Symposium

• de Jonge Oudraat, Chantal

Abstract

The article reviews the UNSCOM experience from 1991 to 1999 and the international community's attempt to neutralize Iraq's WMD threat. It draws some general lessons from this experience and identifies steps that could enhance the effectiveness of future international efforts of this type. It concludes with an assessment of the future of multilateral arms control. From the start UNSCOM encountered many difficulties. Indeed, for the Commission to work effectively it needed the cooperation of Iraq — something the Iraqi government provided only sparingly. Iraqi declarations of its non‐conventional stockpiles and facilities proved time and again to be inaccurate. The scope of Iraqi concealment efforts came to the fore in 1995, with the defection of Saddam Hussein's son‐in‐law Lt. General Hussein Kamel. His revelations took most experts by surprise. It also marked a period of increasing confrontation between UNSCOM and the Iraqi government. Unfortunately for UNSCOM, political unity and cohesion in the UN Security Council began to unravel at precisely that moment. The US and its coalition allies had increasingly divergent ideas about how to resolve the situation with respect to Iraq.