How Should We Think about the Winners and Losers from Globalization? A Reply to Nicolas Lamp

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Abstract

How should we think about the winners and losers from globalization? What role can narrative analysis play in doing so? We argue that to be useful, identifying politically relevant narratives on the distributional effects of globalization, and the role played by trade agreements in fostering such effects, must have an empirical basis. Characterizing different narratives and inferring from each the implications for the (re-)design of international agreements without analysis whether the suggested policy reforms will help losers from globalization does not advance matters. Effectively employed, narrative analysis can extend our knowledge of the politics of trade and policy towards globalization more generally. To do so, it must have an analytical foundation, centre on the relationship of the narrative to the facts, ask which narrative is more persuasive based on empirical evidence and assess whether inferred policy implications will address the core issues of concern to those who employ the narrative.

We tell ourselves stories in order to live. — Joan Didion, ‘The White Album’

1 Introduction

In his article in this issue, Nicolas Lamp argues that there are three answers to the question ‘how should we think about the winners and losers from globalization?’ suggested by three different narratives: a so-called ‘Trump narrative’, an ‘establishment narrative’.

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narrative’ and a ‘critical narrative’.1 In presenting the narratives, Lamp takes no view on their merits; his purported goal is simply to characterize what he regards as salient narratives and infer from each the implications for the (re-)design of international economic agreements. In this commentary, we take issue with the approach taken to his research question. We do so as international economists. Before proceeding, we briefly characterize some differences in the approaches taken by economists and lawyers on such policy questions since we believe these are important in understanding our critique of the article.

International trade lawyers and economists are both interested in understanding and addressing the perceived undesirable social outcomes that accompany globalization (which we understand as the international integration of markets in what follows – that is, economic openness). There has been extensive research and analysis by economists that investigates the effects of economic openness and international cooperation (trade agreements). This shows that integration (openness) boosts gross domestic product and average per capita incomes and that there are distributional effects, both within and across countries. The latter is particularly salient from a global equity perspective: one of the major consequences of globalization has been to reduce cross-country wealth disparities and absolute poverty in numerous low-income countries.

International legal scholarship on the economic and social dimensions of international integration has tended to centre on a human rights perspective and on using trade and other international legal frameworks to promote the justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights. The main interest of international trade lawyers is on the consistency of actions in light of some legal benchmarks – for example, national statutes or trade agreements. The question of the rationale for an adopted policy measure or its effectiveness in achieving a given goal is not a central concern. When focusing on government or private behaviour, lawyers ask whether this complies with international law and the arguments that can be (or have been) taken to the relevant tribunal(s). Insofar as current law is deemed inadequate, lawyers may suggest changes to statutes and/or trade agreements to fill the gap, but whether this will in fact serve to address a perceived problem is often a matter of presumption or assumption. Legal scholarship is not focused on identifying first-best policies or on the consideration of the trade-offs associated with alternative policies.

Economists, in contrast, tend to be concerned with tracing cause and effect. They are trained to ask ‘why’ one observes a given (undesirable) outcome – that is, to analyse the likely cause(s) – so as to be able to identify the source of a problem and target a policy response accordingly. Economists are also trained to assess the relative merits of alternative policy responses (proposals) in terms of their effectiveness and efficiency in realizing a given (political) objective and identifying the trade-offs associated with different policy options. Economists will want to see evidence that trade agreements are an important source of inequality, macro-economic imbalances, ‘unfair’ trade or whatever and that rewriting extant agreements is likely to have a significant impact in improving whatever the issues of concern are. Ultimately, economists are interested in the impact and effectiveness of policies, which calls for the empirical analysis of cause and effect.
These differences in approaches can lead to different perceptions of phenomena such as the distributional effects of globalization. International trade lawyers tend to look at this through the lens of trade treaties, without establishing whether there is a strong empirical basis for attributing distributional outcomes at a given point in time to international agreements (cooperation). A corollary is that there may be no empirical basis for suggestions to change the rules of the road embodied in a trade agreement. Whether more desirable outcomes will be (can be) achieved by reforming international agreements depends on the changes addressing the cause of an undesirable outcome. If they do not, little will be achieved.

Whether the narratives presented by Lamp are empirically founded, whether the policy implications that are attributed to each narrative will help address the central issue identified by each story or, more fundamentally, whether these policy implications would help losers is not addressed. Lamp’s approach can be regarded as one where what matters is how public opinion evaluates different narratives of globalization – that is, understanding what makes for a ‘winning’ argument. This makes it uninteresting to ask about the relationship of the narrative to the facts of the matter (the purpose of the narrative is persuasion, not analysis) and to ask which narrative is more persuasive, based on empirical evidence – the approach that would be applied by economists. By not offering a conceptual framework for evaluating the alternatives, but simply juxtaposing one against the other, the presumption is that persuasiveness will be determined in the political process of which the narratives are a part.

Our bias as economists is that engaging with the question of winners and losers of globalization must involve some intellectual benchmark (conceptual framework) for evaluating alternatives. There may be some value in recounting alternative narratives about the effects of economic integration but this should not extend to an uncritical description of the suggested changes to trade agreements associated with the different narratives. Discussing whether these changes will make a difference, and, if they will, do so in more than a marginal fashion, and at what cost, seems to us (as economists) to be first-order questions that should not be ignored by analysts.

Given this brief and no doubt over-simplified characterization (hopefully, not too much of a caricature) of differences in the approaches taken by the two professions, we first describe in this comment how we perceive what Lamp does in his article and then discuss how the narratives of ‘winners and losers from globalization’ might have been analysed. The discussion proceeds in two parts: the first accepts the goal of identifying politically relevant narratives but disagrees with the presentation in Lamp’s article; the second argues that the first part of the programme (identifying narratives) is simply uninteresting without offering some kind of analysis. The first part of our critique is fully continuous with, and internal to, what we would characterize as an ‘international law’ approach. The second part is more of an ‘international economist’s’ critique and, thus, in fairness, external to Lamp’s analysis.
2 Narrative Analysis

Virtually every branch of the humanities and social sciences contains an extensive literature, sometimes more than one, on the analysis of narrative. One minimal definition of narrative analysis involves two components: (1) the events, the actions, the agents, and the objects that make up the stuff of a given narrative and (2) the shape that those events, actions, agents, and objects take when they are selected, arranged, and represented in one or another medium. For most such analysis, the second of these components has at least two elements: temporal order (stories have a beginning, a middle and an end, although this order need not be used in telling the story) and social context (to comprehend something as a narrative, we must understand the context in which it takes place). Beyond this, there are nearly as many specific developments of this approach as there are people deploying them. In all of these cases, narrative analysis usually serves some analytical purpose. It is precisely to develop analyses of matters where temporal order and social context play a fundamental role that the language and tools of narrative analysis get used.

Unfortunately, Lamp uses narrative to avoid critical analysis rather than to confront it. Indeed, he explicitly eschews analysis. He identifies three narratives with a specific person (Donald Trump), an ill-defined establishment and a rhetorical position (critical). The last two labels lack clarity and may overlap. Those characterized as ‘establishment’, in fact, may be as critical of trade agreements as those mapped to the critical narrative. Trump himself is highly critical of trade agreements, but so are many mainstream trade economists. In what follows, as a first step towards greater analytical clarity, we identify each narrative with its core content or focal point: jobs, aggregate welfare and the global class struggle.


4 While it is true that Trump often talks about jobs, as Lamp notes in passing, his globalization discourse focuses on many other elements: bad deals (the inability of other leaders to do what he can); the role of the USA as a singular power (and the benefits that should flow from that); the current account (as a measure of ‘winning’) and so on. In his discourse these, and many other elements, are not obviously separable from jobs. Thus, while Lamp’s analysis mostly focuses on jobs, it is not clear to us that this is an accurate characterization of a ‘Trump narrative’. At the same time, many other public figures deploy a narrative about globalization and jobs, providing a justification for the clearer label ‘jobs narrative’.
3 Lamp’s Three Narratives Re-labelled

The ‘jobs narrative’ (Lamp’s ‘Trump’ narrative) emphasizes a claim about the relationship between globalization and jobs. The building blocks of this narrative are: at time \( t_1 \), specific people have specific jobs; at time \( t_2 \), there is a globalization shock (trade or migration); and, at time \( t_3 \), some of those specific people are no longer employed in their original jobs. None of these elements are controversial. By themselves, they do not constitute a story. We need two forms of context: positive and normative. The positive context is a causal claim that the globalization shock that precedes the job loss in fact causes the job loss. Clearly, some specific jobs are lost as a result of trade, given that resources will shift from sectors in which an economy does not have comparative advantage towards sectors in which it does. What is controversial is that we can identify jobs lost as a result of globalization relative to those lost as a result of, say, technological change, demographic trends, changes in demand or shifts in production within countries as some regions or cities become more or less attractive for investors.

A key device used by Lamp is to assert that such empirical identification and attribution challenges (the truth or falsity of each narrative) is simply irrelevant. What matters \( \text{qua} \) narrative then is whether or not this assertion is convincing. No evidence is offered to the effect that it is, in fact, convincing.

A trickier claim is the putatively normative one. As Lamp develops the jobs narrative, the normative claim is that workers have a right to a specific job (that is, the one they had at \( t_1 \)). The proof of this is that people making this claim, including Donald Trump, deploy the language of theft: ‘[F]oreigners are stealing our jobs.’ However, this just seems like sloppy analysis. A ‘property right’ means something very specific, and virtually no one, at least in a market economy, believes that people have a right to a specific job. What many people do believe, though it is not clear to us that Donald Trump or any of his supporters believe this, is that working age people have a right to some job. It seems clear why Lamp likes the language of rights: it shields him from thinking about the adjustment to a shock and makes the claims of people that gain from trade strictly irrelevant. But arguing that these are not relevant considerations misconstrues the job narrative. A more plausible interpretation of the job theft talk is what economists call the ‘lump of labour fallacy’ – namely, that there is a fixed amount of work in the world. If this were true, the competition over jobs would be zero-sum in nature. And, as Trump’s rhetoric often suggests, one measure of whether the economy

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5 What Lamp means by the statement that ‘whether one accepts the movement of jobs on the basis of comparative advantage as legitimate is a purely normative judgement’ is completely obscure to us. It clearly flows from the notion of property rights in jobs, but such a claim is not part of any narrative that we actually observe.

6 That this is a fallacy is widely accepted in economics. It is often applied to the case of technological change, but, as David Autor has noted, ‘what is fallacious in the “lump of labor fallacy” is the supposition that there are a limited number of jobs. ... It is not fallacious, however, to posit that as workers are displaced from older to newer activities technological advances create winners and losers’. D. Autor, U.S. Labor Market Challenges over the Longer Run (2010), at 1. The same observation is true of trade.
is ‘winning or losing at trade’ is the total number of jobs. This says nothing about specific workers and specific jobs.

Instead, it is more reflective of a mercantilist logic where the ‘theft’ is from the economy as a whole. Thus, there are not ‘property rights in jobs’. We are then back to a couple of highly debatable positive claims: the lump of labour argument and whether the total number of jobs in the economy has declined as a result of trade. Lamp recognizes in passing that the total number of jobs has not fallen, as the US economy has 4 per cent unemployment, but then adds a new normative claim: that some jobs (that is, manufacturing and mining) are ‘better’ than others (services). While it is not clear how ‘better than’ works here, Lamp simply notes that it is reflected in some of Trump’s statements. To this is added a final normative claim: that foreigners (firms and/or governments) gain jobs by ‘cheating’. While China engages in practices that would be illegal in the USA, it is an open question how much these acts determine Chinese export success or what role trade agreements have played in China’s success. Lamp is uninterested in such positive questions and evaluates the normative questions only in terms of its claimed rhetorical success, for which he offers no evidence.

The aggregate welfare narrative (the ‘establishment narrative’) emphasizes short-term adjustment costs associated with aggregate gains from trade. The building blocks of this narrative contain all of the elements of the jobs narrative but are embedded in a different context. This context again has positive and normative elements. The positive claim is that the job loss is transitional: post-transition, national income will exceed pre-transition national income, evaluated at world prices. The normative claim is a very loose utilitarian one; if total output (income) is higher post-adjustment (the

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7 The ‘establishment’ is held to be epitomized by institutions engaged in the ‘governance of global trade’. Here, Lamp implicitly channels the populist trope that nation-states have lost sovereignty to faceless, unelected and unaccountable bureaucrats (indeed, this is an alternative narrative that could have been considered as it is salient to the political backlash to openness). We think ‘aggregate welfare narrative’ is a more accurate and informative label for this narrative as that is its core feature. It could also be called the ‘mainstream economics’ narrative. Recognizing that the core feature of this narrative is aggregate welfare would avoid making it a strawman in the ‘critical narrative’. Staff of international organizations and many mainstream economists have been critical of discriminatory trade agreements on welfare (efficiency) grounds and have pointed out the income redistributive dimensions of intellectual property protection. Indeed, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’s secretariat staff did so during the Uruguay Round, as have World Bank staff. See, e.g., Subramanian, ‘TRIPs and the Paradigm of the GATT: A Tropical, Temperate View’, 13(4) World Economy (WE) (1990) 509; W. Martin and L.A. Winters (eds), The Uruguay Round and Developing Economies (1996); J.M. Finger and P. Schuler, ‘Implementation of Uruguay Round Commitments: The Development Challenge’, 23 WE (2000) 511.

8 There is nothing normative about this claim, it is strictly empirical. It may be true or false.

9 This is very far from being a formally well-grounded utilitarian claim. Lamp’s assertion that the ‘establishment narrative’s case for trade is hence a utilitarian one’ is technically false. Under a variety of rather special assumptions, this theory can deliver such a utilitarian claim, but it is far from general. As has been clear since the foundational work in this area by Bergson and Samuelson, our normative judgments must be explicit in such cases. See Bergson, ‘A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Economics’, 52(2) Quarterly Journal of Economics (1938) 310; P. Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis (1947); Chipman and Moore, ‘The New Welfare Economics 1939–1974’, 19(3) International Economic Review (1978) 547.
positive claim we just noted), something called ‘aggregate welfare’ must be higher. As a rule of thumb, this is one claim that many economists have little difficulty accepting, but we know that it is not a strong normative claim because of transitional (short-term) unemployment and long-run income losses for some workers.

In the short run, the aggregate welfare narrative recognizes that some workers become unemployed as a result of price changes in the world economy, just as they become unemployed as a result of technological changes or demand shifts. It is the movement of workers and resources into alternative employment that produces the gains from trade: the people who are producing the gains for everyone else bear the costs of adjustment. There is no coherent normative system that rationalizes this situation. It is precisely this problem that underlies arguments for adjustment assistance. It is widely, and correctly, noted that, in the absence of support for such displaced workers, the case for trade liberalization is considerably weakened. Once the economy has adjusted, as the US economy has surely done to the China shock, efforts to reverse the effects of the shock will impose adjustment costs again, though presumably on a different group of people. How one is supposed to weigh those competing negative effects is not at all clear.

The long-run problem is different. Changes in relative prices produce permanent changes in the distribution of national income. Some (possibly many) households may experience a reduction in real income. Thus, independently of any increase in aggregate national income, arguments for or against trade liberalization (or protection)

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10 In various places, it is noted that the establishment ‘admits’, ‘acknowledges’ and ‘recognizes’ that losses occur, suggesting a view that this is something its proponents would rather not do. This is misleading.


12 Given the difficulty of identifying trade displaced workers with any precision and that the same problem exists for adjustment to technological change and other shocks, there is no reason to condition this on trade.

13 Since the new equilibrium will involve lower national income, either more people will lose or the losers will lose more than what was lost in the shift to the open equilibrium.

14 Lamp’s notion of a ‘fungibility assumption’ is not a useful device as there is nothing ‘normative’ about recognizing that consumption is paid for out of wages and, thus, consumption is affected both through the effects of prices on the cost of the consumption bundle and the effect on household income. It is quite appropriate to recognize that unemployment has an additional effect on welfare that works through the sense of identity associated with employment. But this latter effect is no more absolute than the effects that work through prices. These are various sources of well-being, but the existence of one does not exclude the other. The extent to which specific people trade off one for the other, or, alternatively, the economic cost of the psychic loss from unemployment, is an essentially positive issue that has been extensively studied in the literature on psychic states. See, e.g., Clark, Geogrellis and Sanfey, ‘Scarring: The Psychological Impact of Past Unemployment’, 68(270) Economica (2001) 221; B. Frey and A. Stutzer, Happiness and Economics: How the Economy and Institutions Affect Well-Being (2002); R. Layard, Happiness: Lessons from a New Science (2005). Such considerations have been incorporated in the literature on the evaluation of trade policies as well. See, e.g., Davidson, Matusz and Nelson, ‘Fairness and the Political Economy of Trade’, 29(8) WE (2006) 989; Kreickemeier and Nelson, ‘Fair Wages, Unemployment and Technological Change in a Global Economy’, 70(2) Journal of International Economics (2006) 451.
must rest on a normative comparison of income distributions. However, unlike the jobs narrative, which has no room for winners, the aggregate welfare narrative says that both winners and losers should be considered when evaluating alternative states of the world.

The global class struggle narrative is fundamentally different in content from the other two narratives. The building blocks shared by the first two narratives do not figure here but seem to be as follows: at \( t_1 \), there is a pre-existing conflict between capital and labour in relatively closed national economies; at \( t_2 \), globalization takes the form of increased mobility of capital; and, in \( t_3 \), the relative gains from economic activity shift in favour of capital relative to labour in all national markets. These building blocks seem plausible as statements of fact, but, without context, they do not constitute a story. As with the other two narratives, there is a positive claim to the effect that globalization is in fact a causal determinant of the redistribution from labour to capital. Although this seems \textit{prima facie} plausible, providing compelling empirical support for this proposition is difficult, but, as with the other two narratives, empirical content is simply ignored as irrelevant to the narrative. Moreover, the normative content is very unclear. There is much discussion of trade agreements, but little attempt to provide the positive and normative context that would make this an actual narrative, instead of just a set of selected talking points about views on international economic agreements held by some authors who either believe that such agreements are a source of ‘the globalization problem’ and that redesigning them can help attenuate (compensate) losers from globalization.

The big shock driving the resurgence of protectionist pressure in the USA today is the growth of China. This has very little to do with international economic agreements and very much to do with changes in domestic Chinese policies – notwithstanding other narratives in which China’s accession to the World Trade Organization is held to be the reason for the relative decline in the share of manufacturing in total employment in the USA. An implication is that redesigning agreements cannot do much to address the concerns embodied in the jobs narrative. Indeed, given that trade treaties do not address major dimensions of this narrative – notably, immigration, corporate tax regimes and exchange rates (foreign macro-economic policies) – the

\footnote{The label ‘critical narrative’ leaves unclear what this narrative is critical about. We prefer the label ‘global class struggle’ as it is clearer as to the content of the narrative as described by Lamp.}

\footnote{Claims that trade agreements are about the protection of assets and efforts to eliminate regulatory differences are often made by opponents of globalization. Here again, some critical discussion would be in order. Trade agreements rarely entail the harmonization of regulatory standards – not least because the USA would not stand for it. Protection of intellectual property rights is the exception, not the rule. The moves by many governments and the European Union to constrain rent seeking in the area of investment protection and to control investor-state arbitration (for example, the ongoing discussion in the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) on investor-state dispute settlement reform) are examples of states addressing what has come to be perceived as a mistake by many. The issue here is not the compensation of losers of globalization but, rather, learning from experience and a desire to clarify the rules of the road. For UNCITRAL discussions, see \url{https://unctad.un.org/en/working_groups/3/investor-state}.}

\footnote{Hoekman and Nelson, \textit{supra} note 11.}
salience of the ‘critical’ narrative for the jobs narrative is very limited. Lamp makes clear that the different narratives have different policy implications, but this does not help us address the question of how we should think about losers of globalization. What can be said – but was not – is that no matter what one thinks about what is wrong with trade agreements, they are not central to the concerns underlying the two other narratives. Perhaps most important from an American perspective is that the USA does not have trade agreements with many countries and has none with Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, China or South Africa – the BRICS economies. Given that the gains from trade are mostly the result of autonomous policy decisions by foreign governments, the various proposals mentioned to incorporate redistribution of intra-national gains from trade into trade agreements are neither here nor there from the perspective of the losers of globalization.

Given the weakness of the third narrative, in particular, we might ask why choose these three? Why not, say, an environmental narrative, a community narrative or a national strength and security narrative? Perhaps, more importantly, why focus on narratives that presume some kind of globalization as a problem? Where is the consideration of an economic transition narrative (that is, from an industrial to a post-industrial economy)? Where is the narrative of the benefits of globalization that have accrued to many developing countries and the short-term losses that were incurred by some groups in these countries as they became more integrated into the world economy?

4 Why Do a Narrative Analysis?

Narrative analysis is generally deployed to reveal gaps in previously mainstream analysis. Consider two more-or-less randomly selected examples. The Cambridge school of historiography develops a critique of traditional history of political thought, arguing that this misattributes positions to such scholars as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke based on a reading of those texts in terms of the interests of modern scholars rather than in the context of their own time. This is presented explicitly as a narrative analysis. Andrew Abbott develops an argument that, because they cannot treat the sequential element of social action in time, traditional methods of quantitative sociology are unable to deal with time in a serious way. He then goes on to develop methods, rooted in the theory of narrative, that do just that. Such examples could be multiplied many times over. The point here is that, in the place of narrative analysis, Lamp presents an ad hoc discussion of what he regards to be the policy implications of these narratives. Many of these are ad hoc in turn as they are not informed by positive analysis, so we have no idea whether they are likely to be effective in helping the losers

from globalization even if we accept the argument that the focus should be limited to the context of each narrative. The upshot is essentially nihilistic, given the stated presumption that engaging in an effort to assess the empirical foundations of the stories is not of any use. Thus, the reader has no guidance whether the suggested narrativespecific policy implications will help losers from globalization.

Leaving this aside, it is striking that narrativity as a method – one that is employed in many research areas – plays no role in Lamp’s discussion. Effectively used, narrative analysis can extend our knowledge of the politics of trade policy as well as policy towards globalization more generally. Given that the three narratives are positions in a public political discourse, we might be interested in what draws particular participants in this discourse to one or another of the narratives. This would involve a systematic discussion of the objectives of the agents actively deploying a given narrative and an analysis of the elements of the narrative in terms of those objectives. Why, for example, is the lump of labour argument narratively effective independent of its factual content? For whom is it compelling? Why and how was the aggregate welfare narrative effective among decision-making elites (at the national level as opposed to international organizations, which Lamp strangely characterizes as representing the establishment), and why and how did that effectiveness collapse?

An interesting fact is that globalization, and trade, in particular, was simply not part of the public political discourse in the USA from the end of World War II until the 2016 election, despite (unsuccessful) efforts on a number of occasions (John Danforth, Ross Perot and so on). This would produce an analysis directly related to the study of hermeneutics by Elmer Schattschneider and developed by William Riker.20 The details of the narratives in play, successful and unsuccessful, would be an essential part of such an analysis. This would be an interesting use of narrative analysis. Unfortunately, no such effort was made. As a result, Lamp does not help us think about the winners and losers of globalization or whether, within the context of any given narrative – whatever one thinks of it – the policy responses implied by the narrative will address the core issue that is of concern to those who employ it.

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Nicolas Lamp continues the debate with a Rejoinder on our EJIL: Talk! Blog.