is what is called the double obligation requirement – the requirement, said to flow from the pacta tertiis principle, that the act of the principal state must be wrongful if committed by the assisting state. On this basis, no responsibility arises under the rule in Article 16 where State A assists State B’s breach of a bilateral treaty between States B and C. This article does not seek to challenge the double obligation requirement but, rather, works within it by focusing on domestic rules concerning participation in tortious wrongs. At times, however, it does discuss domestic rules concerning inducing breach of contract, particularly where the rules on participation in tortious wrongdoing are not clear.

C Constructing a Representative Set of Jurisdictions

The key, then, is to construct a representative set of jurisdictions to structure the comparative analysis. Constructing the set is marked by the tensions raised above – the tension between a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction assessment and developments in (and doubts about) taxonomic approaches in comparative law; the tension between the need for geographical diversity and an awareness of the historical – often colonial – relationships between states; and the tension between putting certain systems forward as representative and recognizing distinctive features of every jurisdiction.

With that in mind, the following set of jurisdictions is proposed. As representative of the common law, England and Wales, India, Uganda and the USA are considered. Japan and China are considered as East Asian jurisdictions; in the specific area under consideration, the Civil Code dates from 1898 in the former, while, in the latter, the Tort Liability Act dates from 2009. Germany, naturally, is taken as representative of the Germanic limb of the civil law tradition; France is taken as representative of the Romanist limb. Poland is considered an example from Central Europe – being, as it is, a mix of civil law, national and socialist influences. South Africa is an example of what is sometimes called a mixed jurisdiction. In Latin America, Brazil is considered. Iran is assessed in the Islamic tradition. The idea is that these legal systems together compose

69 See Lowe, supra note 18, at 7–8.
70 Special Rapporteur Crawford’s second report includes a brief comparative survey of principles relating to inducing breach of contract in domestic law with a view to assessing whether the double obligation requirement is justifiable. See Crawford, supra note 26, Annex.
a sufficiently representative set of jurisdictions to found a claim to generality under Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute.

D Comparative Survey

To start in England and Wales, accessory liability in civil law has received increased attention in recent years.\(^{71}\) Much of the controversy concerns the existence (or otherwise) of civil responsibility for knowing assistance of a tort.\(^{72}\) In contrast to the difficulties surrounding assistance, it is well established that tortious responsibility arises where one actor procures another actor to commit a tort.\(^{73}\) In the leading case of *CBS Songs v. Amstrad*, Lord Templeman held that a ‘defendant may procure an infringement by inducement, incitement or persuasion’.\(^{74}\) The incitor must intend and share ‘a common design that infringement shall take place’.\(^{75}\) The principle articulated by Lord Templeman was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in *Sea Shepherd UK* in 2015.\(^{76}\)

In India, although no recent case addresses a general rule directly, the civil responsibility of instigators is evident in a number of specific areas of law. First, it was recognized in the pre-independence case of *Issardas Kishinchand* in the context of the tort of malicious prosecution.\(^{77}\) The Court refused to allow an escape from liability for those who, with malicious intent, ‘worked more dangerously and effectively through others’.\(^{78}\) Second, it is possible that the civil liability of an instigator would be captured by the tort of conspiracy.\(^{79}\) And, third, the tort of inducing breach of contract is well established.\(^{80}\) It is unlikely that a legal system that prohibits the procurement by a third party of a breach of contract would not hold responsible a third party who procures the commission of a tort.

In Uganda, much like in India, although there is no case that establishes a general rule, the responsibility of instigators of specific torts is well established. In *Okile v. Eliot & Another*, the Court of Appeal affirmed the responsibility of instigators with respect to the tort of malicious prosecution, the Court citing the earlier case of the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa in *Mbowa v. East Mengo Administration*.\(^{81}\) Responsibility lies


\(^{74}\) *CBS Songs Ltd v. Amstrad Consumer Electronics Plc*, [1988] 1 AC 1013, 1058.

\(^{75}\) *CBS Songs Ltd v. Amstrad Consumer Electronics Plc*, [1988] 1 AC 1013, 1058.


\(^{79}\) See *Daulat Ram Sud v. Kamaleshwar Dutt*, (1971) ILR 2 Cal 308, para. 90 (High Court of Calcutta).


with those who are ‘instrumental in setting the law in motion against the’ plaintiff. More recently, in Omunyokol v. Rutayisire and Others, the High Court found responsible a defendant who instigated the police to undertake an unlawful search, arrest and detention of the plaintiff. The instigator, his employer and the state were jointly responsible for the damage done to the plaintiff.

In the USA, section 876 of the Restatement of Torts sets out the following rule: ‘For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he ... knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself.’ The case of Halberstam v. Welch in the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit contains an extensive discussion of the rule – how it is distinguished from civil conspiracy, the requirements of knowledge and substantiality and its application in other state jurisdictions in the USA. As one commentator put it, in the years since Halberstam, ‘courts across the country have been flooded with cases seeking to impose civil liability on persons alleged to have aided and abetted the wrongdoing of others, and in almost every one of those cases, they have recognized the viability of this theory of liability’. Moreover, it is clear that encouragement alone, in the absence of material assistance, may ground liability.

Much like the US Restatement, the Civil Code in Germany makes explicit provision for instigation. Section 830(1) of the code sets down the basic rule on joint responsibility as follows: ‘If more than one person has caused damage by a jointly committed tort, then each of them is responsible for the damage.’ Section 830(2) then provides: ‘Instigators and accessories are equivalent to joint tortfeasors.’ The basic principle has been developed in the jurisprudence of the Federal Court of Justice. In its judgment of 24 June 2003 (‘Buchpreisbindung’), the Court considered the responsibility of the federal state of Berlin in relation to the purchase of textbooks in breach of antitrust rules. Addressing the basic principle in the code, the Court specified that ‘[h]e, who incites another to commit conduct prohibited in civil law, does not harm the legal order less gravely than the perpetrator’. More recently, the Court has reiterated that the standards developed in complicity in criminal law, which include responsibility for instigation, are to be considered in interpreting complicity in civil responsibility.

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82 Okille v. Eliot, supra note 81.
83 High Court Civil Suit no. 445, Omunyokol v. Rutayisire & 2 Ors. [2014] UGHCCD 126.
84 American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts (1979) (emphasis added); see also section 766 regarding intentional interference with contractual relations.
85 Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (DC Cir. 1983); see also Rael v. Cadena, 604 P.2d 822 (NM Ct. App. 1979) and the discussion in Eastern Trading Company v. Refco Inc., 229 F.3d 617 (7th Cir. 2000).
87 American Law Institute, supra note 84, para. 876. comment d; Halberstam, supra note 85, para. 24.
88 See also section 840 BGB on the consequences of responsibility.
89 BGH, 24 June 2003. KZR 32/02. BGHZ 155, 189.
90 Ibid. § 27.
91 BGH, 5 February 2015, IZR 240/12. NJW 2015, 2122.
As is often noted, the Japanese Civil Code, adopted in 1896 and in force since 1898, was strongly influenced by 19th-century German legal theory. Indeed, the adoption of the code is sometimes described as one of a relatively rare set of voluntary receptions of another tradition. The German relationship continued in the early years of the 20th century, though French and then US influence increased. Article 709 of the Civil Code sets out the basic rule on liability in tort: ‘A person who has intentionally or negligently infringed any right of others, or legally protected interest of others, shall be liable to compensate any damages resulting in consequence.’ Article 719(1) provides for the joint and several liability for joint tortfeasors; Article 719(2) deems as a joint tortfeasor ‘any person who incited or was an accessory to the perpetrator’.

Moving to China, it is hard to do justice to the complexity of the evolution of civil law. With respect to tort law, in particular, recent reform commenced with a new draft law published in December 2002. After consultation and redrafting, the Tort Liability Law of the People’s Republic of China was adopted in 2009 by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee and entered into force in July 2010. Article 6 of the Tort Liability Law sets out the general rule: liability attaches to one who is at fault and who infringes the civil right or interest of another person. For present purposes, Article 9 is critical: ‘One who abets or assists another person in committing a tort shall be liable jointly and severally with the tortfeasor.’ Article 9 may be seen as the legislative reiteration of the Supreme People’s Court’s previous interpretation of the General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China.

94 Kitagawa, supra note 92, at 242–243. Of course, a focus on foreign influence can miss the distinctive elements of the Japanese system itself (at 245).
95 Act no. 89, supra note 92, Art. 719(2). Oda translates the provision as referring to instigators and accomplices. H. Oda, Japanese Law (2009), at 196.
99 Ibid., Art. 6.
100 Ibid., Art. 9 (Koziol and Zhu tr). There has been further development of the principle in the particular area of copyright infringement. See Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Certain Issues Related to the Application of Law in the Trial of Civil Cases Involving Disputes over Infringement of the Right of Dissemination through Information Networks, Fa Shi [2012] No. 20, 17 December 2012, Arts 7–10.
The South African legal system has long held the interest of comparatists and is often classified as a mixed jurisdiction. The law of delict, in particular, reflects this mixed tradition, with the Roman–Dutch actions initially being influenced and developed by common law ideas and judicial decision-making. More recently, recognition of African customary law, as well as the influence on private law of the values of the 1996 Constitution, only reinforces this complexity. On the narrow question at hand, recent authority confirms the general principle in the law of delict. Cipla MedPro, a case about pharmaceutical patents, concerned conduct that is ordinarily captured in other jurisdictions under a provision on contributory infringement. The relevant legislation in South Africa contained no such provision. However, the Supreme Court of Appeal approvingly cited the following passage from the 1917 decision of the Appellate Division in McKenzie v. Van Der Merwe:

Under the Lex Aquilia, not only the persons who actually took part in the commission of a delict were held liable for the damage caused but also those who assisted them in any way as well as those by whose command or instigation or advice the delict was committed. To a similar effect is the passage that was quoted from Grotius (3, 32, 12, 13) that everyone is liable for a delict ‘even though he has not done the deed himself, who has by act or omission in some way or other caused the deed or its consequence: by act, that is by command, consent, harbouring, abetting, advising or instigating’.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that it is ‘unlawful to incite or aid and abet the commission of a civil wrong’.

In Poland, the 19th and early 20th centuries were marked by regional diversity, with Austrian, Hungarian, German and French law elements and influences. The Code of Obligations of 1933 and then the Civil Code, adopted in 1964, drew strongly on the Napoleonic Code. The period since the fall of communism has seen a range of new influences and reform, notably driven by European integration. As to tort specifically, Article 415 of the Civil Code sets out the general rule: ‘Anyone who by a fault on his part causes damage to another person is obliged to remedy it.’ For present

104 See, e.g., CCT 48/00, Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Security, [2001] ZACC 22, which altered the preconstitutional approach to determining the wrongfulness of omissions in delictual liability.
106 Cipla Medpro, supra note 105, para. 39. In addition, in South Africa delictual liability for tortious interference with contractual relations is well developed. See, most recently, the discussion in CCT 185/13, Country Cloud Trading CC v. MEC, Department of Infrastructure Development, Gauteng, [2014] ZACC 28.
107 Kühn, ‘Development of Comparative Law in Central and Eastern Europe’, in Reimann and Zimmermann, supra note 58, at 218.
purposes, Article 422 sets out a rule of particular interest: ‘Liability for damage is borne not only by the direct perpetrator but also by any person who incites or aids another to cause damage and a person who knowingly takes advantage of damage caused to another person.’

Unlike the German Civil Code, the French Civil Code includes no specific provision on instigation. The general clause on responsibility, now Article 1240, simply provides that ‘(a)ny human action whatsoever which causes harm to another creates an obligation in the person by whose fault it occurred to make reparation for it’. Nonetheless, the general principle manifests in French civil law in three ways. First, there is the possibility that the instigator will be treated as a joint wrongdoer under Article 1240 – the key here will be a demonstration of causation. Second, in French law, the institution of the partie civile allows one who has suffered harm to initiate or join criminal proceedings and seek damages in that process. Given that instigation is captured by the French Penal Code, a civil action may accompany a criminal prosecution. And, third, French law recognizes third party responsibility for inducing breach of contract. As noted previously, it would be strange if a legal system imposed responsibility for inducing breach of contract but did not do so for the instigation of delictual wrongs.

This analysis of the French position is generally applicable to Brazil. Brazilian private law is broadly in the civilian tradition, with historical influences from Portuguese colonial power and French and German civilian principles. The Civil Code, promulgated in 2002 and influenced by the Constitution of 1988, sets out the basic principle that ‘(t)hose who, by voluntary action or omission, negligence or recklessness, violate a right or cause damage to another, even if exclusively of moral character, commit a wrongful act’. Except for service contracts, there is no explicit provision for instigation. However, much as in France, the general principle manifests in three ways. First, there is the possibility that an instigator of a civil wrong is found to

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110 Ibid., Art. 422.
111 Code civil (2016), Art. 1240 (translated by J. Cartwright, B. Fauvarque-Cosson and S. Whittaker); see also Art. 1241.
118 Ibid., Art. 608.
be a co-author of the wrong pursuant to Article 942 of the Civil Code. Second, a crime that causes harm automatically entails a form of civil responsibility in Brazilian law. Given that instigation is a mode of criminal responsibility, a judgment against an instigator gives rise to an obligation to pay compensation. And, third, case law and scholarship recognize broad extra-contractual responsibility for inducing breach of contract, responsibility based on the opposability of contracts in line with their social function.

Finally, with respect to Iran, certain procedures and principles in jurisdictions influenced by Islamic law indicate a blurring of the categories of tort and crime as they would be perceived in, say, a common law jurisdiction. This includes, in some instances, the waiving of retributive justice in favour of compensation. In Iran, specifically, the Penal Code incorporates compensatory elements, while a separate regime of civil responsibility for intentional torts is less well developed. For this reason, it may be appropriate to look directly to penal law. In general terms, Islamic law condemns those who instigate others to do wrong. Mohammad Hedayati-Kakhki points to the Quranic injunction that ‘whoever recommends and helps a good cause becomes a partner therein; and whoever recommends and helps an evil cause, shares in its burden’. In Iran, the basic principle informs Article 126 of the Islamic Penal Code of 2013, which includes as an accessory to an offence ‘[a]nyone, who encourages or threatens or suborns or incites someone else to commit an offense, or through a plot, deception, or abuse of power causes an offense to be committed’. It may also be seen in the criminal codes of Pakistan and Egypt, both of which are informed by Sharia.

E Conclusion

The preceding analysis shows widespread acceptance of responsibility for instigation in civil law across domestic jurisdictions. A cursory examination of the relevant provisions in Israel, Switzerland and South Korea demonstrates a similar approach. Moreover, two recent European tort law harmonization projects include the principle

119 Ibid., Art. 942.
120 Brazilian Criminal Code, 7 December 1940, Art. 91, I (entered into force 1 January 1942).
125 Hedayati-Kakhki, ‘Islamic Law’, in Bohlander and Reed, supra note 61, at 342, citing the Qur’an 4:85.
126 Islamic Penal Code (2013), Art. 126(1); see also Art. 127.
127 See Law no. 58 Promulgating the Penal Code (EG), as amended up to Law no 95 of 2003 (1937), Art. 40; Majmu’ah-yi ta’zirat-i Pakistan (1947), Art. 107.
128 Israeli Civil Wrongs Ordinance, 1 October 1968, Art. 12.
129 Federal Act on the Amendment of the Swiss Civil Code (Swiss Code of Obligations), 1 January 1912, Art. 50(1).
130 South Korean Civil Code, 22 February 1958, Art. 760(3).
in their model codes.\textsuperscript{131} Article 9:101(1)(a) of the Principles of European Tort Law proposed by the European Group on Tort Law provides that liability is solidary where ‘a person knowingly participates in or instigates or encourages wrongdoing by others which causes damage to the victim’.\textsuperscript{132} Article 4(102) of the Principles of Non-Contractual Liability Arising out of Damage Caused to Another proposed by the Study Group on a European Civil Code provides: ‘A person who participates with, instigates or materially assists another in causing legally relevant damage is to be regarded as causing that damage.’\textsuperscript{133}

In other words, there is attention across jurisdictions to capturing those who instigate or incite or procure the commission of a wrong. This should be no surprise. In our everyday description of events, it is common to trace out participants in wrongdoing beyond the principal wrongdoer. Moreover, this linguistic attention matches a strong moral intuition about the responsibility of those who instigate others to do wrong.\textsuperscript{134} Indeed, to take this point one step further, it would be more surprising if legal systems did not sanction, in one way or another, such a common form of complicit behaviour.

5 Transposing the General Principle

A Introduction

It is clear, then, that in a representative set of domestic jurisdictions it is wrongful for an actor to instigate another to commit an act that it would be wrongful for it to do itself. Recognition \textit{in foro domestico} is not, itself, enough. It is widely accepted that there is another step in the analysis – the principle must be transposable into international law.\textsuperscript{135} As Oscar Schachter wrote, the ‘most important limitation on the use of municipal law principles arises from the requirement that the principle be appropriate for application on the international level’.\textsuperscript{136} This section proposes that it would be appropriate to transpose the general principle into the international legal system. First, it contends that all of the arguments that justify the embrace of the rule prohibiting aid or assistance are present, if not heightened, when we consider instigation. Second, it considers three objections to the transposition of the general principle.

B Justifying the Principle in the International Legal System

At the outset, it can be noted that the rule on aid or assistance in Article 16 has relatively quickly grounded itself in international practice. As far as is possible to tell, no state has objected to the basic principle in Article 16 since its inclusion in ARSIWA or,
more importantly, since the ICJ declared it to reflect customary international law. This
acceptance is remarkable given that, in Vaughan Lowe’s description, Article 16 repre-
sents ‘a significant development in ... the moral sophistication of international law’.

That increased sophistication lies in the rule’s demand that states attend to the
consequences of their conduct beyond their direct bilateral relations. In doing so,
it serves the legal interests protected by the relevant primary norms. Where those
primary rules are peremptory, there is additional justification based on the norma-
tive value of the underlying interests. In addition, the rule in Article 16 serves the
interest of the international community in the stability of legal relations. Whether
located in a general principle of abuse of rights or more broadly in the idea of an interna-
tional rule of law, the prohibition of aid or assistance is of potentially systemic
importance.

For present purposes, the key point is that whatever justifications may be found for
a complicity rule based on assistance are present, and, indeed, heightened, when we
consider conduct that amounts to instigation. To reiterate, in the classic case, the insti-
gating state provides to the principal state a reason for action – it ‘renders some course
of action more eligible in the eyes of the second actor than it would otherwise have been’.
Although it is possible to construct hypotheticals pointing the other way, there is an intuitive sense in the ordinary case that instigators bear a closer connection
to the commission of the principal wrong than assisters. To use Vladyslav Lanovoy’s
telling phrase, a prohibition on instigation is a way for international law to ‘endeavour
for its own legality’.

Moreover, there are at least two features of interstate relations that render
the introduction of a prohibition on instigation especially appropriate. First, although states may formally be bound by the same obligation, the constraining
force of that rule in practice can vary radically from one state to another. To take
the example set out in the introduction from refugee law, it is certainly the case
that some states feel unconstrained both externally and internally by their inter-
national obligations. Other states, particularly those with effective internal av-
enues of accountability – through parliamentary oversight, judicial review or
strong civil society – may be pulled into compliance. To allow a state to instigate
the breach by another state of an obligation they share is to undermine whatever
legality constraints exist within the former state. It is to allow a state to do its dirty
work through another state.

137 Lowe, supra note 18, at 12.
138 Ibid., at 12–13. For a nuanced discussion, see Aust, supra note 14, at 11–49.
139 See Lanovoy, supra note 68, at 165–168.
140 See relatedly ARSIWA, supra note 9, Art. 41.
141 Lanovoy, ‘Responsibility for Complicity in an Internationally Wrongful Act: Revisiting a Structural
Norm’, SHARES Conference: Foundations of Shared Responsibility in International Law, November
2011, at 1, 4.
142 See Aust, supra note 14, at 50–96.
143 Hart and Honoré, supra note 5, at 54 (emphasis in original).
144 Lanovoy, supra note 141, at 32.
Second, and relatedly, the international legal system is marked by substantial disparities in power and resources among its primary subjects. These disparities, which need not be laboured, open up the particular possibility that powerful states will secure their ends through weaker states. Two examples will suffice. First, after the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the USA was able to secure bilateral non-surrender agreements with a number of state parties, despite the likely inconsistency of such agreements with those state parties’ obligations under the statute.145 Second, Australia’s determination to ensure offshore processing of refugees and asylum seekers prompted it to engage in consultations with Kiribati, Fiji, Palau, Tuvalu, Tonga and France (in respect of French Polynesia) as well as Papua New Guinea and Nauru where detention centres were subsequently established.146 The potential inducement was a substantial aid package.147

These examples are not provided as an assessment of international responsibility in the particular case. Rather, they simply show how disparities in power operate in practice and enable states to secure their ends through other states. Moreover, where these disparities map onto different compliance constraints, states may be tempted to instigate other states to do what they cannot do themselves. These structural features of the international system simply serve to strengthen the case for a prohibition on complicity based on instigation, which should accompany the existing rule in Article 16 of ARSIWA.

C Three Objections to the Rule

The previous section argued that it would be appropriate to transpose the general principle from domestic law into international law. The present section considers three potential objections to the transposition of the rule. These concern the potential evasion of responsibility by the principal wrongdoer where an instigator is held responsible; the idea that determining responsibility for instigation would require an implausible assessment of the principal state’s psychological motive; and difficulties around causation and proof thereof.

Thus, to the first, in his seventh report on state responsibility, Ago’s rejection of responsibility for instigation148 was strongly influenced by the idea that any such responsibility might imply that the principal state could absolve itself of responsibility for its wrongful conduct.149 To Ago, such an outcome would be inconsistent with the


148 As noted above, Ago preferred the term incitement to instigation, though nothing turns on this difference. See Ago, supra note 30, at 57, para. 67, using the terms incitement and instigation interchangeably.

149 Ibid., at 55, para. 62.
principal state’s very sovereignty – its own free choice in committing the internationally wrongful act.\textsuperscript{150} As he put it, ‘[t]he decision of a sovereign State to adopt a certain course of conduct is certainly its own decision, even if it has received suggestions and advice from another State, which it was at liberty not to follow’.\textsuperscript{151} In addition to this conceptual worry, it would clearly be deleterious if the existence of responsibility for instigation allowed a principal state to shift blame and, potentially, to reduce its incentives to ensure its own compliance with international law.

On reflection, though, this worry is more imagined than real. It is hard to see why the imposition of responsibility on an instigating state would mean that the principal state needs to be absolved. Of course, where there is more than one responsible actor, we need to think carefully about the allocation of remedial consequences among those actors, including with respect to the incentivizing effects of particular rules. But, more fundamentally, although Ago is correct that the wrongful conduct of the principal state remains its own, the next step of his argument – that this means there can be no responsibility for instigation – does not follow. In neither domestic private law, domestic criminal law nor international criminal law is responsibility for instigation (or abetment) taken to absolve the principal wrongdoer.

A second objection to responsibility for instigation is also found in Ago’s seventh report. Discussing the responsibility of states for participating in the wrongs of other states, Ago forcefully rejected any analogy to municipal criminal law and its doctrines of incitement to commit an offence – a comparison he described as facile.\textsuperscript{152} The basis of his rejection was his understanding of the conceptual foundation of incitement in municipal law: ‘This legal concept has its origin and justification in the psychological motives determining individual conduct, to which the motives of State conduct in international relations cannot be assimilated.’\textsuperscript{153} This second claim – that to impose responsibility for instigation would be to assimilate the ‘motives of State conduct in international relations’ to the psychological motives underpinning prohibitions on incitement for individuals in domestic law – is not all that easy to understand. If this is an argument about the problems relating to fault in a general sense and its applicability to states, it can be noted that, wherever the fault element on a prohibition of instigation comes out, it will not raise significantly different questions from the overarching issue of state fault more generally.\textsuperscript{154} More importantly, it is doubtful that it makes no sense to say that states (and their agents) can influence the decision-making of other states (and their agents). This does not demand an inquiry into some deep-seated motive of either party. All it requires is the recognition that states as sovereign actors in the international legal system can be influenced by other states in the exercise of that sovereign will.

\textsuperscript{150} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., para. 63; see also Graefrath, supra note 20, at 373.
\textsuperscript{152} Ago, supra note 30, at 55, para. 63 (emphasis added).
\textsuperscript{153} Ibid.
Moreover, we need not think about this point only on the conceptual level. If we look to treaty law, we see a set of obligations prohibiting states from instigating other states to do certain things. So, for instance, under Article I of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, each nuclear weapon state party undertakes ‘not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons’. Under Article 1(c) of the Mine Ban Treaty, each state party ‘undertakes never under any circumstances … to assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention’. And under Article 1(d) of the Chemical Weapons Convention, state parties likewise undertake never to assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in activities prohibited under the convention. The point is not to draw any general rule from this specific treaty practice. Instead, this practice serves to tell us that the idea of state instigation makes sense to states themselves – they are willing to undertake obligations of this kind. Indeed, the inclusion of obligations of instigation in specific treaties undermines Ago’s conceptual claim and also shows that states, in some circumstances, recognize the importance of a prohibition on instigation for sustaining compliance with whatever principal ends they seek to secure.

Moving beyond these conceptual objections, it is nonetheless true that cases of instigation do throw up a particular causal problem. This is the third potential objection to the rule. In cases of instigation, we are dealing with conduct that seeks to affect the decision-making of other states – conduct that renders a particular course of action more eligible. Essential to any coherent idea of responsibility for complicity is that the accomplice’s acts be successful – as John Gardner puts it, I am ‘complicit … only because my assistance actually assists and my encouragement actually encourages’. We see this idea in the commentary to Article 16 of ARSIWA: ‘[T]he aid or assistance must be given with a view to facilitating the commission of the wrongful act, and must actually do so.’ The problem, then, is how we can know whether one state’s acts of instigation really affected the decision of the other state. It is entirely possible that the putative acts of instigation were causally superfluous.

This problem is real, though it should not be overstated. One response is that domestic systems of criminal complicity have long faced a similar problem in respect of the (sometimes inscrutable) human mind. Smith explains that in these cases of

156 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer or Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction 1997, 2056 UNTS 211, Art. 1(c).
158 Ibid.
159 Gardner, supra note 12, at 137 (emphasis added).
160 ARSIWA Commentary, supra note 12, Art. 16(5) (emphasis added).
163 Jackson, supra note 16, at 43–45.
instigation (and its related forms), something like a doctrine of presumed effect operates.\textsuperscript{164} Acts intended to induce another actor to act in a particular way that are brought to her attention are presumed to do so in the absence of evidence to the contrary.\textsuperscript{165} There is no reason that a similar doctrine would not work in the international legal system. A second point of qualification is that there will be cases where it is not difficult to draw a causal inference; factual uncertainty is defeated by the specifics of the case. Again, to draw broadly on the Australian case referred to above, even if there were no public documents relating to the establishment of offshore detention centres, the involvement of Nauru in detaining people seeking to reach Australia would give strong grounds to infer that some inducement has been offered and accepted.

Finally, the factual uncertainty that inheres in the remaining cases of instigation only finds particular salience where the matter comes before a tribunal.\textsuperscript{166} However, to envisage the possible compliance effects of a rule only by the possibility of judicial decision is to miss the other ways that international law affects decision-making. Internally – that is, within the bureaucratic organs of the putative assisting state – these effects may exist regardless of any factual uncertainty faced by an outsider. Externally, the proposed rule gives injured states the language to invoke the responsibility of other states that instigated the breach.

\section*{D Interim Conclusion}

Before setting out the contours of the proposed rule, it is worth returning to the function of general principles in the international legal system. As argued above, two functions are adopted for the purposes of this article: general principles as gap-fillers and general principles as an aid in the interpretation of other rules of international law. As to the former, the general principle under consideration is transposed into international law and exists as a primary rule of international law in its own right. As to the latter, the general principle under consideration aids in the interpretation of the conduct element of the customary prohibition on aid and assistance reflected in Article 16 of ARSIWA. In either case, it is wrongful for a state to instigate another state to commit an act that it would be wrongful for it to do itself.

\section*{6 The Contours of the Rule}

Before concluding, the contours of the proposed rule can be sketched – what the general principle would look like when transposed into the international legal system. This task is simplified by the adoption, entrenchment and acceptance of the rule on assistance in Article 16 of ARSIWA. Indeed, as noted above, the rule proposed herein is simply an extension of the forms of complicity prohibited by international law to capture one that is widely included within other systems of accomplice liability. On this basis, in formal terms, the rule might look like this:

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{164} Smith, supra note 162, at 87.
\item \textsuperscript{165} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{166} For a related thought on ARSIWA, supra note 9, Art. 16, see Lowe, supra note 18, at 14.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
A State which instigates another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if:

(a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and

(b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State.

Much attention has been paid in recent practice and scholarship to the elements of the rule in Article 16 of ARSIWA. Borrowing therefrom, four elements constitute the proposed rule. First, as to the conduct of the instigating state, it must provide to the assisted state a reason for action—it must make the breach of international law more eligible in its eyes. This will most likely be a promise of reciprocal benefit either before or simultaneously with the principal act but unconnected to its execution or subsequent to it. In such cases, the existing rule on assistance in Article 16 does not capture the instigating state’s conduct.

Second, the instigating conduct must significantly contribute to the principal state’s decision to violate its obligations. This is a materiality requirement, which excludes conduct that makes little difference to the overall decision-making process. Such a requirement is justified by complicity’s derivative structure—it links one actor to another’s wrongdoing. As discussed above, it is here where a doctrine of presumed effect might operate in specific cases to defeat factual uncertainty.

Third, the instigating state must act intentionally. As has been widely discussed, the fault element of the rule of assistance is a matter of controversy, one created by the conflicting standards in the text of Article 16 (knowledge) and its commentary (intention) and exacerbated by cross-jurisdictional peculiarities in understandings of intention. This debate matters less for present purposes for, barring exceptional cases, instigation is, paradigmatically, conduct undertaken intentionally. We instigate others in order to get them to act in a particular way.

Finally, the rule requires that the principal conduct that constituted the wrongful act would have been wrongful if committed by the instigating state. This is the double obligation requirement, an element of the rule in Article 16 of ARSIWA that has received quite detailed consideration in the literature. Said to flow from the pacta tertiis principle, under Article 16 of ARSIWA, no responsibility arises where State A assists State B’s breach of a bilateral treaty between States B and C. Thus, likewise, it is only where the principal state’s conduct would also have been wrongful for the instigating state that responsibility arises.

167 Hart and Honoré, supra note 5, at 54.
168 ARSIWA Commentary, supra note 12, Art. 16(5).
169 Jackson, supra note 16, at 157–158.
171 ARSIWA Commentary, supra note 12, Art. 16(5).
173 See, e.g., Aust, supra note 14, at 249–268.
174 See Lowe, supra note 18, at 7–8.
7 Conclusion

In its commentary to the rule on assistance in Article 16 of ARSIWA, the ILC proposed that ‘a State cannot do by another what it cannot do by itself’. This basic, compelling idea is as applicable to cases of instigation as to cases of assistance. This is borne out across domestic systems of private law. How a transposed general principle evolves and adapts in the international legal system cannot be determined in advance. Nonetheless, there is a strong case that international law does prohibit states from instigating other states to do what it would be wrongful for them to do themselves.

175 ARSIWA Commentary, supra note 12, Art. 16(6).
176 Ellis, supra note 55, at 971.